Singapore's Surface Navy - Part Two

Following Singapore's Surface Navy - Part One, August 19, 2020, the following are further points from Benjamin, based on his August 18, 2020 comments:

Singapore’s Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF)(see Fact Sheet) was formed in 2009, believed to be in security coordinational response to threats from Islamic terrorists travelling by sea. The main fear was that Singapore was vulnerable to an event like the seaborne Islamic terrorist Mumbai, India in 2008 (which led to the deaths of 165 Indians).

Why was the announcement of purpose built ships for the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) so recent if the future (around 2,500 ton) multi role combat vessel (MRCV) and joint multi-mission (large 10,000 ton? amphibious) ship (JMMS) were announced years earlier?

The obvious reason was the rise in piracy along the Singapore Straits.

(Map above and statistics below courtesy Gard marine insurance headquartered in Oslo, Norway)

---

Gard explains "According to data from the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCaap ISC), a total of 31 piracy incidents, actual and attempted, were recorded in the Singapore Strait by 30 December 2019 compared to seven in 2018." 

So far the reorganisation of the MSTF is seen in response to the increase in piracy with the concern of terrorism where returning fighters from the Middle East are returning to the region. 

There were speculations why the increase in piracy. From COVID-19 which created economic hardships to the redeployment of naval vessels by the Indonesian Navy to contested waters in the South China Sea (SCS).

Increased pirate activity occurred before COVID hence such conclusion can't be drawn.

I am unsure if Indonesian naval redeployments to Indonesia's joint armed forces base in the Natuna islands resulted in a gap which created an opportunity for the pirates. The area concerned is the Singapore Strait. Origin of redeployed ships is unclear. [See map above. It is 565km from Singapore to the Natuna islands.]

There was a Maritime dispute between Singapore and Malaysia from 2018-2019 (map above) which I believe contributed to this restructuring as well. Here is a Singapore-Malaysia maritime dispute timeline (up to April 8, 2019) mainly over port limits [largely resolved]. The RSN deployed a Littoral mission Vessel (LMV) [in coastguard mode] to the area much to the dismay of Malaysia. Malaysia did not send any naval vessel. They deployed their maritime agency vessels. It was a grey zone conflict with no clashing involved other than a cat mouse chase https://youtu.be/KJiFQbbjdjk and one tanker made contact with their agency vessel - see https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/asia/collision-disputed-singapore-malaysia-waters-reignites-political-tension .

 The matter was resolved with both sides reverting to the original status before the dispute took place after diplomatic talks/pressure. So Malaysia did not get what they came for in the end

What will these new purposed built ships look like? On one end it can be a lighter version of the LMV. On the other end it can be based on the [1,250 ton] Fearless 75.

Smaller than the LMV, these vessels are catered towards localised waters - see https://defpost.com/singapores-maritime-security-task-force-to-acquire-new-purpose-built-platforms/?amp

Also see Benjamin's comments of August 20, 2020 here and here.

(Handy map showing tiny Singapore island's proximity to the vital Strait of Malacca trade narrow. Singapore is geographically sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia.)

--- 

Pete Comment

Singapore's naval procurement strategy and process is a complex, ongoing, matter. It would also be interesting to focus, in similar depth, on Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine surface ship procurement. All of those navies are also under pressure from encroaching Chinese naval, coastguard and naval militia/fishing fleets.