Nuclear Propelled Australian Submarines? Huge Obstacles+Costs. Part 1.

Current articles by learned Australian writers as to whether Australia should acquire nuclear propelled submarines, have resurfaced since September 2018.

The following is the first in a series. Below I discuss a thought provoking essay written by Dr Tom Lewis, which proposes Australia should buy US Virginia class nuclear propelled submarines. Tom's essay is called “A working sub fleet – for less than half the cost”, dated October 5, 2018, which appeared on The Australian Naval Institute website. 

I have drawn some exact and sometimes, approximate, wording from Tom’s essay, and Agree and often Disagree.

Arguments For Appropriateness of Australian Nuclear Subs	Pete’s Reasons Why This Is Unviable or Viable
“Now we have a new PM” scrap plans for the 12 new Shortfin Barracuda SSKs	Our 2 month old Prime Minister may only last until May 18, 2019 when a new Labor Government, with its own ideas on subs, is likely to take power.
Buying a paper concept sub is risky	True. Neither Australia nor France have any experience in converting a (Barracuda) nuclear propelled submarine into a conventional (Shortfin Barracuda) diesel-electric submarine.
Barracuda re-model will use diesel engines, and fuel tanks, in a design which will likely be fraught with problems.	True. Also Australia’s Shortfin Barracuda is likely to be delayed owing to delays in France's nuclear Barracuda program (owing to major technical problems in the latter's K15 nuclear reactor).
“nuclear off the shelf option is the only way to go”	True. In the sense that, if buying nuclear, it should be off the shelf.
	The US didn’t even transfer all its Virginia technical secrets to its nuclear ally (since 1958) Britain. The US won’t transfer such secrets to Australia. Virginia (and new UK SSN) reactors are 90%+ HEU nuclear weapons grade, with the proliferation issues that implies.
US Navy’s Virginia-class submarines are in production now, and cheaper than a new build diesel-electric variant	Virginia’s demonstrated price is calculated for internal US Navy purchase and may not include the development cost component. But, the US Navy is already crying out for higher drumbeat production of Virginia’s for itself. The US would not accept a diversion of expertise, designers, workers, managers, shipyards to build Virginia’s for Australia or oversee construction of these subs in Australia.
Cost. The US Virginia class will only cost half the $50 billion for on its French Shortfin project.	This claim is only demonstrable once the first Australian Virginia is launched or when the last one is launched. The $50 billion estimate for the build and operation of the French Shortfin is a rubbery figure that has already been revised to $100 Billion
Proven design. If we bought a nuclear boat off the rack, we would be buying something already in service. We would know it works. We never had difficulties with the off-the-shelf Oberons.	True.
A diesel-electric is limited by needing diesel in port, returning to port, from tanker-tenders or from Guam, etc.	True. The speed, range, tactics, strategy and “hotel load” (non-propulsion) functioning of conventional submarines are severely limited compared to nuclear propelled submarines.
US Virginia (and UK Astute class) submarines have whole of operational life reactors that don’t need refueling.	Meanwhile the French Barracuda’s revised K15 reactor will need refueling every 7-10 years (and that will be in France)
Undetectability.	True. Nuclear allows for more discrete operation particularly avoiding regular snorting operations that are visible to Chinese satellites. But the sheer size of Virginia make them more detectable to ASW platforms in many of Australia’s shallow northern operational areas
Speed. Nuclear subs are much faster	True. Only a nuclear reactor allows a sub to remain protectively ahead or behind of a 15-30knot naval taskforce, protect SSBNs, and quickly transit Australia vast distances North, Indian Ocean, Southern Ocean and especially from the Fleet Base West(ern Australia) to the East Coast – including Fleet Base East.
“Crew. If we bought boats off the Americans, we could buy a few planeloads of crew too.”	Wrong. It takes huge efforts by the US to train crew (a limited resource) before and within operational nuclear submarines. Also crews are patriotic Americans who may consider Australian Virginias to be a defacto squadron of the US Navy when Australia separately needs its Virginia’s most. In the early 2000s the US shelved possible “sea-swap” plans to rotate submarine crews at Australia’s Fleet Base West for economic, political and US Naval professional reasons.
“Safety....The nuclear engine is a sealed unit.”	False. The US relies on the SUBSAFE Program, (here's a US Navy explanation) which is an extremely extensive, expensive and rigid set of nuclear submarine safety measures. These cover all nuclear navy practices, eg, over radiation leaks from reactor piping and fire risks, etc. There are also rigid armed, exclusion zone, security measures. Future nuclear weapon options, and civilian concerns have led nuclear submarines to be frequently based (at great cost) away from city harbours. Could Australian nuclear subs be based and/or repaired at Australia’s bases near Perth, in Adelaide or in Sydney Harbour?
“Pakistan”?	Pakistan has no serious plans (or the money or know-how) to build nuclear powered submarines. It has plans to mount nuclear tipped cruise missiles on French and Chinese designed conventional submarines.
Deterrence.	Israel already has Dolphin conventional submarines that carry nuclear tipped missiles. North Korea has been actively testing nuclear capable ballistic missiles on its conventional submarines.
	If Australia planned to buy just 6 x 2 crew (Gold and Blue) Virginia class SSGNs then that may be cheaper than the 12 Shortfin SSK project. The Australian Virginia’s land attack missiles (a major reason for nuclear propulsion) would be conventionally armed, at first...

Submarine Matters has been discussing the Virginia class option (or non-starter) as far back as 2012 (Barracuda SSNs 2012), Virginia's 2013 and 2015. 

Pete