Aus SSNs With Future Weapon "Ambiguity"

Anonymous, on October 28, 2022 made the following excellent comments: 

Pete. Thanks for [France's SSN offer Should be a Taskforce Plan B] and link back to your previous accurate posts. I share this view to the point that your plan B is now my plan A. 

I note ASPI interviewed Admiral Mead [on October 27, 2022] who remained optimistic about the RN-USN project. Of course it is his job to do so. Yet the fact that he suggested a (now) “14 year old girl” might become the commander of Australia’s first SSN suggests it will take another 20 years.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-navy-is-cultivating-a-nuclear-mindset-says-ssn-taskforce-chief/

Since the announcements that both:

(1) USA are struggling with Virginia program delivery and would have difficulty supporting RAN SSNs before 2040 and

(2) the UK cannot supply the Astute class and would presumably offer Australian participation in the SSN(R] program it is difficult to share Mead’s optimism.

The Columbia SSBN program runs to 2041 assuming no further delay. Starting a US SSN design then assuming a two year drumbeat and 8 year construction time would mean a first RAN SSN by 2049 and 8 not completed until 2063. What will the PLAN have by then? As per your point on US politics, there will be another 4 POTUS elections before that start date.

The UK SSN(R) will best case not complete design till 2026, while the Dreadnought SSBN program runs to 2038. The corresponding start date would give a first RAN SSN by 2046 and 8 by 2060. The UK approach now also has a lot more cost and delivery risk because the SSN(R) design is not complete.

The cost of the US SSN(X) and UK SSN(R) will also be so much higher that they might delay other defence programs, like the Hunter frigates and completion of the F-35 acquisition.

Also the potential decade plus delay in the start of Adelaide sub construction jobs won’t go down well in the new government, which creates political risks for the RAN. What if Labor decides to fund something else instead in the mean time?

So I’d rather we set out on a more achievable and affordable task sooner and got 8 French SSNs that would still be regionally superior to Chinese or Russian SSNs, than wait to build the world’s best SSNs and possibly never receive them.

Pete Comments

Thanks Anonymous. Taking your points in turn.

Yes a French SSN offer, if firm, may well be more useful and relevant for Australia to face a China that refuses to wait for the late 2040s AUKUS sub in-service date. Australia rejecting a French SSN option on refueling grounds seems a false goalpost when it is recalled the French fuel is lower proliferation sensitive LEU. Also amidst the $10s Billions of SSN infrastructure Australia will need to construct an Adelaide or HMAS Stirling LEU refueling capability could be part of it.

I think a US SSN, be it late model Virginia or SSN(X), will be built to include such high anti-China, anti-Russia ASW Seawolf-like specs, that its higher cost and technical sensitivity will prevent export to Australia. The Astutes going out of production, UK SSBN production hiatus, and SSN(R) high ASW specs and cost and delay also being nonstarters.

Added to all that is unforeseen inflation in the US, UK and Australia and unfavourable exchange Australian dollar rates making an already extremely expensive AUKUS SSN project a huge financial risk over the 25 years until an Aus SSN is operational.

So, yes a French Barracuda SSN could cut risks in several ways.

On the ASPI article Mead is as careful as his position allows. Marles has more latitude though runs against the US and UK’s well documented delays till 2040s when Marles talks of “need for haste is dictated by deteriorating strategic circumstances”. Nowhere in the public AUKUS SSN program delivery timings is there hope for “haste”.

I see the article’s statement “Marles has undertaken to strengthen the lethality and deterrent effect” as providing distant hope that Marles is hinting that the 25 tonne Conventional high explosive limit for AUKUS SSN weapons can be enriched by other explosive technologies.

But this is probably a faint hope until

A.  In Ukraine Russia uses a Radiological Weapon (eg. using explosives to spread  radioactive substances in the large power Reactor complex over a wide area) or uses a Nuclear Weapon.

or

B.  After China installs ballistic or hypersonic missiles on the Solomons

or

C.  When China invades Taiwan.

Fear of China made SSNs for Australia an unexpected possibility and even greater future fears of Chinese or Russian acts may make Australian weapon “ambiguity” possible.