On December 13, 2024, Drop Site News published a report that alleged that the Pakistani Government requested help from China in order to create a survivable nuclear second-strike capability. This was in return for eventually allowing the Chinese PLA Navy to build permanent basing facilities at Gwadar. Such a base would have placed China's navy in a better position to influence events in the Middle East, including protecting China's oil and gas sources. The report claimed that the Chinese side rejected Pakistan's request.
Pakistan may have requested the capability to launch nuclear-armed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).Ballistic missile submarines are usually nuclear-powered (SSBNs). SSBNs would undoubtedly be ideal second-strike platforms from a survivability standpoint. But, in my opinion, the cost and complexity of such a platform would place it outside the realistic reach of the Pakistani military for the foreseeable future.
However, as South (and North) Korea have recently proved, a conventionally-powered diesel submarine platform, with or without AIP, can also be utilized for the purpose of ballistic missile launch. Such subs, without the N (for nuclear powered) are called SSBs, which are less survivable than SSBNs due to limited underwater endurance.
However, an SSB (especially one with AIP) can still enhance a country's nuclear deterrence posture. This is achieved by discouraging adversaries from attempting debilitating nuclear first-strikes due to the increased risk factor involved in dealing with a retaliating submerged platform.
The Pakistani SSBs could be a larger variant of the Hangor-class. The Hangors and Chinese Yuans in general, could be seen as a design evolution of the Soviet Kilo-class SSK. A major improvement of the Yuans (and Hangors) over the Kilos are the their Stirling engine-based AIP propulsion.
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| Display model of a Type 032 Qing-class SSB, used by the PLA Navy to test SLBM technologies. --- |
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| Close-up of the SLBM launch tubes on the Type 032 Qing-class. --- |
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| The one and only Type 032 submarine. --- |
It is not entirely clear why China may have rejected Pakistan's request (if the report is true). Might China have rejected any Pakistani request for an SSBN or SSB due to counter-proliferation principles? Or did China feel that the Pakistani offer of Gwadar as a permanent Chinese naval base was an insufficient offer in return for such a capability?
I think it is plausible that such a deal, if and when struck, would likely involve China transferring sufficient technology, under the table, to build an SSB within Pakistan itself. The secrecy would be necessary to avoid China being seen as violating the NPT (to which China is a signatory while Pakistan is not).
Such a transfer of technology might manifest as a continuation of the Type 039A Yuan/Hangor-class production line at Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW). Of the 8 Hangors ordered by Pakistan in 2015, 4 are being built in China and 4 in Karachi.
The Pakistani SSBs could be a larger variant of the Hangor-class. The Hangors and Chinese Yuans in general, could be seen as a design evolution of the Soviet Kilo-class SSK. A major improvement of the Yuans (and Hangors) over the Kilos are the their Stirling engine-based AIP propulsion.
Alternatively Pakistani SSBs could turn out to be an operational variant of China's sole Type 032 Qing-class submarine (pictured above). The Qing is a diesel-electric submarine which has already been used by China to test JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs and related technologies from a conventionally-powered platform, hence the Qing can be considered as having proven itself as an SSB test submarine.
Pakistan May Already Have 5 Nuclear Weapon Submarines
Irrespective of how Pakistan-China negotiations go in future, Pakistan will not be entirely dependent on acquiring a Chinese designed SSB to launch nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has a submarine-launched version of its nuclear capable Babur cruise missile (specifically the Babur III submarine launched cruise missile or SLCM). Pakistan's 2 x conventional Hashmat-class (Agosta-70) and 3 x conventional and AIP equipped Khalid-class (Agosta-90B) submarines may be capable of launching Babur IIIs. Once the 8 x Hangor-class are commissioned they might also carry nuclear tipped Babur III SLCMs.
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| Babur subsonic land-attack cruise missile in flight during a test launch. --- |
Deployed on even conventional submarines the Babur might be a significant second-strike weapon. If it has stealthy, low flying, flight characteristics, the subsonic Babur cruise missile might be somewhat survivable against networked anti-missile systems. The Babur is believed to be powered by a Chinese engine of the same type that powers the CJ-10. The Babur could present a significant complication for any country that might seek to pre-emptively destroy Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and other high value targets.
A Pakistani ship or submarine launched nuclear-tipped missile of any type comes with significant command and control risks. Surface warships in particular that are capable of firing Baburs are hijack risks, as a previous attempt was already made (linked above), helped by elements within the Pakistan Navy who were loyal to extremist causes. However these might be risks the Pakistani National Command Authority considers worth taking to improve the chances of national survival.
As an aside, on December 19, 2024 the US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer stated that Pakistan intends to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with the ability to reach the United States. On December 18, 2024 the US announced further sanctions on agencies and companies involved in Pakistan's missile program, which DNSA Finer labelled an "emerging threat" to the US.
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| Existing (as of 2021) Pakistani missile systems and their reported ranges. Graphic via CSIS. |
Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly could have begun development of a nuclear-powered submarine platform. While it remains to be seen where this project will go, it could present a future export possibility for countries like Pakistan and Iran. A cost sharing program in turn might allow all three countries to pursue a truly survivable second-strike capability in the long term.
Hi Gessler
ReplyDeleteLike North Korea (NK) Pakistan is quite a poor country to develop nuclear missiles and warheads. A major difference is NK, to date, is very stable (a permanent Kim Dynasty dictatorship). While Pakistan has been unstable, with violent, unpredictable military coups and contested elections. The only predictable things about Pakistan has been imprisonment or even Pak Gov
or sponsored terrorist execution of formers leaders.
The US was/is concerned about Pak's instability. Interesting is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%E2%80%93United_States_military_relations#Nonproliferation_and_security
"In the end years of the 2001, the United States provided material and training assistance to Pakistani military in guarding its nuclear material, warheads, and protection of its weapon-testing laboratories that United States paid for almost $US100 million.[17] The assistance program, maintained through the United States...(DoD) and the Pakistan's Ministry of Defence (MoD), included providing the knowledge on building the night-vision devices (NVD), supplying helicopters, and nuclear detection equipment.[17] With the United States' assistance, Pakistan established the National Command Authority (NCA) on the line of U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and uses its Megaport Program at the Port Qasim in Karachi which it deployed the radiation monitoring and imaging equipment monitored by a Pakistani central alarm station.[18] In 2007, the United States offered the Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, for locking its nuclear devices, which Pakistan turned down— possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches".[19]
According to the U.S. defense officials, Pakistan has developed its own technology based on the PAL technology, and the U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.
...On December 10, 2012, the [US and Pak] co-chaired the Pakistan-U.S. Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation (SSS&NP) Working Group in Islamabad. Gottemoeller traveled to Pakistan after former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote in an article that, "Pakistan had moved its nuclear doctrine from minimum deterrence to second strike capability and expanded its arsenal to include tactical weapons that can be delivered by short-range missiles like the Hatf-IX.[25] The meeting ended with an agreement on continuing dialogue on a range of issues related to the bilateral relationship, including international efforts to enhance nuclear security and peaceful applications of nuclear energy."
Clearly US-Pak cooperation might be low noting your advice in the article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2024/12/pakistan-negotiating-with-china-to.html :
"...on December 19, 2024 the US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer stated that Pakistan intends to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with the ability to reach the United States. On December 18, 2024 the US announced further sanctions on agencies and companies involved in Pakistan's missile program, which DNSA Finer labelled an "emerging threat" to the US."
Cheers Pete