Following Gessler’s “Much on India’s Outlook: QUAD Meeting Part 1"
here is Part 2, where Gessler presents wide-ranging, insightful, views.
It is mainly on US – India relations. On February 14, 2022 Gessler commented on US perceptions evident around the QUADrilateral Security Dialogue Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Melbourne, Feb 11, 2022:
"Hi Pete, in response to
your Feb 13 reply:" [ie. Pete wrote the
QUAD is becoming more overtly strategic on some agenda topics and in
sideline/corridor statements. This is useful as possible China/PRC
action on Taiwan MAY be drawing closer.]
"Indeed - as far as I'm aware, the Chinese Communist Party has a self-declared goal of seeking reunification with Taiwan, by hook or by crook, before 2049 - the 100th Anniversary of the People's Republic. Which means that, all things being as they are, one would be well served to expect a kinetic conflict across the Taiwan Strait at some point, any point, within the next 27 years.
Speaking of QUAD &
the Indo-Pacific in general, there were other important developments within the
US coinciding with the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Australia. Namely, the
release of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy document - as far as I'm aware, the
first such region-specific strategy document released by the White
House/National Security Council.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted it DURING his visit to Australia, no doubt to underscore the QUAD's importance to the Strategy. Blinken’s tweet being https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1492235106106359814 :
“Our
Indo-Pacific Strategy sets forth a vision for a region that is free and open,
connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. As an Indo-Pacific nation, we're
committed to working with our allies and partners to make that vision a
reality.”
While the Blinken’s tweet only contains the Fact Sheet https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/ which provides a quick, brief look at the points,
the actual document
itself (linked below) provides a lot more context, detail & nuance:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
This first line from the
Conclusion section, on Page 18, says quite a lot:
"We
have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will
demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us
since the Second World War".
[Pete comment: Although the US in the Korean and Vietnam wars were also major.] Delving into some of the
stated objectives & goals, each followed by a little bit of analysis on my
part...
1) QUAD &
Indo-Pacific -
Statement: “Deliver on the QUAD” "The Quad...will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles."
"...helping Indo-Pacific partners close the region’s infrastructure gap...As we do, we will promote resilient and secure global telecommunications, focusing on 5G vendor diversification and Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) technology..."
My take: Note how the part about QUAD talks on developing/deploying/setting the desired secure standards whereas the parts on the wider Indo-Pacific talk about the US 'promoting' the said secure standards. Simply put, the desired standards (which will likely underpin US strategic alignment with a given country) would be developed/determined by the QUAD countries and the rest of the Indo-Pacific will be expected to adopt them and them alone - edging out Chinese alternatives in the process which could compromise said efforts. I've previously talked about these standards on your blog before.
2) Australia & AUKUS “REINFORCE DETERRENCE” - Page 15
Statement: "Through the AUKUS partnership, we will identify the optimal pathway to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest achievable date"
My take: Nothing new on
this front, but then again it hasn't been that long since the initial AUKUS
announcement. I don't expect a lot of new information to go on at least until after
the 18-month AUKUS submarine assessment period [likely April 2023 see “Australia,
the UK and the US have commenced 18 month trilateral effort to
identify an optimal pathway to deliver this capability” ] is
over - and to an extent after the Australian federal elections [likely in May
2022], because I'd reckon it'll be interesting to see how the new government
(assuming it won't be another term of the incumbent dispensation) looks at
AUKUS.
3) EXPAND
U.S.-JAPAN-ROK [South Korea] COOPERATION - Page 17:
Statement:
"Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation
among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the
ROK...Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a
trilateral context."
My take: At some level, I
believe the US is concerned about the possibility of fractures developing along
the Japan-South Korea relationship, especially should one of them choose to
equip themselves with nuclear weapons in
this decade or the next. The US seems to be more interested than ever in
making sure any differences are addressed and any fears are allayed - whilst
keeping both of these industrialized powers focused on the common threat of North
Korea & China.
4) "Support India's Continued Rise & Regional Leadership"
[Page 16] "We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific."
[Page
13] "...Steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India
and support its role as a net security provider"
[Page 16] "We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development."
My take: Lots of
interesting stuff here. I don't know if that's only because I'm from India, or
because its the only big country in the region which still has a very evolving
relationship with the US. This contrasts with Alliance partners, like Australia, ROK
or Japan, which have been on more or less the same footing with the US for the
better part of the last half-century.
Firstly "Major
Defence Partner" was a designation created by the Obama administration and
continued by Trump & now Biden. It was created as a means of getting India
on equal footing with Alliance partners of the US in terms of India accessing
& purchasing US defence technologies, despite India still remaining
officially a non-Ally. In more common parlance over the years it has often
meant "Ally but not on paper".
Secondly, going over the
wording of these statements, it would appear that India would continue
maintaining an independent defence & nuclear weapons posture, but with
strategic convergence of goals between itself & the US and its Allies. The
US expresses no concerns regarding India's increasing ways & means of
deploying nuclear weapons on far-off targets as part of its efforts to build a
full spectrum of deterrence against China. This includes survivable means like Indian SSBNs, and in fact the US appears to support it. This is in stark contrast to the US's open demand
contained within the same document toward the complete de-nuclearization of
North Korea. Although on paper both India & North Korea are non-signatories to the
NPT and by definition 'illegitimate' nuclear powers.
Thirdly, the repeated statement of phrases such as "Regional Leadership" and more importantly "Net security Provider" - terms not used (at least in this document) to describe any of the Alliance partners of the US are interesting for two reasons:
A) it signals a willingness on the part of US leadership to let India function as what has been oft described by strategic policy watchers as the US' "Deputy Sheriff" in the Indian Ocean Region, and perhaps beyond in future (South China Sea).
B) It indicates India has been more or less successful in convincing the US to give it a free hand in dealing with threats that more directly concern its immediate neighbourhood (like Myanmar) in a way that's more amicable to India's interests...such as continuing to work with the Military junta that toppled Suu Kyi's democratic government in that country.
All in all, it will be interesting to see how the US-India defence/strategic relationship develops in the coming decades.
That said - this document
puts to rest any fears anyone may have regarding the US' lack of interest in
the region, or desire to seek a more isolationist foreign policy...at least
until the next US Presidential election cycle. [When Trump may win the 2024 Election.]
Addendum to the India
section of my above comments:
Considering this policy
document specifically talks about the Indo-Pacific, several other matters
are left out. What would also be interesting is how the US-India relationship
interfaces with the 'Mid-East Quad' that's developing with Israel & the UAE
joining the common core of US & India - in an apparent bid to shape events
in the Middle Eastern region in the coming decades.
India lies at the
geographical inflection point between the areas of
responsibility of the US INDOPACOM and US CENTCOM. Plus India has
considerable interests in the Arab States Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
and an interest in continuing a deep strategic relation with Israel. So that's
one more thing to watch - could this Mid-East Quad take on a more or less similar strategic role as the Indo-Pacific one?
Who could be the target or common foe of such a grouping? Iran? Perhaps in future, Turkey which might want to revive its past Ottoman glory?
On that note, the UAE's Ambassador to India recently had this to say: “India-Israel-US-UAE ‘West Asian Quad’ crucial to address complex global threats, says UAE envoy” of Feb 10, 2022 at https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-israel-us-uae-west-asian-quad-crucial-to-address-complex-global-threats-says-uae-envoy/827242/ "
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