October 31, 2021

Great Article on AUKUS Submarine Hurdles

 This long article, by Chris Buckley, for the New York Times, via Bangladesh's BdNews24,

on October 30, 2021, 
says it all, so well:

“Nuclear-powered submarines for Australia? Maybe not so fast” 

When Australia made its trumpet-blast announcement that it would build nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the United States and Britain, the three allies said they would spend the next 18 months sorting out the details of a security collaboration that President Joe Biden celebrated as “historic.” 

 

Now, a month into their timetable, the partners are quietly coming to grips with the proposal’s immense complexities. Even supporters say the hurdles are formidable. Skeptics say they could be insurmountable. 


Australia’s prime minister, Scott Morrison, has laid out an ambitious vision, saying that at least eight nuclear-propelled submarines using US or British technology will be built in Australia and enter the water starting in the late 2030s, replacing its squadron of six ageing diesel-powered submarines. 


To pull off the plan, Australia must make major advances. It has a limited industrial base and built its last submarine more than 20 years ago. It produces a few graduates in nuclear engineering each year. Its spending on science research as a share of the economy has lagged behind the average for wealthy economies. Its past two plans to build submarines fell apart before any were made. 


“It’s a dangerous pathway we’re treading down,” said Rex Patrick, an independent member of Australia’s Senate who served as a submariner in the Australian navy for a decade. “What’s at stake is national security.” 


Each country has a vested interest in the partnership. For Australia, nuclear-powered submarines offer a powerful means to counter China’s growing naval reach and an escape hatch from a faltering agreement with a French firm to build diesel submarines. For the Biden administration, the plan demonstrates support for a beleaguered ally and shows that it means business in countering Chinese power. And for Britain, the plan could shore up its international standing and military industry after the upheaval of Brexit. 


But the Rubik’s Cube of interlocking complications that pervades the initiative could slow delivery of the submarines — or, critics say, sunder the whole endeavour — leaving a dangerous gap in Australia’s defences and calling into question the partnership’s ability to live up to its security promises. 


“I don’t think this is a done deal in any way, shape or form,” said Marcus Hellyer, an expert on naval policy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. “We sometimes use the term nation-building lightly, but this will be a whole-of-nation task.” 


US officials have already spent hundreds of hours in talks with their Australian counterparts and have no illusions about the complexities, said officials involved. Morrison “has said this is a high-risk program; he was upfront when he announced it,” Greg Moriarty, the secretary of the Australian Department of Defense, told a Senate committee this week. 


Failure or serious delays would ripple beyond Australia. The Biden administration has staked American credibility on building up Australia’s military as part of an “integrated deterrence” policy that will knit the United States closer to its allies in offsetting China. 


The United States and Britain, for their part, face hurdles to expanding production of submarines and their high-precision parts for Australia, and to diverting expert labor to South Australia, where, Morrison has said, the boats will be assembled. Washington and London have heavy schedules to build submarines for their own navies, including hulking vessels to carry nuclear missiles. 


“Success would be tremendous for Australia and the US, assuming open access to each other’s facilities and what it means in deterring China,” said Brent Sadler, a former US Navy officer who is a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. “Failure would be doubly damaging — an alliance that cannot deliver, loss of undersea capacity by a trusted ally and a turn to isolationism on Australia’s part.” 


Australia is hoping for a reversal of fortune after more than a decade of misadventures in its submarine-modernisation efforts. The plan for French-designed diesel submarines that Morrison abandoned had succeeded a deal for Japanese-designed submarines that a predecessor championed.


“No living Australian prime minister has commissioned a sub that actually got built,” Greg Sheridan, a columnist for The Australian newspaper, wrote in a recent article critical of Morrison’s plan. 


Australia’s latest proposal contains many potential pitfalls. 


It could turn to the United States to help build something like its Virginia-class attack submarine. (Such submarines are nuclear-powered, allowing them to travel faster and stay underwater much longer than diesel ones, but they do not carry nuclear missiles.) 


But the two American shipyards that make nuclear submarines, as well as their suppliers, are straining to keep up with orders for the US Navy. The shipyards complete about two Virginia class boats a year for the Navy and are ramping up to build Columbia-class submarines, 21,000-ton vessels that carry nuclear missiles as a roving deterrent — a priority for any administration. 


A report to the Senate Armed Services Committee last month warned that the “nuclear shipbuilding industrial base continues to struggle to support the increased demand” from US orders. That report was prepared too late to take into account the Australian proposal. 


“They are working at 95-98 percent on Virginia and Columbia,” Richard V Spencer, a Navy secretary in the Trump administration, said of the two US submarine shipyards. He supports Australia’s plan and said his preferred path on the first submarines was to galvanise specialised suppliers to ship parts, or whole segments of the submarines, to assemble in Australia. 


“Let us all be perfectly aware and wide-eyed that the nuclear program is a massive resource consumer and time consumer, and that’s the given,” he said in a telephone interview. 


Other experts have said Australia should choose Britain’s Astute-class submarine, which is less expensive and uses a smaller crew than the big American boats. The head of Australia’s nuclear submarine task force, Vice Adm. Jonathan Mead, said this week that his team was considering mature, “in-production designs” from Britain, as well as the United States. 


“That de-risks the program,” he said during a Senate committee hearing. 


But Britain’s submarines have come relatively slowly off its production line, and often behind schedule. Britain’s submarine maker, BAE Systems, is also busy building Dreadnought submarines to carry the country’s nuclear deterrent. 


“Spare capacity is very limited,” Trevor Taylor, a professorial research fellow in defence management at the Royal United Services Institute, a research institute, wrote in an email. “The UK cannot afford to impose delay on its Dreadnought program in order to divert effort to Australia.” 


Adding to the complications, Britain has been phasing out the PWR2 reactor that powers the Astute, after officials agreed that the model would “not be acceptable going forward,” an audit report said in 2018. The Astute is not designed to fit the next-generation reactor, and that issue could make it difficult to restart building the submarine for Australia, Taylor and other experts said. 


Britain’s successor to the Astute is still on the drawing board; the government said last month that it would spend three years on design work for it. A naval official in the British Ministry of Defense said that the planned new submarine could fit Australia’s timetable well. Several experts were less sure. 


“Waiting for the next-generation UK or US attack submarine would mean an extended capability gap” for Australia, Taylor wrote in an assessment. 


The challenge does not stop with building the submarines. Safeguards to protect sailors and populations, and meet nonproliferation obligations, will require a big buildup of Australia’s nuclear safety expertise. 


Residents in some parts of Barrow-in-Furness, the town of 67,000 that is home to Britain’s submarine-building shipyard, are handed iodine tablets as a precaution against possible leaks when reactors are tested. The Osborne shipyard in South Australia, where Morrison wants to build the nuclear submarines, sits on the edge of Adelaide, a city of 1.4 million. 


Australia operates one small nuclear reactor. Its sole university program dedicated to nuclear engineering produces about five graduates every year, said Edward Obbard, the leader of the program at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. Australia would need many thousands more people with nuclear training and experience if it wants the submarines, he said. 

“The ramp-up has to start now,” he said.”

15 comments:

  1. Here we go. SSN queue is the nuclear equivalent of the COVID vaccine queue.
    https://news.usni.org/2021/10/28/stefany-repairs-to-uss-connecticut-could-cause-perturbations-in-public-shipyards
    KQN

    ReplyDelete
  2. Thanks KQN

    For pointing to https://news.usni.org/2021/10/28/stefany-repairs-to-uss-connecticut-could-cause-perturbations-in-public-shipyards

    At https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/10/strangely-sober-sermon-aukus-ssn.html?showComment=1635569549076#c2877366735599122241
    I estimated the USS Connecticut repair costs being magnitudes from 10's US$ millions, through 100's US$ millions through to Beyond Repair.

    For the repairs just to USS Connecticut mid-range magniture estimates of 100s US$ millions seem on target.

    However the USS Connecticut's repairs' knock-on effects to the whole USN's SSN maintenance queue/program, as illustrated in https://news.usni.org/2021/10/28/stefany-repairs-to-uss-connecticut-could-cause-perturbations-in-public-shipyards

    may place USS Connecticut as Beyond Economic Repair.

    Pete

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  3. Hi Pete,

    Problems in the Netherlands to keep the time line Netherlands’ Walrus-Class Submarine Replacement Program Facing Delays

    "he Dutch "Walrus-class replacement program" will take more time than initially planned. The delay in the procurement of four new generation submarines to replace the four in-service Walrus-class submarines of the Royal Netherlands Navy is because talks with the three competing shipbuilders has yielded less information and less depth than the Dutch Ministry of Defense had hoped for."

    /Kjell

    ReplyDelete
  4. Hi Pete
    The main issue with the UK Astute class is really the Rolls Royce PWR2 reactor safety profile
    A lot is classified but its production has stopped and a new reactor the PWR3 is being designed with US help ..This is also why the HMS Vanguard (also on PWR2) is in dry-dock since 2015

    The 2018 public Audit report (mentionned in the NYT article) basically says that no independant civilian nuclear watchdog would have accepted this design ( It follows problems that were discovered in 2011 ) An N sub in an harbour ,close to Adelaide as in this article, is a Npower plant and should be designed , inspected, audited ..as such

    Now I am speculating: the biggest problem of PWR is not the meltdown since TMI (Tchernobyl was not a PWR and run by irresponsible/stupid people), Fukushima was first a Tsunami with massive leaks into the ocean) but the leakage of radioactive material gas in particular in the primary due to corrosion of the Zirconium alloy U cladding(thousands of tubes..)

    In civilian reatctors (cheical extraction as well) before the reactor is shut qdon and the fuel rods replaced
    ..
    Not that simplre if the reactor iss ealed for life

    ReplyDelete
  5. Hi Pete
    (My Key board was not functionning well so I am reexpanding my post)

    In civilian reactors an acceptable level of leak is authorized (a chemical process to adsorb the gases is also in place)before the reactor is shut down and the defective rods changed Usually within the typical 3 years of the fuel life this does not occurs .Such an incident happened in Taishan 1 close to HK (South China French EPR at 1750 MW in spring 2021, operated by French EDF)It became public because EDF wanted to shut down the reactor (French legal limits) while the Chinese (higher accaptable limits ..and a shortage of power) wanted to keep running. It was shut down this summer and the rods changed or in the process of.The disclosure was made in the US..and the Chinese were mad..

    For a reactor "sealed for life" ie w/o the infrastructure (equipment , people,training ) to change the fuel routinely ,it becomes somewhat problematic

    ReplyDelete
  6. Nuclear power plant is a hard sell nearly anywhere on Earth, may be the only exception is France. If you are top in maths and sciences, would you go into nuclear engineering and dead end your young career? No, you will sign up for computer sciences, electrical engineering so you can go to Apple, Microsoft, Google, etc.
    There is another issue with defining the next generation of SSN. What is their mission scope? Do they need to carry hypersonic glide weapons and what is the range of those weapons? If the answer is just to kill some ships the the Russian Zircon, then may be an Astute or Virginia will be fine.
    If the answer is I need to lob them to 7000km (in a straight line), then even a Virginia's beam of 10 meters may be too small. 7000km means a boost glide hypersonic weapon, and that hypersonic glide warhead needs to go pretty fast, like Mach 17+. That is not a small weapon. The US Army boost hypersonic glide weapon which is being developed, I think the booster has a 38-inch diameter. If correct, we are talking a weapon the size of a Pershing II which has a 1m diameter and is ~11m long. In no time, we will be looking at a submarine the size of an SSGN like the Ohio or Columbia or close to it.
    These hypersonic glide weapons will be expected to maneuver in their terminal phases. The way they change direction is by rolling. That will increase the drag, the velocity will slow down quite a lot and the actual range will be much shorter than 7000kms.
    Given these SSNs are supposed to be introduced in 2040, I just doubt anyone can say there is no need to support boost glide hypersonic weapons.
    KQN

    ReplyDelete
  7. Thanks /Kjell [your Oct 31, 2021, 10:55:00 PM]

    And https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/netherlands-walrus-class-submarine-replacement-program-facing-delays/ also provides the info:

    "A 2nd round of dialogue should have started in September 2021 but has been postponed until December. This round will be used to further review the concepts and whether they meet the requirements set by the Dutch MoD.

    It now appears that the long-awaited decision on a winning bid, initially expected by the end of 2022 at best (following an initial one year delay in the process) will have to be pushed further."

    Pete Comment

    So I think the Netherlands are very intelligently and intentionally prolonging the bargaining with all 3 (Naval Group, Saab-Kockums and TKMS) on the shortlist to get the best deal and price.

    This is so much better than Australian Prime Minister Turnbull prematurely choosing just one seller (Naval Group) in 2016. That 2016 choice weas long before the final design, local content, other duty of care details and especially FINAL PRICE were nailed down.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Thanks Anonymous [your 2 comments at Nov 1, 2021, 1:38:00 AM and at Nov 1, 2021, 2:59:00 AM]

    Both your comments/info on UK submarine and other reactor issues are very interesting.

    I'll respond (as an article later this week) to what you've written.

    Regards

    Pete

    ReplyDelete
  9. Hi Pete,

    FYI, I was doing a search for info on the upcoming SSN(X) reactor, as I surmise that this may be used as a common reactor system for AUSKUS.

    Found this recent report to US Congress on SSN(X), and it mentions that a switch LEU was investigated:

    It is not practical to substitute LEU into existing naval fuel systems or to design a VIRGINIA Class Submarine (VCS) replacement [i.e., the SSN(X)] around an unproven advanced LEU fuel concept. Developing a newly designed submarine capable of later acceptance of an LEU reactor core would also involve insertion of substantial margin (e.g., increased hull size) that would be difficult to estimate accurately at present and costly to implement. If future United States policy requires a shift to LEU, at least 15 years of advanced fuel development and significant investment would be required. This development timeline makes it impractical to design a lead ship VCS replacement with an LEU reactor while meeting the Navy’s schedule.

    https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11826

    ReplyDelete
  10. Thanks Shawn C

    Of all the complexity and expense matters Australia is most like a "Babe in the Woods" over reactors.

    We'll need to hold the hands of Daddy (US) and Mummy (UK) and hope for the HEU reactor best.

    LEU is out - unless we went back and begged forgiveness from Macron and LEU using Naval Group.

    Cheers

    Pete

    ReplyDelete
  11. To Shawn
    You a quite right, and the conclusion of the US Congress is absolutely correct
    The key words are "existing" and "unproven LEU concept"
    Interestingly no mention of operationnal performance differences, none in fact,safety or disposal
    Larger core of LEU , only if you keep the fuel for 35+year . and not refuel.
    The Fr Rubis class is less than 300O T !Refuel every 7 years

    So again look at the LEU/HEU discussion from a distance

    The US has a glut of HEU due to disarmement , started its programm before the PWRindustry maturation in the 70, and all the civilian norms.The USN has an excellent safety record , has enough U Weapon grade until at lest 2060 and has put in place a robust learning curve.Why change ?Not concern by NPT. No civilian N oversight either, Has a plan for disposal? Have practically open ended financial/technological ressources to go after any route

    If you do not have, or an excess of HEU and/or you decide not to pay for HEU anymore(as France in 2003,( "500 bombs is sufficient" in fact 290 today), if you have a completely developped civilian N industry from mining to disposal including fuel processes .You choose LEU.
    You "piggy back" on this industry and you develop the system , the robots , the inspection tools, the training, and have your learning curve in plac: 50 years in France.
    It is not only an economical aspect but also a safety/public acceptance as you can use the same civilian independant watchdog to inspect the Sub and the fuel cycle. By changing the fuel every 10 years(or 7), which is a routine operation with robotized transfer system,lasting weeks as in civilian plant ,you have acces for inspection (optical/ultrasonic/physical analysis.) to the walls of the pressure reactor as in civilian plant and a legal mandate in many countries.

    The red herring of lost time to refuel does not make sense owing to the much longer and frequent maintenance periods of any sub.As for hatches modern subs have frequently hatches including the OHIO class SSBN for weapon reloading

    So China , Brazil , India and probably SK and Japan are following the LEU route. If you do not have a robust N industry, you cannot have an independant N sub fleet

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  12. Just for the fun ...


    https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/coal-ash-is-more-radioactive-than-nuclear-waste/

    ReplyDelete
  13. It seems that government is contemplating the Collins 2, an extended version, to be a possible stop gap, bridging the nuclear direction. Oh the “bloody irony”. Again I allude to the fact that if the Collins variants were of a continuous build, we would probably be evolved enough for the appointment of a nuclear propulsion module . It is truely mind boggling at the shortsightedness of our supposed government.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Hi Lee McCurtayne

    1. People have been floating the Collins 2 idea since about 2005. There would need to be much more supporting evidence before I believe any current Collins 2 rehash.

    2. Are you suggesting Australia (and presumably Saab Kockums?) could become involved in developing a nuclear propelled Collin 2? Or would that be a Collins 3 SSN?

    Regards

    Pete

    ReplyDelete
  15. Well from where I sit, a 2045-50 timeline is futile with a potential enemy walking up the driveway. What options (that make sense) are open to us other than the Naval offering?. Sorry but the Collins 2 would be a far quicker and cost effective option. Yes I hear the howls from the peanut gallery but with the knowledge bank of the ASC, Kockhams and SAAB it would be far more achievable than the S### Fight the “powers that be”have put Australia in. Really, what are our dwindling options? The Japs find us lacking, the French are gone, the Yanks will kick it down the road and the Brits are really selling us their next Gen sub. Frankly the ASC can digitise what we already have in the way of plans and hard material. The Gotland was refurbed and lengthened, proving that an existing sub can either be rejuvenated Collins or a new Collins variant is still just as desirable.
    My comment about a nuclear version of the Collins 2 or 3 is a Collins with the designated infrastructure, space and nuclear rear end facilitated by either the Americans or the Brits.
    Yes I understand it’s a tall order, but it would be a “Work in progress” evolving a very good platform to an obvious destiny. If the ASC had been given the ability to evolve, this would have just come to fruition through necessity. Is this not what was the “logical” evolution of any sub building nations ambitions. Steady, methodical advancement.

    ReplyDelete

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