Submarine Choices for the Phillipines

A comment by jaimecenturion101 indicates the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Horizon Modernization Program saw a need for between 2 and 6 submarines from the 2020s. In 2018 current Philippine Navy chief, Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad pushed hard for (conventional diesel-electric) submarines to be included in medium term plans.

 

rhk111 on November 10, 2019 made interesting comments on Submarine Matters article South Korea Could Export Submarines to Philippines and an additional comment of November 13, 2019 under article "Any US Block on Philippines Buying Submarines a Big Mistake". rhk111’s November 13 comment indicated the Philippine President had little constitutional power if the President had any inclination to source submarines from China or Russia. The Philippine military (including Philippine Navy (PN) is reputedly still mostly pro-US.

 

Pete comment – This pro-US orientation/tradition might undergo change if the US imposed pro-Human Rights embargoes/punishments on the Philippines. If the PN were starved of Western submarine choices because the US imposed a ban on any US parts in these submarines then a PN preference for non-US parts subs (ie. Russian or Chinese) may grow.

 

China - Yuan variant S20s

 

China has been marketing an export Yuan class variant known as the S20 in the Asian region with one being bought by the Thai Navy under the designation S26T and two expected to be bought. Eight S20s will be sold (or perhaps virtually gifted) to the Pakistani Navy.

The high cost of submarines means that the relationship between seller country and buyer is often highly political. For example the 8 x S20s to being sold by China to Pakistan has alliance cementing aspects being a naval means to contain/encircle their mutual adversary, India.

However, as China has probably been the main adversary of the Philippines in South China Seas frictions one would think it unlikely the Philippines would buy submarines from China, but surprises can happen. For example China could offer subs at very low “foot in the door” prices.

 

Russia – Improved Kilo submarines

 

Russia successfully exported Kilo submarines up to the mid 1990s and then an Improved Kilo class development (Project 636) exported since 1996. China received 10 Improved Kilos, Vietnam (6) and Algeria (4).

Russia’s export of 6 Improved Kilos to Vietnam provided an opportunity to increase Russian influence. One reason being many Vietnamese submarine naval officers, petty officers and especially engineers were stationed in Russia for years to learn Russian in order to become proficient at all the Improved Kilos procedures. These Russian influences may be carried over to Cam Ranh main base back in Vietnam - see this article from Vietnam.

A large number of naval, civilian political and economic factors go into submarine selection. Reasons include the vast costs of purchasing, training, crewing and maintenance involved.

Another major selection criteria What does the PN want to do with the submarines?

Often the main use in peacetime is surveillance of non-state actors eg. Islamic terrorist-separatists (in southern Philippines?) smugglers, private army "wars" and illegal fishing boats, surveillance of adversary navies (Chinese Navy and others nosing around “West Philippine Sea” islands with undersea oil/gas potential) and to create doubt in adversary navies’ captains if they decide to trespass in Philippine waters.

Submarine uses in wartime still includes surveillance and threat creating doubt, a sub’s torpedoes and anti-ship missiles can sink enemy ships, expediting naval blockades, a sub’s land attack missiles can hit cities and high value military targets, also a sub laying mines in-near enemy harbours/bases.

Potential Western sellers to the Philippines and some key strength, weaknesses include:

Franch Naval Group’s (NG’s) Scorpenes

A mature export design (so development costs long paid for) as it has been sold since the 1990s to 4 customers including Malaysia. Generous commissions possible (as in Malaysia). If the PN wants AIP (especially useful for longer term submerged surveillance missions sitting on the seabed) then NG’s second generation AIP may be almost ready (but such AIP may be expensive due to recent development costs). NG is French Government owned so corporate structure likely to remain stable. Can often speak English.

Germany’s TKMS – Type 209s and 214s

Could offer the Type 209 (no AIP) or Type 214 (with a mature AIP though expensive). Type 209s and 214s are mature designs sold to many export customers. Corruption opportunities generally low. TKMS corporate structure may be subject to change in medium-long term. German staff might generally speak English.

South Korea’s (SK’s) DSME

Can offer ChangBogo Type 209 variant. Mature design. Nine sold to SK Navy. Three have been delivered to Indonesia with 3 more on order – all as Nagapasa-class. Maturity, established sales record and known efficiency of SK shipping industry tend to indicate on-time, on-budget. Medium corruption opportunities?

SK also builds Type 214 variants (with AIP) for SK Navy. But SK has no licence to export Germany’s highly valuable mature Fuel Cell AIP technology.

DSME 2000 concept export submarine – too early to assess, but purchase cost would be high for first customer(s) as it would be a new submarine design incorporating new Lithium-ion Battery technology. English proficiency may be low.

Sweden’s Saab-Kockums - A26 Submarines

A new design though influenced by Sweden’s Gotland class. Two A26s (called Blekinge-class) being built for Swedish Navy. Has mature Stirling AIP. Low corruption opportunities. With just 2 x A26s not yet built Sweden’s development costs likely to boost price for any initial export customer(s). Though Sweden originally built subs for cold water Baltic Sweden successfully modified Challenger and Archer class subs for warm water/air Singaporean Navy. Swedish staff generally speak good English.

Spain’s Navantia S-80 Plus

First S-80 Plus (Isaac Peral) class not yet completed for Spanish Navy after a troubled development. Its AIP immature as it has not been tested operationally. Some of prolonged development costs likely to be passed on to export customer(s). Includes some sensitive US combat system components (and Harpoon missiles) that may not be exportable from Spain. Navantia staff may speak English and definitely Spanish.

Japan? or other exporters (eg. Taiwan?) unknown.

Pete