January 2, 2024

France, an Indo-Pacific Middle Power Ally

On December 30, 2023 Anonymous from France commented to the effect:

You [Pete] are right that the French are not a direct substitute for the superpower American alliance against China’s regional "assertiveness" (to be diplomatic).

You have to look through the French perspective.

As the result of hundreds of years, sometimes of colonial presence, about 2 million French citizens are scattered between the Mozambique Strait (in the western Indian Ocean) east to French Polynesia (mid Pacific Ocean). Those French territories [see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overseas_France ] have the same status as the State of Hawaii has to the US.

These overseas French citizens, since 1945, have no desire to be independent. In the case of New Caledonia, 3 consecutive referendums over 20 years defeated  Melanesian nationalist urges, with New Caledonia remaining French. These citizen communities are heavily mixed ethnically and religiously. France’s string of regional alliances with friendly neighbours (eg. India, Australia) is natural and not "projecting power". The French military presence is commensurate with past threats (and "showing the flag").

France understands Australia’s belief in the American alliance against China. Contrary to popular belief the French are nor anti-American – there being a long history of French-American alliance, since 1778, and even earlier.

At the end of the day countries are alone - as the Ukrainians and Israelis will discover probably. [Pete comment: Lucky Israel has nuclear weapons to ensure its independence]. 

Trump [most likely to return as President] is clearly a transactional, mercantilist leader, raising alarm in NATO, but it is just clearer than before. Nothing new under the Sun.

As for Canada, France offered the Rubis SSN at the request of Canada. Canada has a premier LEU Nuclear infrastructure/industry. The veto came from the US to Canada and this is well documented and not the desire to not antagonize the US.

France’s relationship with China is not that different from the relationships to China of other EU members. France is heavily supplying systems to India. France also sold Mirage 2000s and modern La Fayette class frigates to Taiwan, and the current upgrades.

The irony is that Australia rejected the Japanese Soryu submarine deal in 2016 in favour of the French Naval Group Attack class SSK. Australia's rejection of Japan's Soryu was partly to maintain good relations with China...a great trading partner of Australia’s!

2 comments:

  1. Pete and French Anonymous,

    Thanks for another thoughtfully written article. I first started reading Submarine Matters to better understand the AUKUS decision. I assumed that the RAN must have had good reasons for not making the far simpler contractual switch to the French SSN design. From prior studies I had read and my understanding of relations between the RN and RAN, I presumed that the British Astute SSN would be the best fit for the RAN and what Australia would build. However it soon became clear that this would be impossible.

    This was combined with an apparent slowdown in the implementation of AUKUS, starting with the failure to budget to build required infrastructure in the Morrison 2022 budget. I began to have doubts about the reality of AUKUS, especially given known supply problems in both the USN and RN SSN programs. At this point I began to question the official reasons given for not switching to the French Barracuda SSN. When I understood the Barracuda SSNs advantages in both cost and immediacy of construction I switched my preference to it.

    The RAN building the Barracuda SSN seems from an engineering and cost viewpoint to be the fastest, cheapest and most easily constructible SSN option for the RAN, whether built in France of ASC. It does not come with the advantage of close ties to the USN, but basing US SSNs in Perth might ensure the latter anyway.

    I accept that the politics is such that powerful forces are sticking to the US/UK plan, regardless of the real world ability to deliver it. However, I wish that the RAN would at least consider it as a “plan B”. With the prospect of Trump being elected POTUS again in 2024 rising, the US/UK pathway for AUKUS looks very high risk. Without US ITAR approvals, a UK alone pathway does not exist. Are we about to waste another 3 years and $3 billion US?

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  2. Hi Anonymous at 1/05/2024 11:21 PM

    Thanks for your comments.

    Australia utilising SSNs from any source, be they US, UK, France, involves consumer and supply side problems.

    Consumer problems of the RAN include:

    - about 7 years to conclude $100s Billions contracts and initial make payments (our US$3 Billion industrial base deposit doesn't count)

    - 8 years to construct submarine build, deep maintenance and West coast base infrastructure

    - 12 years to fully nuclear train the 1,000s of Australians involved

    Supply side problems include:

    - scarce nuclear submarine builder workforces in US, UK, France - all of whom need to build next generation SSBNs as their highest national and corporate priorities from now to 2040 or so.

    This particularly impacts the UK and France who have very limited builder workforces. So limited are the UK and France that they cannot simultaneously develop/design/build SSNs for Australia while building their SSBNs throughout the whole of the 2030s.

    UK and France can only help Australia after the 2030s IF the UK and France are not overwhelmed by the growing Russia threat (in the UK and France's national security priorities.)

    This leaves the US to supply 3 Virginias in the 2030s, which is a long-shot, which may not happen due to the rising threat of China towards the US.

    Regards Pete

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