Captain Crozier COVID-19 Affair - Sacking Admirals?

With Captain Crozier of USS Theodore Roosevelt being relieved of command, April 2, for  publically demanding his COVID hit crew be allowed to disembark in Guam - new questions are being asked about which Admiral heads should roll. If any. 

This is following the resignation of a high civilian, acting Secretary of the Navy Modly, over the affair. All this is to do with sometime conflicting needs of honouring chain of command against responsibility for the welfare of your crew. 

This is a complex issue involving the USN's octopus like chain of command.

Looks like Croziers's immediate boss is Rear Admiral Stewart P. Baker, Commander Carrier Strike Group 9 which includes USS Theodore Roosevelt. Should Baker's head roll? 

Here's a major part of a Washington Examiner, article, April 7, 2020, focusing on Admiral Baker:

"Baker was Crozier's direct commanding officer in his role as commander of Carrier Strike Group 9. While aircraft carrier captains such as Crozier are in charge of their particular vessels, an admiral commands the deployed strike group, [including the carrier, and associated destroyers, cruisers, submarines and supply ships].

So far, however, we don't know what Baker was or was not doing about Crozier's concerns in the days that preceded the latter's email. And that matters very greatly because learning more will help us get to the bottom of whether Crozier's chain of command failed him or he failed it.

For a start, note that the New York Times has reported "that tensions between Captain Crozier and his immediate boss, Rear Adm. Stuart P. Baker, the commander of a multiship task force including the Roosevelt, most likely complicated the Navy’s response to the viral outbreak and prompted the captain to send a four-page [email] pleading for help."

As Defense One's timeline points out, we know that these tensions were bubbling two days before Crozier's email hit the San Francisco Chronicle. Now, note some reporting on why Crozier sent his email without first informing Baker of his intent to do so. As the very well-sourced David Ignatius explains, Baker told Modly that he had asked Crozier why he hadn’t sought advance clearance for the message or large distribution and, "According to Modly, Crozier answered that 'he worried Baker would not let him send it to that broad a group.' Baker affirmed to Modly: 'He was right. I wouldn’t.'"

The key here is thus to figure out whether Modly is being entirely honest when he says that Crozier was receiving all appropriate Navy guidance and assistance before he sent out his email. Or whether Crozier, as his unauthorized email would suggest, felt that the chain of command was risking the lives of the Theodore Roosevelt's crew and air wing without compelling mission rationale to the contrary. It is worth noting here that, contrary to Modly's pushback against Crozier's email description of a nonwar footing that justified the Theodore Roosevelt's return to port, it would be a big problem for the Theodore Roosevelt to arrive in the South China Sea as an epidemic wreaked havoc across the ship. That would risk the ship being unable to face a critical enemy threat such as Chinese ballistic missile forces.

So, what about Baker?

Well, what's odd here is how quiet Baker has been since Crozier's firing. We haven't heard that he's delivered any rallying speeches to the Theodore Roosevelt's crew, for example. Instead, Baker seems to have been focused on praising his Navy leadership. Note Baker's comments on Sunday expressing how he is "extremely thankful for the overwhelming support from the government of Guam and Naval Base Guam in the fight against COVID-19, even with such short notice, they were able to assist getting our Sailors moved off ship in a short period of time. Their support has been critical to our ability to remain mission ready."

Again, perhaps Crozier was receiving Baker's ardent support and simply overreacted without justification. Perhaps the Navy had already decided to give Crozier what he needed as hundreds of crew members faced infection. But Baker's choice of words and the disagreements prior to Crozier's email over how to handle the outbreak suggest another possibility. Namely, that Baker had his eyes more tightly focused on getting one of the Navy's few vice admiral billets and ignored Crozier's concerns in fear of aggravating Navy leaders.

In short, we need to know more. As far as is possible amid the coronavirus outbreak, congressional armed services committees should seek testimony from Baker, Crozier, Modly, and 7th Fleet commander Bill Merz [HQ'd in Yokosuka]. The Navy has had too many senior leadership failings in the past 12 months. Let's ensure accountability."

WHAT OF OTHER ADMIRALS INVOLVED?

Baker's vulnerability includes only being a Rear Admiral. But there are more senior Admirals up the chain:

-  Baker's boss Vice Admiral Scott D. Conn Commander US Third Fleet, based in San
    Diego.

-  Conn's boss, 4 star Admiral John C. Aquilino - Commander US Pacific Fleet, based in

    Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

-  Aquilino's boss, 4 star Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander Indo-Pacific Command  

-  Another Aquilino boss, 4 star Admiral Michael M Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations

-  Gilday's boss, 4 star General Mark A. Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

PETE COMMENT 

Look's like there are sufficient 4 stars to blur the chain of command. 

The COVID-19 threat deserves quick sorting out on policy and naval-military operational response levels. 

Pete