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On Indonesia's concerns about future Australian SSNs, Indian-Indonesian relations (1960s-70s) and the extraordinary growth of the Indonesian Navy (1950s-60s) Gessler on July 31, 2022 commented:
Hi Pete (and others
reading this)
I'm not really aware of
the security & diplomatic equations between Australia & ASEAN, so for
my sake please entertain this line of thought:
Perhaps certain ASEAN
countries (Indonesia in particular) view Australia as a potential future
adversary? And if they do, then its obvious that they would prepare not for
what the adversary says he will do, but rather for what he is capable of doing.
Perhaps Indonesia fears that with RAN operating nuclear submarines, Australia
will attain a massive unassailable lead in military terms vis-a-vis Indonesia?
Allow me to tell you why I'm thinking in this way...back in the 60s & 70s, the relationship between Indonesia and my country (India) wasn't very good. At one point, the Indonesians had laid claim to the Nicobar island chain (the southern part of [India’s] Andaman and Nicobar Islands), and were carrying out military intrusions & illegal patrols, not unlike what China is doing in the South China Sea today. Indonesia was also openly on the side of Pakistan during the 1965 war, including providing material assistance.
This Indian article below sums up a lot of that history (along with an overview of Indonesia's subsurface naval history). Later though, things took a positive turn [between India and Indonesia] and all disputes were abandoned. Though I'd wager India's [“Smiling Buddha”] nuclear weapons testing in 1974 had a lot to do with it. This is along with the fact that the power dynamic between India and Indonesia shifted vastly into India's favour over the decades, especially on the naval front,. This would have made the pursuit of a refreshed Nicobar Islands dispute a not-so-wise decision.
Do you suppose Indonesia
fears a similar thing happening vis-a-vis their equation with Australia?
Getting potentially "boxed in" by nuclear powers (or at least,
nuclear navies) to their north & south, all the while getting needled by
the Chinese, can't be an enviable position as far as geopolitics go.
I still think that if
push comes to shove, Indonesia will throw its lot in with the QUAD/Western
alliance rather than with China...but I can't help but see this as the sort of
thing that could change if the political dispensation in Jakarta changes. Note
that I do not follow Indonesian politics, just saying that political
re-alignment always remains a distinct possibility in a time of global
instability like the current.
Pete Comment
The Indian article Gessler has identified, is very
interesting.
The link recounts: "In his book Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965-1975, retired Indian Navy Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani traced the dizzying growth of the Indonesian Navy" with words to the effect:
Between 1959 and 1964,
the Indonesian Navy had acquired an enormous fleet from the Soviet Union, including:
- 1 heavy cruiser: Kri Irian
- 18 destroyers and frigates
- 12 Whiskey-class submarines
- 67 corvettes and motor torpedo boats
- 12 missile boats
- 21 minesweepers
- 11 landing ships
- 6 landing craft
- 4 transport ships, and
- 4 oilers.
My first thoughts
include Indonesia being insufficiently wealthy in the 1950-60s, to afford a huge fleet. Indonesia had an independent naval history only going back to 1945. Hence, I think Indonesia would have been hard pressed to man one-fifth of the 156 vessels
that the Soviets allegedly sold to Indonesia.
Presumably the Soviets
provided the huge fleet out of anti-colonial internationalism, to strengthen Indonesia as an ally and most likely to free all of Indonesia from the Soviet's enemy, the Netherlands. This last was seen clearly in Operation Trikora. The section on Soviet sailors and airman wearing Indonesian uniforms in Trikora is most interesting
I’d be very interested to hear from readers about what happened to the majority of the 156 vessels sold to Indonesia.
That sounds possible. But it also could be due to China’s belt and road initiatives.
ReplyDeleteChina is currently hostile to both India and Australia.
they may be using their influence with top Indonesian officials to get a complaint lodged aimed at weakening Australian defenses
Like Peter Zeihan used to say, India never joined the world trade order. Actually, it was a conscious decision, or we can say India sacrificed that path for nuclear autonomy.
ReplyDeleteIn 1996 or 1997, India asked for ASEAN membership and was ready to accept any demands for opening up the market. But then came the demand to stop the ATV program, and India must declare IOR a nuclear-free zone. For further leverage, ASEAN told India, that India gets PNGed from ASEAN and ASEM summits ( and to this date no ASEM summit happened in India). I don't think India is that unimportant atleast for Asia, that no ASEM summit happens for 25 years in India. The total non connectivity between India and ASEAN is not because of the incompetence of foreign policy, but it is by design at request from Europe.
But that's history, if any country wants to get "INDEPENDENT" nuclear boats or weapons, the path is filled with thorns and sacrifices.
Hi Anonymous [at Aug 5, 2022, 9:53:00 AM]
ReplyDeleteIndonesia has legitimate concerns about nuclear HEU in reactors proliferation to Australia, all by Indonesia's self.
Indonesia is no mouthpiece for China. Indonesia has more to worry about China as "Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the coast of [the Natuna islands] is slightly overlapped by China's widely disputed South China Sea claim" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natuna_Regency
Indonesia currently has 73% equivalent and increasing * of Australia's GDP and Indonesia has much lower labour costs. Like Russia helped India build up a nuclear submarine capability Russia could assist Indonesia in the long term. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)#Table
Hi Arpit Kanodia
ReplyDeleteYes, from India's point of view - it wanted to avoid US remote control from the 1950s with the US really running world trade up to the 1990s, before China's economic rise. The US also selectively observed non-proliferation by handing over nuclear sub secrets to the UK from the 1950s-60s including Polaris missiles while the US preached non-nuclear sub and non-nuclear weapons proliferation to non-P5 countries.
As India was a possession of the UK in the mid 1940s when the P5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
was being chosen - hence India was left out of the NPT "haves" - India had to go its own way in nuclear weapons ownership.
Also Russia was almost giving away weapons at lower prices to India (1950s-90s]. In the face of the China threat during and after the 1962 border war India needed to address China's nuclear weapons buildup.
Yes nuclear-free zones are always political and nebulous. Australian HEU in subs would certainly breach the spirit, if not the letter, of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Rarotonga.
So as we are breaking it we may as well go the whole hog and put nuclear warheads on the long range missiles we are developing for space-race research. scroll down at https://www.gspacetech.com/launch
ASEAN is a much troubled organisation in terms of lack of strategic cooperation between its own members and with lack of a multi-lateral approach to India, China, Australia, US etc. I think China has successfully worked to divide such members as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from the rest of ASEAN.
Can't say I've ever heard of the ASEM you mention. I wikipedia-ered it and it does meet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia%E2%80%93Europe_Meeting
Yes it seems India has had "thorny" or uneven nuclear sub development in only developing Arihant class "Baby Boomers" - not full size - with no independently built SSNs to protect them (yet).
Regards
Pete