I’ve added further links, comments in brackets [...] for
extra info and bolded to highlight some parts.
Liu
Zhen for China's Hong Kong South
China Morning Post (SCMP) reported
January 11th (updated 12th) 2019:
"Chinese army sends DF-26 ballistic missiles to
northwest region
·
Long-range missiles can carry nuclear
or conventional warheads and strike medium to large vessels up to 4,000 km away
·
[Chinese] State media says they are
being used in [China’s] plateau and desert areas for training
The People’s Liberation Army has sent its DF-26 ballistic
missiles to China’s northwest region in an apparent bid to beef up training of
its missile force.
State broadcaster CCTV reported on Thursday that the
far-reaching anti-ship ballistic missiles were being used in active training in
the country’s northwestern plateau and desert areas.
The DF-26 can carry a nuclear or conventional warhead and
strike medium to large vessels [and use nuclear warheads against deep divesubmarines] as far as 4,000km (2,500 miles) away.
On [January 11, 2019], nationalistic tabloid Global
Times highlighted the timing, with the mobilisation coinciding
with US
warship the USS McCampbell [see
Wiki] “trespassing”
in China’s territorial waters near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South
China Sea that are claimed by Beijing.
But Song Zhongping, a Hong Kong-based military commentator,
[Song Zhongping can be considered a semi-official Chinese Government spokesman as he graduated from the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Engineering
University (now the Rocket Force University of Engineering)]
said it would not be necessary to resort to a long-range
missile like the DF-26 if China wanted to take action over such “intrusions”.
“You don’t kill a tiny chick with a cleaver you would use on
a bull,” Song said. “Mentioning the
DF-26 is more about muscle-flexing in response to provocations generally.”
DF-26 is more about muscle-flexing in response to provocations generally.”
Song added that China had already deployed anti-ship
missiles to both the Paracels and the Spratly Islands, which would be far more
effective in dealing with any potential conflict.
“US warships in the South China Sea will fall within the
firing range of these artilleries in the event of any incidents,” he said.
The mobilisation was seen as a measure to strengthen
training of China’s missile force.
The PLA Rocket Force has set up training grounds and target
ranges in the vast plateau and deserts of the northwest and carries out test
firing in the sparsely populated region.
The ranges are equipped with monitoring facilities and
electronic jamming to simulate a battlefield, and they are also outside the range of detection of US radars
such as the THAAD – or Terminal High Altitude Area Defence – system
deployed in South Korea.
The CCTV report showed seven military trucks carrying DF-26
missiles travelling along a road amid rough terrain and sand dunes but did not
say when the mobilisation took place.
“Over the past few years, we have trained and held drills
everywhere from the east coast to the northeast, and the desert in the
northwest,” brigade commander Yao Wenshan told the broadcaster. “Our special
mission is to kill at one strike from thousands of kilometres away.”
The DF-26 missile was first seen in public at a military
parade in 2015 and it was confirmed to have entered into service in April [2018].
This week was the first time the missile has been shown to
be in operation, including close-up footage and shots from its launch panel.
China has another anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D [see Wiki],
which is also believed to be able to strike an aircraft carrier, but with a
shorter range of about 1,450km."
ARTICLE ENDS
Also see a Chinese Government Youtube (in English) on the DF-26, released at the same time as the SCMP article.
ARTICLE ENDS
Also see a Chinese Government Youtube (in English) on the DF-26, released at the same time as the SCMP article.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT
Its likely some DF-26s remain closer to China’s coast for
continuing targeting (satellite, SOSUS and radar ground station) network
practice and for possible use in time of conflict.
Extra information from Wiki includes DF-26s:
- have a 3,000–5,471 km (1,864–3,400 mile) range,
and so are classed as a intermediate-range
- have a 1,200-1,800 kg warhead.
- the USAF estimates that as of June 2017 over 16 launchers were operationally deployed.
The ambiguity of whether or not a DF-26 unit has
conventional or nuclear warheads makes it risky for the US to target
these missiles in a first strike.
From the China coast they can
hit carriers and Guam.
The CEP
is an inaccurate (?) 150 – 450 meters (490 – 1,480
feet) which implies reliance on a nuclear warhead.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Below is an earlier Youtube, uploaded in April 2018. The claim, 1 minute, 42 seconds in, that China has "2,500" DF-26s must be a mistranslation and may relate to the DF-26's approximate range of 2,500 miles.
Pete
I doubt the DF-26 is that inaccurate. Its maneuverable boosted (in the terminal phase) re-entry vehicle likely uses Beidou GPS plus some form of seeker. I read that Beidou has a commercial accuracy of only 10 meters. There are some commercially satellite photos on the web of Chinese test targets simulating a flat top and you can clearly see on the craters right next or right in the middle of that flat top target. Of course the target is not mobile while a CVN is. My guess is that the shorter range DF-21 is to go after CVN while the much longer range DF-26 is for fixed targets like a base, a naval port. I would not be surprised to see DF-21 and DF-26 deployed to the new 2nd artillery base on Hainan. Like many Chinese bases, there are likely tunnels deep under.
ReplyDeleteKQN
On the announcement by Mrs. Parly that France will be developing hypersonic glider by 2021, I wonder if we are going to witness a proliferation of MRBM as the launch platform for those gliders. Next is how soon will Australia join the fray (joint development for example) and whether system requirements for SSK will now dictate the support of VLS for those MRBM/Glider. MRBM and Gliders appear increasingly unavoidable. At a minimum, the modified ballistic trajectory will reduce the risks of misunderstanding.
ReplyDeleteKQN
@Pete:
ReplyDeleteI agree with the assessment that there is no reason to think a ballistic missile is that inaccurate in this day and age.
I'm not aware of any reports indicating that DF-26 yet had an anti-shipping warhead like DF-21D. It certainly is in the realm of possibility, but the primary target seems to be Guam and other fixed assets outside the SCS. The US likely isn't the only possible target; depending on basing Japan would also be in range. PLANs ability to target moving ships outside the first island chain is fairly limited right now so I wouldn't expect such expensive assets to be built to that purpose yet.
It is worth noting again that geography and US foreign bases force the Chinese to test their weapons very far from the sea: whether the DF-26 has an anti shipping role or not, clearly neither it or the DF-21 can be tested on an actual sea target, less the US learn about as much from the test as the Chinese. This has to impact their confidence in these weapons somewhat.
Cheers,
Josh
Hi KQN and Josh
ReplyDeleteThanks for your 29 Jan and 31 Jan comments respectively. I discuss them at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/01/chinese-df-21d-and-df-26-missile.html .
KQN I'll comment on your 30 Jan MRBM/Glider comments in an article tomorrow.
Cheers
Pete