May 30, 2024

Australian Nuclear Weapon Hedging: A Work in Progress

In response to  Shawn C's May 29, 2024 comment 

True about Australia having very able and fast snorkelling Collins SSKs. Australia has continuously used SSKs since 1967

Many commentators are then at a loss as to why Australia is moving to SSNs - costing about 5+ times more than SSKs. The answer is the value Australian governments place on the nuclear weapons potential of Australia's future SSNs. Nuclear subs (the world over) make the best nuclear weapon platforms - hence SSBNs. This implication, of course, contradicts Australian governments' spin - spin that Australia is distorting its whole defence budget in favour of SSNs because  SSNs are the best way to fight a conventional war. 

The whole scope of Australian governmental strategy remains unclear. This is a very secret area with many possibilities. It could be the very long term SSN program permits Australian nuclear insurance hedging under the protection of the US and to a lesser degree the UK. Without this protection China could disrupt the nuclear elements Australia is putting in place in case US extended nuclear deterrence proves insufficient  over the next 3 decades. 

Elements already, or soon, in place include: Australia's world largest Uranium reserves; the Australian invented and owned weapons grade suitable SILEX uranium enrichment method; development of dual-use long range Gilmour rockets/missiles; Australia's long history of Hypersonics research; and, Australia's long possession of nuclear device designs which are publicly available (see "restricteddata"). Also see Howard Moreland and "The H-bomb secret".

Australia needs a deterrent against China. Australia projecting even conventional explosives against the Chinese mainland would likely mean a Chinese nuclear response. Australia, against China, has a need for long range strike weapons - with nuclear subs being the most discrete way to move close to the Chinese coast. This will put China's population centres at risk - thereby improving Australia's essential deterrence strategy.

Australia's use of nuclear explosives won't happen in a broader regional proliferation vacuum. It is likely Australia would find justification moving to nuclear explosives after South Korea and Japan have finalised nuclear weapon capabilities (even short of these countries having such weapons). Also the unknown India factor may play a part if India's power projection in the Indian and Southern oceans become somewhere between ambiguous and threatening. What Indonesia does or may likely do might also be a factor.

If the US extends long range nuclear sharing to Australia - something only extended to short range NATO country strike - might be something that heads off Australia needing to develop a complete national nuclear capability.

I have created the acronym SSHN for Submarine, Nuclear Powered with Hypersonic Missiles. Advanced missiles, with hypersonic glide vehicles. These would make even Australian SSHNs (like Virginias (if ever delivered) or then SSN-AUKUSs) a more cost-effective platform than traditional large SSBNs which would be too expensive for Australia - a middle power. The "B" for Ballistic missiles (SLBMs on submarines) are also proving relatively easy to shoot down in the Ukraine and especially in the latest Israel vs Iran conflict. SSHNs can accommodate smaller intermediate range 3,000-5,500km missiles - missiles with a shorter flight-warning time than full-size SLBMs, like the 12,000+km range Trident D5.

So Australia's long held resistance to all things nuclear is being overcome by fear of China - triggering the need, or option, of having Australian nuclear weapons. Alternate Australian nuclear weapon platforms, be they long range bombers or land based ICBMs in silos, are too specialised. Such bombers and ICBMs are also very vulnerable to pre-emptive strike from Chinese submarines that might launch hypersonic or ballistic missiles off Australia's coast. 

All of the above musings are a work in progress. I have never had paid governmental access to any of the above -  so I can write about it. The only thing near access was a tipoff from a two star Australian Defence Attaché, Washington. He advised that many US officers he was talking to repeatedly raised the rhetorical question:

"Do you really think the US would defend Australia against a major nuclear power if the price was US cities getting nuked by that nuclear power?!"

France also gleaned that response - which is why France developed its own nuclear deterrent in the 1960s. 

8 comments:

  1. Pete,

    Australia has a nuclear technology history that's only a decade younger than the US... I had a schoolmaster in grammar school who was ex-SAS(not ASAS) who experienced the Maralinga Tests.. he had a big neck tumour as a souvenir.

    I kind of understand the anti-nuke hysteria in the last century, but I also reckon it put a big crimp in Australia's energy network and reliance on coal.

    That said you have slow population growth - 2 million between 1990 to 2000, then 7.75 in the 24 years after. Australia's energy issues were only partially solved by consumers adopting Chinese-made solar cells, though its still minor (9% of total yearly energy used) compared to coal (27.5%)

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  2. Hi Shawn

    However much reactors should play a part in Australia's energy mix, no Australian voters anywhere want a reactor in their area. Attempts to name sites of reactors are political suicide for even pro-nuclear politicians.

    This is even in pro-Dutton (the champion of Aussie nuclear energy) electorates. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Dutton#Energy_and_emissions

    "Dutton’s nuclear proposal was further criticised by Australia’s big energy retailers, with AGL Energy, Alinta, Energy-Australia and Origin Energy all dismissing nuclear as a viable source of power for their customers for at least a decade, pointing to the long lead time for development and very high cost compared to other energy options, including renewables."

    If the US doesn't share nuclear weapons with Australia we should organise our own:

    Once the Gaza War becomes a memory and China is feared by more Australians I reckon Australia should buy Israel's Plutonium reactor and Reprocessing factory design https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon_Peres_Negev_Nuclear_Research_Center and contract Israelis to build it in Australia. This facility could be built on remote Woomera defence department owned land (of 122,188km2 roughly the size of Pennsylvania) in South Australia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAAF_Woomera_Range_Complex

    "Simple" I say. Locals won't notice all these Israeli accented people suddenly appearing in South Australia :)

    Pete

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  3. Pete,

    I live in a country that had many ‘Mexicans’ staying for two decades, but not one taco in sight. Turns out they preferred a kosher Mediterranean diet 😄

    Reckon Scotty got his wires crossed with his AUKUS obsession, I’m certain Marcon would have happily sold him 6 Attack-class, 6 Barracuda SSNs plus a Nuclear Power station and a uranium processing facility.

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  4. Hi Shawn at 6/04/2024 2:57 AM

    Alas Macron and French Government owned Naval Group have never clearly offered SSNs to Australia because:

    1. France is scared China, a more important trade partner to France than Australia, would block many types of French exports to China (like China did to Australia). "China is the largest trading partner of France outside the EU" https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240507_11293719.html

    2. France is very weak strategically in the Pacific while the Chinese military is becoming strongest there, and

    3. France did not have the political weight, compared to the US plus the UK, to break the SSN proliferation taboo supplying to Australia. France is not even supplying its LEU naval reactor to Brazil's SSN program such are France's non-proliferation sensitivities.

    I calculate Israel (with its opaque approach to nuclear weapons) is more likely to one day below the radar, help Australia build a "prototype power" (really Pu) reactor + reprocessing facility than a France (fearful of China's reaction and a non-proliferation believer).

    Cheers Pete

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  5. Pete

    The more I have studied it, the more I am convinced that the decision to acquire UK or US SSNs was political not technical. That is, France was quite prepared to sell SSN technology or build SSNs for the RAN. Rather, the RAN or cabinet partners chose to go with their long term security partners, UK and USA, not France. France has since been reported as assisting India with SSN technology, which would surely have bothered China more than Australia. Dutton was reported as saying in 2021 that the French SSN was considered and SSNs were offered. IMO it was a mistake for the RAN to reject that option given constraints in both UK and US industry, but that is academic now.
    https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/17/australia-considered-buying-nuclear-submarines-from-france-before-ditching-deal-peter-dutton-says

    That being said, I think your SSHN concept has a lot of merit, especially since, as you say, Ukraine has shown IBMs can be shot down by modern SAMs. The French themselves seem to like this option for their “warning shot” nuclear doctrine. The MdCN ASMP is supersonic, and they are now reportedly developing a hypersonic successor, the ASN4G. The ASMP fits within the dimensions (length, weight, diameter) of the naval (sub launched) MdCN cruise missile, which can be encapsulated and launched via torpedo tube. Why not a sub tube launched ASMP?
    https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EUNPDC_no-80.pdf

    So I think your concept is already technically possible, and could be developed and implemented by France and other nations.

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  6. Pete

    You deal with both the technical and the political in your article, so I have separated my comments into two replies, this one on the political. For the record, I am against Australia acquiring nuclear weapons. Whilst a significant deterrent it also risks responses from other nations. We could see a regional nuclear arms race break out. In this case I think Australia might end up less secure. If such an arms race has broken out I agree Australia willprobably feel it has to join it. But I do not think it is. In Australia’s interest to start it.

    That being said, Australian public opinion is clearly shifting towards a pro-nuclear position, and the Lowi Institute annual issues survey provides evidence of this.

    This year the survey included a question on public acceptance of nuclear energy. The result was a clear majority 61% in favour with 37% opposed. It is noticeable that even the Labor party in arguing against the LNP nuclear policy argues on cost and time to build grounds. It has given up on arguing against nuclear on safety or proliferation grounds, which is a major change from past rhetoric.
    https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/climate-change-and-energy/#report

    The second item of significance is AUKUs and the nuclear submarines themselves. Quite simply, support for RAN SSNs is still strong, with 65% in favour, 32% opposed. Despite a perceived improvement in relations with China, China is still perceived as a threat by 71%, with trust in China and President Xi still very low.
    https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/climate-change-and-energy/#report

    So nuclear weapons remain illegal in Australia. But public acceptance of both nuclear energy and nuclear submarines appears to have permanently shifted. If China remains a threat that may well extend to nuclear weapons in future.

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  7. Hi Anonymous at 6/04/2024 9:16 PM

    As you write the issue of French SSNs for Australia "is academic now."

    Further on SSHNs they can be seen as exceedingly multi-purpose nuclear subs with a major purpose being "Baby Boomers".

    After 2 two multipurpose Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) on 2 Virginia Block IVs (maybe) for Australia I wonder if 3 x VPTs might be optimal for Virginia Block VIs and on SSN-AUKUSs. This might mean 9 or 12 Hypersonic missiles, depending on missile size.

    The French ASN4G or ASMP H missile are interesting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASN4G . And then there's the US https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Range_Hypersonic_Weapon . All early days yet on submarine launched hypersonic missiles (SLHMs).

    Cheers Pete

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  8. Hi Anonymous at 6/04/2024 9:59 PM

    On Lowy's findings regarding increasing popularity of nuclear power/electricity the constant contrarian blocker seems to be Not in My Backyard/Area. Meaning it doesn't matter if nuclear is increasingly popular if building actual plants is politically, in practice, a non-starter.

    Yes SSNs as China inhibitors have wide acceptance. I reckon if South Korea and Japan begin to mature nuclear weapons programs And Australian fears of China continue to grow Then I too agree increasing numbers of Australian will view Australian nuclear weapons as a necessary option.

    If Trump wins in November 2024, Then after entering the Presidency in early 2025 again threatens to withdraw US forces from defending South Korea Then South Korea could take the final step of putting nuclear warheads on their KSS-III ballistic missile submarines. These subs, being SSBs, are clearly designed as platforms for a nuclear warhead option.

    I don't think SK would risk KSS-IIIs merely sending conventional warheads at nuclear armed NK. NK's trump card is nuclear against SKs more powerful conventional forces. Also NK may reason "use them or lose them logic" - that is it is better to fire off its hard won nuclear weapons at SK, rather than merely having its nuclear weapons destroyed in their silos and caves.

    Regards Pete

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