Japan's Type 12 surface to ship missile would need major changes to upsize it into an intermediate-range (out to 5,500km) hypersonic cruise missile. It would need to be longer, wider, with a much larger warhead to impress Chinese targets. Japan's Epsilon rocket, at the end of this Submarine Matters' article, is more capable.
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Gessler, with customary acuity, commented on September 13, 2022, along the lines:
There is “an important
development with regard to Japan's 're-armament' program:
During the ongoing 2+2 Ministerial (Defence & Foreign Ministries) dialogue between Japan & India, the Indian side has expressed its support for Japan's development of 'counter-strike' capabilities.
While the terms 'counter-strike' and 'counter-value' are invariably linked to nuclear weapons in any other context, it appears that at least so far the Japanese are only hinting at a conventional long-range strike capability with cruise missiles. The procurement in question is this.
Keeping in mind what Pete has already written regarding Japan's capability to go nuclear in a 'long weekend', I think nobody can realistically dismiss that such a long-range strike capability, once obtained, will always remain conventionally-armed.
In my opinion, these strike missiles will be made to be nuclear-capable platforms, conventionally armed now and in the foreseeable future, but able to be mated with the nuclear warheads as and when required.
The question now is, why the
Japanese side considered it important to make this part of the agenda in the
high-level meeting with Indian counterparts, and why India felt it important to
pledge support for the same...This is considering the missile project (modified
Type-12 ) is not a joint Japan-India program.
In any event, the Japanese option of extending a force of 1,500 supersonic or
hypersonic? Type 12 missiles upsized to a 1,000km range is
not long enough to reach India. So there is no reason to think that the purpose
of the mention was to allay any fears the Indian side may have regarding
Japan's re-armament.
Could the two countries be
attempting to send a signal to China that nuclear weapons-related cooperation
between India & Japan is not off the table? That India would/could be
willing to allow cold-testing of nukes meant for/designed by Japan to be
carried out on its soil? Using its established infrastructure (which is NOT
regulated/checked by anyone as India is not an NPT member)?
We are in for some interesting
times ahead.
Pete Responds
The above mentioned Type 12 as a super or hyper sonic cruise missile is more difficult to shoot down than a subsonic
cruise missile counter-strike against China, Russia or North Korea. Sheer
flight speed makes counter-strike or even pre-emptive strike more credible.
Given the short Chinese ballistic
missile flight time to Japan – Japan would be well advised to mount many of its
Type 12s variants on hard to detect and hit Japanese submarines.
Japanese conventional warheads
are insufficient to impress nuclear armed opponents. Conventional warheads
wouldn't make much impression on ICBM silos rapidly being constructed in central-western
China. Also Japan would need to preach Mutually Assured Destruction to counter China's
SSBN first or second strike capability.
For a land silo force Japan's
solid fuel "ICBM in waiting" Epsilon rockets may
be suitable. Japan’s nuclear explosive and easily built device precursors would
give Japan a "breakout" capacity of 12 months or less.
Concerning broader northeast
Asian nuclear weapons proliferation - there is the illogicality of South Korea
going to the expense of building KSS-III SSBs unless these missile submarines could be nuclear armed.
Another way of seeing things
may be - secret discussions between India and Japan - which might include the
possibility of India passing on Agni MRBM-ICBM technology (including thermonuclear warhead data)
particularly to face the main common enemy, China.
It could be a two way barter deal with Japan passing on its (probably Minuteman III range) solid fuel Epsilon rocket technology and especially Japan's (literally) tonnes of stockpiled Plutonium could be bartered to India. Japan reputedly has 9 tonnes of Plutonium stored in Japan and 35 tonnes stored in Europe.
So there are many aspects that are unprovable without benefit of large intelligence organisation confirmation, but possible.
Japan's ICBM capable 26m tall, 91 tonne, solid fuel, Epsilon rocket struts its stuff in this video.
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The JAXA Epsilon solid fueled rocket is an 'ICBM in waiting'. They can and should adapt it to be capable of delivering high end conventional warheads at the very least such as high yield thermobaric or other high yield conventional warheads like this
ReplyDelete"One of the leading options for a reentry package, and a central focus of the FALCON study noted above, is the proposed Common Aero Vehicle (CAV). The CAV would be an unpowered,
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle capable of carrying approximately 1,000 pounds in
munitions or other payload. According to the Air Force, these payloads might include a “fuzed penetrator” warhead that would hit its targets with impact speeds of approximately 4,000 feet per second. With this high impact speed, the CAV should be able to attack and destroy some types of hardened or buried targets. The CAV could also carry several small smart bombs to destroy facilities and infrastructure above ground, wide area autonomous search munitions (WAASM) to destroy dispersed targets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could gather intelligence in the target area"
Source: Page 13 of
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/RL33067.pdf
PS: India does not have a working thermonuclear warhead. What it has is a capable boosted fission warhead that can deliver likely 'dial a yield' ranges of 40-100 kT (60-80 kT individual warheads likely in any eventual MIRV or MaRV IRBMs/ICBMs).
Hi Pete.
ReplyDeleteI have drawn a genealogy of Japanese ASCMs. [1]
I will use this as a reference to write about the "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile" (Type 12) and its derivatives.
The "Type 12" was literally adopted in 2012, and several improvement projects exist.
One of them is the "Type 17 Ship-to-Ship Missile" (Type 17) , a shipborne version with an extended range.
In addition, development of two derivatives of the "Type 17" was initiated: a MPA-launched version and a ground-launched version.
However, the latter "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile Kai" (Type 12 Kai) was cancelled due to requirement for longer range and better survivability.
In order to fulfill this requirement, development of the "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile : Improved" (Type 12 Imp.) and its derivatives were initiated.
Their main features are as follows : "Long-Range", "Stealth", "Ground-attack-capable", and "Rapid-deployment".
The first three indicate that these ASCMs are capable of destroying enemy fleets as well as air-bases (whether they are on land or at sea).
And the last one strongly suggests that the Japanese government expects "the next war" to be imminent.
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By the way, so how imminent is "the next war"?
In my opinion, "the next war" is likely to start in the 2030s.
The timing of the start of deliveries of the "Type 12 Imp." suggets it.
Since the development of the "Type 12 Imp." is scheduled for completion in FY2025 [2], the first mass production contract should have been awarded in FY2026, and the first delivery should have been in FY2029.
However, the Japanese government decided to accelerate the start of deliveries by 4 years to July 2025. [3]
Naturally, the derivative versions will be deployed similarly ahead of schedule.
There is reports that over 1,000 rounds, including the derivative type, will be purchased [4], but it will take at least several years to complete.
This suggests that the Japanese government expects "the next war" to occur in the 2030s.
[1]http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/Japanese_ASCM_Genealogy.svg
[2]https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/2021/pdf/jizen_02_logic.pdf
[3]https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/souhon/pdf_choutatsuyotei/09_yudou_r04.pdf#page=2
[4]https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20220820-OYT1T50270/
Regards
wispywood2344
Thanks wispywood2344.
ReplyDeleteFor your Sep 24, 2022, 9:32:00 PM details and comments.
I've turned them into article "More on Japan's ASCMs Types 12 & 17" of September 26, 2022, at
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/09/more-on-japans-ascms-types-12-17.html
Regards Pete
Hi GhalibKabir @Sep 15, 2022, 3:03:00 PM
ReplyDeleteI'm of the feeling:
That if Japan aimed "ICBM in waiting" Epsilon warheads at China, be they ballistic, mid-course redirected and/or gliding
China would still fear warhead ambiguity (ie. China could not discern if the warheads were conventional or nuclear)
with a Chinese nuclear response resulting.
++++++++++++
On "India does not have a working thermonuclear warhead" I think India keeps its development of two-stage thermonuclear warheads secret for the same reasons India keeps its MIRV capability secret.
That is, in the late 1990s-early 2000s India made a Nuclear Weapons Low-key, Ambiguity Deal with the US, UK and France, in order to permit India to join the legal nuclear "haves" club as a defacto member.
Put another way. Since the negative international response to India's 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests India has agreed to keep its subsequent nuclear weapons achievements fairly quiet for PR and international legal/political reasons.
And it stands to reason that with India's main enemy, China, developing multi-megaton 2 stage thermonuclear weapons in the 1960s the Indian military would be remiss if it didn't MAD protect India with an equivalent multi-megaton device capability.
Regards Pete