Orca Doctrine Developing: Australian SSN Substitutes.

A depiction of an undersea, sea surface, aircraft, satellite and land weapon-sensor network in which Orcas can function. Note Orcas can communicate back to land base via encoded acoustic signals to the undersea sensors depicted. (Artwork in Submarine Matters October 26, 2014 article).

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In response to Anonymous’ June 19, 2022, 9:23:00 AM comment. 

Good that we agree on using Orca evolving to 80+ tonne unmanned "submarines". 

I'm a bit confused over your: 

"If the start of a nuclear sub build is as faraway as claimed we should hold proper tenders for it. If it is soon we should focus on that and buy new diesel subs from Germany or Japan to replace Collins in the interim if there is any capability gap. Build Orcas here in the mean time. There seems little point re-establishing an SSK manufacturing capability in Australia for a stop-gap solution." 

1.  I don't think the US SSN building industry would expose itself to an Australian tender. I think it unlikely it would hand over the vast amount of sensitive Virginia/SSN(X) technical detail required by Australian tender procedures. Also GD-EB and HII are flat out building Virginia SSNs and Columbia SSBNs for their own navy. 

2.  Which leaves the UK SSN(R) Astute successor as the no need to compete, monopoly SSN supplier for Australia. 

3.  The group of ex-RAN officers at https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/jun/19/new-collins-based-submarine-best-fit-while-waiting-for-aukus-defence-experts-say are over optimistic (launched by "2032") about how quickly Sweden could design-build "Son of Collins". 

Its panning out Sweden will have taken 14 years to build A26-Blekinge-class subs for its own navy, ie. 2014-2028. Also Sweden's thin submarine designer-builder-manager workforce will be building A26s for 6 years 2022-28. This 6 year hiatus would hinder SAAB's ability to design-build "Son of Collins" in Adelaide.  

4.  So, a more accurate timeline is the standard 15 years to design-launch "Son of Collins". Then 3 more years to Commission/problem solve that first submarine. The first Son of Collins being operational by 2040, is more accurate. 18 years also applies to the German Type 216 and the latest Japanese sub, which is the Taigei. The main development hurdles for the 216 and Taigei will be Australia's familiar larger sub requirement for extended range-endurance (conquering the total 7,000km to-from transit to operations), at higher speed, with larger crew. This has been required for all new Australian submarines conceived since the Collins concept in the 1970s. 

Australian submarine's' transit reality means we need submarines at least 1,000 tonnes heavier than standard for the German Type 214/218 subs used by Singapore. Hence we would need never operated large TKMS 216 concept subs. 

An alternative is a sub 1,000 tonnes heavier than Japan's shorter range Taigeis. This is noting after Australia rejected Abbott-Abe's handshake promised Soryu in 2016 Japan would be very hesitant exposing itself again to another face-losing Australian rejection.   

5.  I think the LOTE will end up as A$2 Billion per Collins life of type extension eg. MTU diesels are needed. But this process can deliver the first "LOTED" Collins in 2028 with the remaining 5 every 2 years thereafter. So I think the LOTE is the best Interim manned  submarine solution. 

6.  Orcas will probably grow in size, particularly those that are nuclear propelled. Cutting out an SSN's necessary 8,000 tonnage to support a human crew will probably always mean Orcas will only displace one third of an SSN. Orcas human "crew" will always be remote, back in Australia. Orcas' remote "commanders" (as with weaponised Reaper UAVs right now) will be the people who give permission for Orcas to fire their torpedoes and cruise missiles at targets. As established here even manned submarines report back to base to seek permission to hit a target. Disposable Orcas can be even more talkative and will be managed with required Australia-based digital codeword certifications )to minimise enemy tampering) to hit a specific target. 

7.  As Orcas evolve, they may be able to do 90% of what a manned submarine can do. About the remaining 10% - Orcas cannot deliver Special Forces/Divers. An Orca network option a third the cost of an SSN option might present a reasonable permanent capability for Australia. 

8.  We won't need to train or risk a 2,400 member submariner corps (noting two 100+ member "Blue" and "Gold" crews per SSN and on-shore training and command teams) required for an SSN fleet.

9.  This is recalling Orcas will be part of a network already used by Australia. This network overlaps many manned submarine functions. It includes:

-  AUKUS/QUAD fixed undersea sensors intensively laid and criss-crossing the Pacific and Indian oceans,

-  increasingly sensitive reconnaissance radar, optical and electronic interception satellites doing much of the intelligence collection role once done by satellites

-  missile/light torpedo carrying anti-sub, anti-shipping aircraft/helicopters and already  ship based medium UAVs and perhaps future land launched large UAVs, 

-  missile/light torpedo carrying warships, and

-  Australia's steadily evolving land based, long range, AUKUS hypersonic missile capability, and

-  Foreign conventional (Singapore and Japan) and nuclear propelled (US, UK) submarines can hit targets detected by Orcas.

Also the US will blaze the technical and doctrinal Orca trail. Australian Orcas will interoperate with US Orcas.

10.  As Orcas are unmanned some versions would be expendable in time of war. Orcas themselves could carry 10 tonne conventional warheads. 

11.  If nuclear propelled Orcas, in the context of broader Australian-Foreign weapon-sensor networks, are developed to do all this, Australian SSNs will not be necessary.