In Australia's future SSN-AUKUS case these UK designed SSGNs are
likely to feature VLS and beams larger than the current Astutes' 11.3m. These
would be more than adequate to accommodate a missile the 9.86m size of the old Polaris
A3 MIRVed ballistic missile. These A3s had a range of 4,600km - more than adequate to
hit Beijing from a launch point east of the Japanese home islands.
The misadventures of AUKUS robot AlboGov never cease. I publish on subs, other naval, nuclear weapons & broad political issues. Aussie sub changes are glacial: talk rather than actual new subs. The 1st Collins LOTE may secretly concern the US Combat System & be ready 2029. Trump may decide to cancel the AUKUS Virginia offer due to USN advice it needs all operational SSNs right through to the 2040s. My colleagues Shawn C and Gessler are excellent writers. Pete.
Hi Pete,
ReplyDeleteReckon Australia would have a snowball's chance in Woomera of buying nuclear warheads and .. unless you offer tens of billions of greenback to a Republican US to buy the nukes and ballistic missiles.
The cost to build a suitable nuclear storage and transport system would be staggering, and whichever port is used for weapons loading/unloading and maintenance enters the Russian and PRC '100 first places to nuke' list.
Note: UK SSBNs use Trident missiles under a 'common ownership' system that allows them to use the USN North Atlantic King's Bay facilities. None are stored in the UK.
The SSN-AUKUS are also attack boats, not ballistic missile subs - they are supposed to go forth and probe the SCS, Pacific and Indian Oceans - sometimes sneaking super close to territorial boundaries, running into a sea mount and bumping into other subs, not hide in the Great Australian Bight.
Hypersonics are another matter... https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2023-02-17-Lockheed-Martin-Awarded-1-1-Billion-Initial-Contract-to-Provide-Nations-First-Sea-Based-Hypersonic-Strike-Capability
Hi Shawn at 10/02/2023 8:42 PM
ReplyDeleteAustralia A$368-500 Billion SSN slush fund (using a variation of the US-UK Trident model) might have a shared with US hypersonic missile with a nuclear warhead "black project" option.
Your suggestion of LM's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) may be a goer https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2023-02-17-Lockheed-Martin-Awarded-1-1-Billion-Initial-Contract-to-Provide-Nations-First-Sea-Based-Hypersonic-Strike-Capability
Also I've been looking at a much more mature system, the longstanding US-Israeli Arrow 3 project which is a current "exoatmospheric hypersonic anti-ballistic missile" with the 6.8m high, 820mm diameter, Arrow 3's "reported flight range is up to 2,400 km (1,500 mi)" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow_3
Imagine the likely 4,000km range of an 9.5m high 200kg warhead, hypersonic Arrow 4 in an Aus Virginia's VPT or in a SSN-AUKUS VLS? More on that tomorrow?
Nuclear weapons storage? Possibly Fleet Base West or more likely the Strategic Weapons Facility in the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Base_Kitsap complex in Washington State if its a "common ownership system".
What could go wrong?!
Cheers Pete
From Australia’s viewpoint even the 2500km range Arrow 3 would certainly “do the job”. That range would be sufficient for an SSN in the South China Sea (or safe in the Philippine Sea) to target Beijing. Shanghai could be targeted from an SSN located another 800km further south.
ReplyDeleteHi Anonymous at 10/04/2023 9:08 PM
ReplyDeleteNo. An Arrow 3 with a 2,500km range could not reach Beijing from the South China Sea (SCS) or from the Philippine Sea (due east of the Philippines).
China's heavily ASW (weapons and sensor) defended Hainan island, at the extreme north of the SCS is 2,634km from Beijing. A launch point from the Philippine Sea is even further from Beijing.
As an aside the US used to station SSBNs (of Submarine Squadron 15, 1963-1981) at Guam Naval Base. Perhaps Guam can be described as being on the eastern edge of the Philippine Sea. These SSBNs were armed with Polaris missiles with a 4,600km range.
A submarine probably needs a launch point with a 500km safety gap in addition to the minimum distance to target. Otherwise a closer in launch point is too predictable for enemy (in this case Chinese) ASW resources.
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/06/guam-nuclear-submarine-and-air-base.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_Squadron_15
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UGM-27_Polaris
Regards Pete