Might "Advanced Capabilities" Make Subs Obsolete?

Anonymous made the very interesting comments below on Mar 20, 2023. My/Pete's comments are in [ square brackets ].

Hi Pete 

After reading all of your postings on AUKUS and more widely, some thoughts. 

We now know that AUKUS Pillar 1 [see the lefthand column in diagram below] will fill the capability gap created by the retirements of the Collins class subs, with Virginia class SSNs in 2030s. The SSN AUKUS class will be the Collins eventual replacement mid to late 2040s or later. The proposed cost, at least A$268 Billion. Based on past projects, even the high-end figure of A$368 Billion is probably significantly lower than the final costs. [Yes new Australian defence programs usually cost twice or more of the original Government estimate]  

There is a real risk that projects currently underway will make SSNs 'visible', much as the development of air power made battleships sitting ducks. [Yes so many inexpensive and more sensitive fixed seabed. tethered, and mobile UUVs, UAVs, Unmanned Surface Vehicles and ship mounted sensors can be mass produced by China, particularly for South China Sea and Taiwan Strait use. Denying even SSNs passage through those waters.]

Further, the development of XLUUVs like Ghost Shark, [and see. Australia's "Ghost Shark" Project by US company Anduril, is connected to the AUKUS "additional undersea capabilities" program . I'm hoping Ghost Shark, already capable of intelligence gathering (and soon smartmine laying) heads off the need for Autralian SSNs.]

and the RAAF's Ghost Bat (formerly Loyal Wingman) offers a glimpse into the future. The war in Ukraine highlights how low-cost, less capable autonomous vehicles in sufficient numbers can be a force multiplier. Add to the mix, the increasing application of improved AI dramatically improving capability. The next 20-30 years can be expected to produce innovative breakthrough military technologies. AUKUS Pillar 2 focuses on delivering some of these "Advanced Capabilities" [see righthand column in diagram below]. 

There appears to be little discussion on how to reduce Pillar 1 costs, shorten the acquisition timetable, and give greater focus to Pillar 2? For example, if we were to save $100 Billion  on the SSNs acquisition costs, we could redirect say $50 Billion to Pillar 2 with the rest no longer being needed, reducing Australian DoD's demand on the budget. 

Pillar 1 focuses on acquiring highly capable SSNs and in sufficient numbers to operate with a school of XLUUVs ('loyal shark-pack'?). 

Assuming that France would be willing to share [with Australia] the 'crown jewels' or their Barracuda class SSN, particularly after their [Attack-class] Shortfin rebuff, could it provide strategic deterrence for significantly less cost and potentially sooner? [Macron seems willing to again build Attack class SSKs in Australia but "He said France would not supply nuclear submarines to foreign countries"] 

Barracuda's manning levels are also significantly lower than the Virginia or AUKUS (based on Astute) subs, overcoming the manpower issues raised by AUKUS. 

It is accepted that the Barracuda class is less capable than the Virginia class or Astute class (and therefore its planned, yet to be even designed replacement, AUKUS class). Does this really matter, if has sufficient capability to meet the strategic objective of [just conventional warhead?] deterrence? 

We are paying a high price to get a premium product, later than we would like, with a promise that it will deliver the needed capability. Given the time scales involved, the uncertain political whims of future US and UK governments, and the growing geopolitical threats, should we now re-look at the Barracuda option? It could be available in the 2030s, if not earlier, with support from the French Government. [France seems to value good commercial relations with China higher than profits of selling SSNs to Australia.] 

Should our Pillar 1 focus NOW be on the acquisition of a sufficiently capable SSN and in greater numbers, while at the same time increasing our investment in the development of a 'loyal shark-pack'?

Food for thought?

[Looking at the Pillar 2 column of AUKUS "Advanced Capabilities" below - they will make it more difficult for enemy nuclear propelled and conventional submarines to function. It is likely China and Russia are working on similar "Advanced Capabilities" making it increasingly difficult for Australian, UK and US submarines to function. So the less expensive future may indeed be with unmanned technologies.]

AUKUS Pillar 1 (on left, above) is Submarines, while AUKUS Pillar 2 is Advanced Capabilities. The above chart is derived from: “FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States Partnership (AUKUS)”, The White House, 5 April 2022.
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