After more research I've come
to the conclusion that in 2016 France was only offering a more challenging
variation of the Brazilian solution [1].
This means, for Australia, France was mainly offering the Shortfin SSK (at about 3 times the cost of a
Scorpene).
France was also vaguely
offering a Barracuda SSN hull which might be see service after 2050 IF
Australia, like Brazil, developed the reactor. [2]
In 2021, after the AUKUS
announcement [3] France MAY have attempted to play catchup by PERHAPS offering a Barracuda/Suffren
SSN (reactor and all).
But as at 2022 France's nuclear
submarine industry is in less condition to "deliver" an SSN (built in Australia) in under two decades, than
the UK or US.
France's limited nuclear
submarine building capacity is fully committed with French Navy orders to
complete 5 x new SSNs and 4 x not yet fully designed third generation SSBNs.
All French source SSN
advice Submarine Matters has been receiving in 2021-2022 has been vague, unverified and often suffers from poor translation. Without reliable sources, particularly French Government
documents or French Government statements it is all "spin".
I'd be grateful if such Documents or Statements could come in .html format, which permits translation.
For Australian sources see:
[1] https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2014/01/brazil-future-ssn-dcns-assistance.html
[2] https://indaily.com.au/news/2016/03/24/france-pitches-nuke-sub-option-for-australia/
and
Thanks Anonymous @Nov 2, 2022, 5:31:00 PM
ReplyDeleteYes, I respect what you're saying. There are several 2nd or 3rd hand Australian media claims about what the French submarine sellers were saying, or not.
Australia changing course in 2030 - 3 or so years before the French SSK delivery date is were policy vagaries meet those of sales - an art.
Ok in 2030 the 15 year period for Australian submariners to be fully nuclear trained would start - fully trained by 2045. This time with the need to speak French in French nuclear and naval establishments - French-English expression differences being considerable.
So with 2030 + 15 training + 5 years for language problems = 2050. I'm more convinced by:
"“If, in 2050, Australia wants a nuclear submarine, they [who? what? Australia and DCNS can do a NEW design? Like in Brazil?] can design a nuclear submarine,” DCNS chief executive Herve Guillou told AAP this week in Cherbourg."
at https://indaily.com.au/news/2016/03/24/france-pitches-nuke-sub-option-for-australia/ of March 24, 2016.
Regards Pete
Pete
ReplyDeleteYou may be right. I have no more information either way.
At this stage I am becoming pessimistic about the whole RAN SSN project. British shipyards are busy till 2038 on Dreadnought SSBNs. US shipyards are busy till 2041 on Columbia SSBNs with Virginias now also behind schedule and a big maintenance backlog. France finishes the last Suffren in 2028 and is only building their next SSBNs on a five year drumbeat. But after AUKUS, why would they help us? Meanwhile virtually none of the most senior RAN flag officers have engineering training, unlike the USN, which is why, as I now realise, several of their statements about how AUKUS would be delivered have proven false.
We shall see what they say when they report in March.
HI Pete
ReplyDeletedo you really believe French engineer, technicians, navy personnel down to petty officers are not at ease with English?For at least 30 years getting good grade at the TOEFL or TOEIC is compulsory to get any technical/Engineering degree. Accent certainly , (Japanese, Chinese,Arabs, Italians, South americans are in the same accent in English league)
As we say un France this is a "cliché"
Hi Anonymous from France @Nov 2, 2022, 9:23:00 PM
ReplyDeleteYour attitude, typos and grammar are indicative.
It would be up to Australian nuclear engineers with PhD's in nuclear physics to, in French Nuclear Establishments in France, to speak French perfectly, in their 10+ year stint.
This is so these 1,000s of Australians would know perfectly French literal meanings, implied meanings and the cultural history of highly secret French nuclear submarine reactors. All this would be needed for 100% safety.
The same for Australian naval engineers and command officers on French Navy SSNs for 10+ years.
Regards Pete
Hi Anonymous @Nov 2, 2022, 9:03:00 PM
ReplyDeleteI also have no definite information either way, which is always a methodological problem with nuclear submarine programs.
Added to the US and UK program problems, you point out, is the likely problem that the final Virginia's and new SSN(X)s and SSN(R)s will likely be upgraded towards US Seawolf-class quality - with it much higher prices.
This will be to face the much higher short, medium, long term threat posture of the Russian and Chinese nuclear navies. It is possible that in return for continued Chinese support for Russia (in its Ukraine situation) Russia is increasing its handover of SSK and SSN quieting technologies to China. Even without that Chinese spending on nuclear submarine development may lead to a rise in quality and quantity. Hence a possible need for a Seawolf 2.0 SSN standard in the US, UK and French navies.
Very true about "senior RAN flag officers have engineering training, unlike the USN, which is why, as I now realise, several of their statements about how AUKUS would be delivered have proven false." The only exception I know of being Rear Admiral Katherine Richards, Head Navy Engineering, at https://www.navy.gov.au/about/senior-leadership-team and she can't transform RAN conventions quickly.
The AUKUS SSN project may suffer the same fate of other Aus Prime Ministerial submarine imprimaturs - now Morrison and Johnson have gone and probably Biden next on the way to Trump 2.0 (with his record of Western alliance disruptions).
Added to AUKUS leadership discontinuities are Australia's huge budgetary problems, the deficit and inflation - all naval "mega"program disruptors.
Regards Pete
Pete
ReplyDeleteFor the record I am an engineer and have worked with several French engineers over the years. All could speak English quite clearly. I also have done two trips to France to inspect projects and never had a problem with language. Their English is a lot better than our French. Engineering is a five year degree in France vs four years in Australia. Entry to French engineering courses is highly competitive. All the younger French engineers I met in particular were very fluent in English. So if we went back to the French sub option I do not see language as a barrier among engineering officers. With the US combat system fitted I do not see much of a problem for the other sailors either.
Incidentally one of the French SSN design team engineers, Eric Fusil, who also led the Scorpene design, is now a lecturer in naval architecture and submarine design at Adelaide University Engineering design. He will be speaking at the SIA conference.
I think there are two real risks. One is cultural on the RAN’s part. The RAN submarine service evolved from the RN submarine service and adopted its operational practices, which it proudly sticks to. That will need to evolve now that we know Astutes are off the table. We will need to learn French SSN operating practices to ensure safe operation. Otherwise we are waiting till the 2040s and could lose the capability.
The second is build capacity. Even if Australia builds the French designed SSNs in ASC, the reactor if not the entire reactor compartment (15% to 20% of the build) will need to be built in France. For eight SSNs that is the equivalent of France building two extra SSNs at Cherbourg to support our ASC effort. Such joint yard builds can be done, as HII and GDEB have proven in the USA. However it needs a long term commitment of a dedicated proportion of the French construction workforce. If Cherbourg has that capacity it is possible. If they do not, then the RAN should abandon SSNs and pick a reliable SSK before it is too late.
One major point in favour of the French SSN design option is that it is a completed design. If UK and USA are really offering SSNR or SSNX then they are not mature designs as Admiral Mead said. So we not only face longer delay and higher cost, but also design risk. It is a potential repeat of the problems with the Hunter class.
Thanks Anonymous @Nov 3, 2022, 11:40:00 PM
ReplyDeleteLooking at your paras:
Para 1. Yes many French speak good English. Though some Paris based "informational" types (after 2016) that I spoke with had pretty bad English.
A big concern is that many French might not speak good English at venues Australians would need to spend years at, specifically French submarine reactor research and training centers.
Para 3. Yes their may be RAN cultural inflexibility with the RAN being steeped in RN traditions and joint crewing with the RN since 1913 in AE1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_AE1 if not before.
Inflexibility and linguistic misunderstanding would not be helpful when RAN crew and officers would need to serve onboard French SSNs for years in the reactor and command sections (all effectively as French Navy trainees). Important French nuclear safety practices might not be absorbed by these French Navy-RAN "trainees" as well as nececessary.
Para 4. I agree. There were "joint yard build" activities in the Collins build, between Osborne and Swedish shipyards, where some things fell through the cracks. Desirably working to SUBSAFE or equivalent SSN standards, be it with the US, UK or France, "falling through
the cracks" can't be repeated.
Yes this whole AUKUS or French SSN aspiration could get too hard/expensive and Aus could return to SSK building during the Collins LOTE program.
Para 5. I agree. The Barracuda SSN being a current and completed SSN design is a real advantage over the technical and price risks of perhaps Seawolf-standard and priced SSN(X)s and SSN(R)s in the 2040s. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seawolf-class_submarine
Regards Pete
Very related - Xavier Vavasseur for Naval News reports 04 Nov 2022 https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/philippine-navy-receives-submarine-training-from-frances-dci-group/
ReplyDeletePhilippine Navy Receives Submarine Training From France’s DCI Group
A number of Philippine Navy officers are receiving submarine training in France, with DCI Group. The formation started in 2019 in Brest. Its goal is to assist the Philippines as the country is looking to set up its own submarine force from scratch.
The Philippine Navy is aiming at creating a submarine force. [BUT THE PHIL NAVY] are considering proposal from both France’s Naval Group and South Korea’s DSME.
Hi Pete
ReplyDeleteIn this same vein already discussed: "Naval is not selling sub but help build an independant Sub force", that's their Marketing strategy..
Interestingly a broad naval defense tech cooperation agreement beetween PT Pal and the EAU state defense Industry was alsosigned last week
https://www.naval-technology.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2022/11/signature-mou-naval-group-ptpalenergylab-735x551.jpg
Thanks Anonymous @Nov 5, 2022, 6:52:00 PM
ReplyDeleteYes I share your suspicion that:
Naval Group (post Attack-class rejection) being in desperate need to secure new SSK orders, is totally disconnected to NG's "help build an independant Sub force" CHARITABLE WORKS in Indonesia and the Philippines... :)
Cheers Pete