The Russo-Ukraine crisis has made submarines a higher priority for the Bulgarian Navy.
EURACTIV advised, January 21, 2022:
“Bulgaria wants to buy two submarines to re-establish its submarine
fleet. The last Bulgarian submarine [Slava in Bulgarian, Fame in English] was decommissioned 10 years ago and
is now a museum. Since 2011, the Black Sea state has not had a submarine fleet,
but in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, the desire for one is growing.
[Bulgaria's Defence Minister, Stefan Yanev, said on January 20, 2022.]
“We don’t have submarines, but it’s good for every fleet to have them. Talks are underway with a specific country to buy submarines. There is a way to allocate money for submarines in the state budget. We will not buy new submarines, but at least they will be in good technical condition,"
COMMENT
AND BACKGROUND
Bulgaria (a country just larger than South Korea, with a population less than 7 million) has the misfortune of sitting on the Black Sea, that sea dominated by Russia. Bulgaria was unsettled by the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. Russia's latest aggressive pressure on Ukraine has made Bulgaria even more nervous.
After Bulgaria sided with Germany in WWII Bulgaria was forcibly incorporated into Russia’s neo-Tsarist Empire in 1944. Bulgaria then received inexpensive Russian weapons when it joined the Russian dominated Warsaw Pact in 1955.
The Bulgarian Navy has mainly subsisted on second hand, small, old ships and boats. Four Russian built Romeo-class SSKs of 1959 vintage, were gifted, in obsolete condition, to Bulgaria in 1985. Maybe there were enough old Romeos in Europe, Middle East, China and North Korea to cannibalize for spare parts for Bulgaria's subs up to 2011.
Bulgaria become a non-Russian dominated democracy in 1990. When Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007 Emperor Putin would have been further mind boggled.
As a NATO country geographically too close for comfort to Russia Bulgaria will probably tend to buy the 2 secondhand subs, in good condition, from NATO countries. Investing in NATO subs is good for Bulgaria's alliance credentials. Bulgaria would be unlikely to buy subs from potential enemy, Russia, again.
Do we have some subs for you!
There are few secondhand subs from NATO countries to choose from that are in good condition.
The top picks are 2 of Norway’s Type 210 Ulas, one owner, average 32 years old, well maintained, no AIP (so cheaper to run).
Italy’s Sauros might also be tasty, one owner, around 32 years old.
Spain’s Agostas, one owner, diesels getting cranky, at 38 years old.
Least likely might be Poland’s Kobbens, average 57 years old, 2 owners, worn out, in bits, held together by rust.
As with most submarine buys Bulgaria may need to wait 5 years - unless Bulgaria is willing to cobble together parts into Kobbens.
Pete
ReplyDeleteThis post is for a possible future post you might care to tile "Dollars, Drumbeats and SSNs".
I have been looking at the question of time to construct SSNs, cost and what program must be achieved to minimise the time Collins Class subs must remain in service. This is particularly critical to avoid capability gaps for the RAN. For this purpose I an assuming it is undesirable to keep any Collins SSK in service longer than 40 years from commissioning, even after life extension.
One of the problems in replacement the RAN faces is that the six Collins Class SSKs were built quickly, with a one year "drumbeat" starting in 1990, and an average construction time of 7 years. This means, if we adopt the "40 year rule" that they all need replacement between 2036 (Collins) and 2043 (Rankin). Note that in 1995, the ASC shipyard had the fully or partialy completed hulls of all six Collins Class subs present at the one time.
From the little we know about the Attack Class construction program from the ANAO Audit, the intent was to start construction in 2023, with a 2 year "drumbeat" and delivery starting from 2023. With the delays that occurred, the best that could have occurred now was a 2025 start, with delivery commencing from 2035 onwards. This meant the critical 6th Attack SSK, which would replace the last Collins SSK (Rankin) would commission in 2045, when Rankin would be 42 years old. The worst case would be Sheean, which would not be replaced until 2043, when Sheean would be 43 years old. This ignores any yard capacity constraints, and assumes up to 5 Attack Class hulls could be present in ASC simultaneously.
So had we continued with the Attack Class at the leisurely pace proposed, we would have faced a capability gap risk anyway. This was because we were replacing an SSK class built at a one year drumbeat, with an SSK class to be built at a 2 year drumbeat.
Can we do better? I think the answer is yes. The key is the drumbeat. I have constructed a schedule that assumes the following:
- ASC would build an "Austute" modified Astute Class SSN, with S9G reactor fitted
- ASC would need to be upgraded to a nuclear engineering standard, taking 3 years to 2025.
- The first Austute would be laid down in 2026, take 8 years to launch (same as BAE Astute #1)
- Austutes would be built in batches of 3, with a one year drumbeat between each, but then a gap till the previous boat was launched, assuming ASC can only fit 3 boats at at a time, similar to Barrrow in UK.
- This would give Austute commission dates of 2034, 3035, 2036, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2047, 2048, and 2049.
- Note that the first batch are assumed to take 8 years each, 7 years for the second, 6 years for the third. This is the same as Electric Boat achieved on Virginia construction, using modular techniques. The same approach should be used for the "Austutes".
The result is the critical 6th Austute enters commission in 2043, allowing retirement of Rankin at age 41.
Pete (further to previous)
ReplyDeleteTwo other points to note:
1. if we did build RAN SSNs in sequential batches of 3, I see no reason not to build 9 instead of 8. The extra cost and build time would be small once the process is set up.
2. Assuming the Austute build went from 2026 to 2049, by the time some extra years were added for mid life upgrades of the nine Austutes, it would be time to start building the next class, nominally in 2056. Hence a continuous build would be achieved.
I have estimated the total program cost in $2022 and outturn $ assuming:
- Austute cost is BAE Astute cost, converted to Au$, inflated by 1.3 for Australian shipbuilding cost premium (Rand report), S9G reactor cost added,
- $30 million per annum extra (each) for ANSTO and ARPANSA,
- $558 million of design costs,
- $2.4 billlion for ASC upgrade, and $2 billion each for FBW (2025-2027)and FBE (2033-2035) upgrades.
The end result is a 2022 cost for nine Australian built Astutes with S9G reactors of $54.6 billion, and an outturn cost of $78.8 billion. This is only CAPEX and regulatory cost, not OPEX. Also it assumes no differential extra cost to go from the Astute combat system to the US combat system. If that is more, add another $9 billion.
I know this is only speculation, but all is based on public sources. To me, the most critical thing to avoid capability gaps is to start upgrading FBW and ASC to a nuclear engineering standard ASAP. Sorry for the long post. Not sure how to send you the cost spreadsheet.
Hi Pete,
ReplyDeleteOff topic, it seems Korea has some problems with its subs ROK Navy Finds Major Defects On Three Of Its Type 214 Submarines
"The ROK Navy found defects in the cables of the inverter module, one of the central components in the propulsion system, aboard ROKS Son Won-il, ROKS Yoon Bong-gil, and ROKS Yoo Gwan-soon. These are the first, fifth, and sixth boats of the class. Each submarine will have to go through a complex overhaul to receive repairs. This will immobilize each vessel at least four months.
To make matters worse, the inverter modules, produced by Siemens, cannot be fixed in Korean shipyards due to legal barriers concerning technology transfers and intellectual property. Therefore, the parts will need to be shipped to Germany for repairs, with the round way trip expected to last 2 months, leading to each submarine being out of action for at least 6 months."
/Kjell
Thanks /Kjell
ReplyDeleteThese defect problems may not be good for TKMS sales https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/rok-navy-finds-major-defects-on-three-of-its-type-214-submarines/
South Korea will more intensively need to utilize its Type 209 variants (KSS-I) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jang_Bogo-class_submarine#Boats_in_class
and accelerate commissioning of its 3,000 ton subs (KSS-III) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KSS-III_submarine#Ships_in_the_class
Pete
Thanks Anonymous
ReplyDeleteFor your excellent two comments posted at Feb 19, 2022, 6:24:00 PM.
I aim to turn it into an article "Dollars, Drumbeats and SSNs" on Tues 22 Feb or Weds 23 Feb.
Meantime, can you provide a link to "Australian shipbuilding cost premium (Rand report)"
Regards Pete
Pete
ReplyDeleteThe Rand Report into Australian shipbuilding was prepared for the Defence Department in 2015. See
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1093.html
Incidentally you can also add the answer to the question: what will SSNs cost to crew? The number is higher than the cost of crewing SSKs, but nowhere near as much as the construction cost.
Assuming an average cost per crew member of $200,000 per annum,
and the need for a crew establishment in the navy of 2.3 times the actual crew complement,
The crew cost per Ausstute SSN is $45 million per annum or $1.35 billion per SSN over a 30 year operational life. This would not be all additional cost, since we are already paying for (smaller crews on the Collins Class.
So the net increase in crew costs over 30 years to go from 6 SSKs (Collins)m to 9 SSNs (Austutes) would be $7.4 billion.
This is why I think the RAN should go for 9 SSNs. In the scheme of things, once you have spent all that money on infrastructure, construction capability and the safety regime, you might as well build as many SSNs as you need. You pay a lot to put the first one in the water. After that the cost per extra boat is not that different to what we were paying for the Attack Class.
Thanks Anonymous [at Feb 20, 2022, 6:25:00 PM]
ReplyDeleteThere is an interesting pre-AUKUS article on Australian SSNs:
Nuclear propulsion for Australia’s submarines? of 17 Nov 2016, by Peter Briggs at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-propulsion-australias-submarines/
"As a rule of thumb the size of the Submarine Arm is driven by the number of qualified crew at sea, for every person at sea the Arm should contain another 1.6 – 1.8 people. So the crew size of the chosen SSN is a key determinant.
For a fleet of ten of the larger British or American SSNs, an Australian submarine arm of about 3,400 would be required."
Some of the 3,400 would be fixed numbers, such as admin, training, maintenance and higher than submarine Commander staff. So lets say 3,200 people for an 8 to 9 SSN arm.
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Also those simultaneous Collins SSK crew, admin and maintenance costs. Substantial but diminishing until the last Collins goes out of service in the 2040s.
Pete
Pete