Submarine Reactors from Rickover to Gorshkov and Beyond

My responses to parts of the late 2026 comment string include.

Even the US may have been unable to build a submarine reactor without the political connections, budgeting and engineering brilliance of Admiral Rickover. This Wikipedia entry has seemingly intentionally deleted almost all of Rickover's huge contribution to nuclear power - giving "Mamie Eisenhower" equal opportunity billing. Rickover successfully project micro-managed construction, land and at-sea testing of submarine and surface ship reactors and dictated the regulatory environments for them. He did the same for the land based civilian reactor sector and most things radioactive safety.

Britain totally relied on the US for submarine reactor development from 1959. Britain then refused to admit it benefitted from continuing US assistance and inspiration for PWR1. British nationalistic pride, Rolls Royce commercial objectives and US military industrial reluctance may have amounted to insufficient US assistance for PWR2. This partly explains PWR2's technical shortcomings. I admit I talk too often about PWR2 - yet it has largely incapacitated the 10s of $Billions UK Astute class, while also limiting the UK Vanguard class. Whether the UK can garner sufficient US assistance for PWR3 and PWR3+/4 remains an Anglophone anxiety.

Russia had/has a large enough industrial base, inventive talent, Admiral Gorshkov, set of national priorities (eg. nuclear weapon strategy) and skilled espionage to largely parallel develop submarine reactors. 

China, France and India benefitted from similar strengths as Russia.

Arpit is right in questioning whether middle power, South Korea, can develop submarine reactors like the great-sometimes super powers above. China, a superior innovator and manufacturer to SK, has taken decades longer than China hoped to develop quiet, efficient, submarine reactors. 

Also SK suffers from poor geography. However good the nuclear submarines SK builds they are hemmed in by the Japanese island chain and close proximity to NK and more especially to Chinese and Russian fixed undersea sensors, SSNs, SSKs and other nearby ASW platforms. 

SK and China may be strongly opposed to Japanese naval/military resurgence in the shape of Japanese developed nuclear submarines.

It is only the US that has the benign vast ocean space geography to fully benefit from the speed and other characteristics of nuclear submarines. The US advantage includes "owning" the Western Hemisphere for thousands kms until it gets to adversaries - Bering Strait excepted.

There is much more in the late July 2026 comment string that I'll respond to in future weeks.