The AUKUS September 15/16, 2021 SSN future for Australia intention has thrown up a wide range of production, cost, political and legal issues. The following are 2 major areas.
1. Build Aus Nuke Subs in Australia?
Gessler commented Sept 16, 2021:
"Things seem to be getting pretty interesting again with regard to the Australian submarine program. I'm guessing the official press releases are yet to come (as per what I've read on ABC).
But if RAN & Australian DoD are serious about an SSN acquisition, I personally reckon it makes the most sense to purchase 4-6 submarines directly from the US/UK. Considering that both the Astute & Virginia-class production is currently running, it might be the most affordable way to acquire an SSN capability, both with regard to price & time.
Wanting to construct SSNs in Australia would again lead to a program as humongous in price & convoluted in scope as the Attack-class SSK program, if not more so. In fact, definitely more so. CONSIDERABLY more so.
Off-the-shelf purchase of a number of SSNs of similar configuration as currently being built for USN or RN (minus any export-controlled stuff) would certainly seem to be the most straightforward way. But I understand there's lots of jobs/economical issues tied up with the local construction plan for Attack-class, I wonder what the Morrison Govt will come up with to satisfy those needs. Eagerly waiting for your thoughts (both as comments and/or in the form of an article)."
[Some thoughts on Sept 14, 2021 from Pete]
2. HEU Double Standard
KQN on Sept 16, 2021 rightly raised the issue:
"Virginia, Astute and Los Angeles class SSN all use highly enriched fissile material beyond the limits of non proliferation treaty, so how can one say one is not violating at a time when we beat up on NK and Iran for enriching fissile material? Should the laws apply to every one and not based on one party's interpretation?"
Much as I hate to say it, but one has to be somewhat realistic that our government will have to lease American subs to train our sailors on well and truly before taking on our own nuclear subs. Just leasing a certain amount of Los Angeles class subs could take us up to that point where subs may not be a viable asset any longer. There is that possibility, so one has to ask do we embark on this "fait acompli"
ReplyDeleteRe: 1 - there is no spare capacity in either US or UK to build submarines for someone else that I can see. US is building flat out with USN orders stacked up & even more planned. UK is building their last 2 Astutes & have started on their new SSBNs. I don’t see how they could build 8 more without impacting the SSBNs. While the UK can build faster than it currently is, 8 is more SSNs than the entire UK SSN build. If this had been done somewhere around UK boat 3, they could have kept their build rate up. Australia could have had 4, still LOTE Collins & then have taken 4 Astute mk2. So I expect an Australian build of either Astute or Virginia block IV (not block V), with an imported reactor.
ReplyDeleteRe: 2 - I look at it as being somewhat like the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement. Supposedly that is NTP compliant.
You will be laughing if US Navy will shift to LEU and when you should find replacement for the futur AUS SSN class.
ReplyDeletehttps://fissilematerials.org/blog/2019/06/us_shift_away_from_heu-fu.html
We have no capacity in Barrow to build further Astutes as Dreadnought is in build now.
ReplyDeleteProduction issues (as well as political need to build in Australia) raised above would normally be show stoppers to the SSN project.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, AUKUS seems to be a major national priority to all members. If this is due to Chinese escalations with respect to South China Sea and Taiwan (Less certain about the second) need for submarines is immanent. This may require USN releasing some submarines already under construction. This is normally not done, but may be possible in special circumstances. As I recall, US shipped weapons to Israel on extremely short notice during 1973 war, and this would have had to be from US inventory.
If Biden were to authorize this, I doubt there would be much Republican resistance (less sure about Democrats). Over time, Australian specific modifications could be added.
All this is determined by how urgent is the perceived need. Difficult things are doable in an emergency, and are impossible at other times.
Pete: Could you comment on urgency of SSN requirement, related SSK/SSN tradeoffs? Or maybe put up some links to other articles on this? Otherwise this discussion is taking place in a vacuum.
P.S.
ReplyDeleteUS President Biden, on September 15, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/
only vaguely indicated specific US action:
"Our governments [which includes the UK Government] will now launch an 18-month consultation period to determine every element of this program - from workforce, to training requirements, to production timelines, to safeguards and nonproliferation measures, and to nuclear stewardship and safety - to ensure full compliance with each of our nation’s commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."
Hi Anonymous [Sep 26, 2021, 2:31:00 AM]
ReplyDeletePlease see my revized https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/09/initial-guess-timates-aus-numbat-class.html
Delays in Australia buying, building or leasing an SSN are inevitable becused it takes 15 years to train safe nuclear proficient officers, petty officers and onshore maintainers.
Pete
Hi Pete [Sep 27, 2021, 12:20:00 AM]
ReplyDeleteIs that 15 year thing a hard constraint? If so, assuming you start next year, any nuclear sub (Astute, Virginia, or whatever) will not be available until 2037.
Whatever threats they are required to address may materialize before that date. Incidentally, Xi Jin Ping is 68 years old now. Whatever adventures he may be interested in will probably not wait until after he is 82 years old. In the meantime, something is needed that can keep enough units rotated on station in South China Sea. I don't think the Collins can do that, and I doubt they will be militarily credible that long anyway.
If the suspected threat is likely to emerge in this time frame, what options remain?