Political Concerns of the Walrus Replacement Program

On February 8, 2021 the inexhaustible Locum commented:

"Many talk the Talk, but when start, do they walk the Walk?

The official Walrus replacement process started at the beginning of 2013. With the Netherlands signing a MoU about submarine cooperation with Norway and Germany. 

In this process there are two sides. One side wants to import a cheap MOTS submarine from abroad. The other side [the Navy and Ministry of Defense] wants a Walrus 2.0.  

The cheap MOTS side, consists of politicians and civil servants who differ greatly from the Defense Ministry’s Walrus 2.0 aspiration. The “cheap MOTS side” are afraid of a repeat of the Walrus troubles. [Pete comment see "The purchase of today's submarines, the Walrus class, was a headache." at marineschepen March 15, 2013 ] 

In the 1980s, politicians decided to save a large shipyard consortium (RSV) by speeding up the Walrus design phase. [RSV collapsed in 1983.] Then, the same happened during the "JSF" [F-35A?] System Development & Demonstration phase. The construction had already started, but many drawings were not ready or had not been made at all.

During the development, the specifications also changed because of the increasing Soviet submarine threat. Costs skyrocketed while time milestones were missed. The Navy’s leadership made the mistake of not reporting this to the politicians. The Walrus (troubling) affair was born. [Pete comment: see “Construction: complex, full of delays and problems” at this other marineschepen article].

There are not only 2 sides with totally different views about the Walrus replacement. Other Departments interfere in this project too. In this kind of large defense project there are financial, economical (trade & jobs), industrial and Foreign Affairs aspects too. Unfortunately, the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Internal Affairs and the Prime Minister himself, all fit the expression “Too many cooks in the Kitchen”. [Also reported in this previous SubMatts article.] All those Ministries have opposing views about the Walrus successor. 

Our Netherlands economy depends a lot at international trade and has an open character.

So the foreign relations aspects are important for the Netherlands. Two contenders (Naval Group and TKMS) are from the most powerful EU members. This plays a significant role in the choice of the new sub.

All those factors have made the Walrus replacement a highly politically sensitive matter.

According to the current time schedule, in:

2021, the decision will be made for the Staff Requirements, design and shipyard.

2022 the contract will be signed in [Pete comment: Finally? :-]. 

2023 or 2024 the start of construction will begin. 

2027 the Walrus replacement must be delivered to the Dutch Navy, and 

2028 enter service. 

Well, that's a challenge !

Many experts, insiders and other interested people in The Netherlands are following the Naval Group designed for Australia Attack class project. [See here and here.]

Many Dutch do not like the French and do not favour the shortened Barracuda version.

Why? because the Dutch see the French as too dominant, too selfish and unreliable.

According to the Dutch General Accountability Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) one of the 3 contenders is too expensive for the Dutch budget. But this candidate is also the best performing one. Many Dutch suspect that this is the shortened Barracuda. 

[Pete comment. See the relevant Dutch General Accountability Office's "Report on the Replacement of the Submarines" here of 10 December 2020, which, once translated, states: “According to the [Minister of Defense], a better design that could handle all tasks with 3 pieces would be rejected due to excessive costs.”] 

Because political factors play the main role in this project. There is a realistic chance that the Walrus replacement ends up 'a train-wreck'. In other words: they get, what they don't need.

Locum
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Artwork from Dutch General Accountability Office's "Report on the Replacement of the Submarines" 10 December 2020, here. Looking at the words and pictures translated by Pete, to the effect:
---

Major Costs Investigated

4 Submarines

Including Anti-ship missiles

Land attack missiles

Torpedos

Submarine midlife update

Support ship

Additional Costs

Equipment and Fuel

Personnel Costs

Repairs and maintenance, need including in the Defense Budget

Transition costs, costs (unknown). [It may be significant that the accompanying artwork shows a new submarine with a Barracuda style pumpjet.] 

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PETE COMMENT

I suspect that TKMS which is offering the Type 212CD E can demonstrate its costs most precisely to the Dutch Government because 212s have been operating for many years. Germany like the Netherlands works loosely in the NATO command structure. However, the Germans, like the French, are also seen as a powerful, dominant, EU member.

Sweden, with Saab, offering the A26, is a similar small-medium European country as the Netherlands. The A26 is less costed as it has yet to be launched/operated and Sweden is not in NATO. But Saab may be offering the best industrial build-in-Netherlands agreement which would please many Dutch ministries, voters and trade unions.