China Taking Taiwan within Two Years? Econo-Politics.

China doesn't suffer from the downsides of new party in power commotion from elections every 3-5 years. So its long term senior officials and CCP leaders can keep their eyes on the ball, One China treaties and all. My take Taiwan by missile theory may make invasion lower risk for China.

Timelines that may increase or decrease chances that China may invade Taiwan within the next 2 years include: 

-  Added to supply chain slowdowns China is experiencing a drought, leading to hydropower and food shortages that are slowing economic growth. Hence value of a Peoples War distraction. 

- the risk Xi needs the extra popularity that a Xi created wartime Presidency would provide. This is before or after the November 2022 Party Congress. The Congress is expected to certify Xi as leader for a third term which may pan out to life. 

- the US midterm Elections in November 2022 may associate Biden with losing  Democrats while the Trump myth wins. China may want to take Taiwan while Biden is muddling along, ie. before November 2024 when a tougher US President might be elected.  

We live in interesting times.

Donor Report: China's Missile Activities to Blockade Taiwan

Hi Donors

I have just emailed you the August 2022 Donor Report.

It is titled "China's Missile Activities to Blockade Taiwan".

If you don't see it in your IN Box it may have turned up in your SPAM Box.

I hope you find it interesting.

Regards Pete. 

B-21 Nuclear Bombers for Australia May Be Worth It.

See ASPI article "Senior US official says Washington would consider supplying B-21 bombers to Australia" dated August 23, 2022.

at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/senior-us-official-says-washington-would-consider-supplying-b-21-bombers-to-australia/

Pete Comment

Quite an eye watering ASPI title. I've hithertoo discounted Australia buying B-2 or
B-21 stealth bombers on cost grounds. I've also always assumed that, as with the
F-22s, the US would guard its technical supremacy by never selling stealth bombers, even to Five Eye allies.

The B-2s' cost is around US$4 Billion each in US 2022 dollars (only US$2 Billion in 1997 dollars) for the 21 B-2s ever built - and only for the USAF. B-2s are also the most expensive aircraft to maintain in history - with each B-2 flight hour requiring 119 hours of maintenance.

Even if 100 new improved B-21s are sold to the USAF the price for a foreign customer ie.  Australia (adding training, spares, basing, profit etc) would surely cost more than AU$2 Billion each. If the US ever gave the green light Australia might be looking at purchasing 12.

At that price only nuclear weapons delivery would make sense and differentiate Australian B-21s from the Super Hornet and F-35A fighter-bombers that Australia already has.

Still, I think an Australian nuclear deterrent (against China) would make more sense than 8 AUKUS SSNs (that could only project 25 tonnes of conventional high explosive each with their torpedoes and missiles). So I now think AUKUS SSNs are not what Australia needs - because they won't deter a nuclear armed China. 

Other arms of an Aussie nuclear deterrent might include:

-  long range missiles (see the 25m high "Gilmours")

and 

-  DSME KSS-III SSBs (ie. conventionally propelled ballistic missile submarines).  Kym Bergmann at APDR has written an excellent article on the KSS-IIIs. 

Even little Israel has been able to afford a nuclear triad, with Jericho MRBMs to ICBMs, nuclear armed fighter bombers and Dolphin SSBs. This allows Israel to pursue independent foreign and defence policies - without following the US into every war startable.

East Timor: The Next China Debt Trap?

The gas fields can be seen between East Timor and Australia
(Map courtesy GeoscienceAustralia via Asia Times, October 2020)
---

Australia has already had a mixed history with Timor Leste aka East Timor (ET) a new island nation ruled by politicians of various old guard leftwing factions. After Australia was the major force that liberated ET from the Indonesians in 1999, ET became independent in 2002. 

As ET’s capital and harbour Dili is only 722 km from Darwin (map above) it is not a case of if, but when, China debt traps ET. This is of high economic and strategic interest to Australia. 722 km is much closer to Australia than the 2,000 km distance of the Solomon Islands to Australia. 

Australia and ET have long haggled over the undersea oil and gas fields that lie between them.

Along comes a headline today Timor-Leste warns it will work with China if Australia insists on pumping Timor Sea gas to Darwin.

This may pan out that impoverished ET might receive enough Chinese infrastructure loans to debt trap ET. The major loan might be for a gas pipeline from the gas fields south of ET to a factory China would build in ET. Given very few East Timorese are engineers or technicians it will be China laying the pipeline, building and running the factory and probably reaping more gas revenue than ET.

Australian and other Western oil-gas companies have considered the ET gas pipeline-factory project overly risky on sheer commercial grounds. One issue concerning them is if they build a factory in ET, then ET’s predictably leftwing governments might nationalise it.

But China has advantages to avoid nationalisation. It might directly bribing ET leaders before, during and after the project. The Chinese military will cross-subsidize such a venture for naval basing rights to Port of Dili and Chinese airforce access to ET's Baucau Airport. ET is too poor and only has small military-police forces, making it unable to hold China back.

East Timor with its oil-gas resources and closer proximity to the US-Australian Army base at Darwin and air base at Katherine would be quite a prize economically and strategically for China. Also a Chinese dominated East Timor is well sited in the southern Indonesian archipelago - to create problems for Indonesia. 

PRC Sub & Missile Blockade of Taiwan: Australia?

 

Major PLA-N Naval Units, p.54 of US DoD's China Military Power Report, Nov 2021. The list reflects the vast naval resources China could aim at Taiwan. Maybe submarines and missiles first then hundreds of surface ships and aircraft later.
---

The map above indicates China's PLA-N, from its Eastern and Southern Theater commands, has a combined 32 SSKs available to wage a hidden blockade of Taiwan. Smart mines, UUVs and undersea sensors would act as force multipliers in this blockade.

Gabriel Honrada for Asia Times, has written an excellent article, dated August 16, 2022, which brings together many interesting points about Taiwan and Submarines.

Issues include:

China deploying some of its Yuan and Song-class SSKs for a part submarine blockade of Taiwan. This may starve out Taiwan’s economy in weeks as food, minerals, energy and other supplies that come by sea are cut. In terms of energy imports Taiwan has only a “11-day supply of natural gas and 146 days’ worth of oil”.

Use of submarines [and missiles] could minimize the need for more vulnerable Chinese surface ships and aircraft to attack in the initial phase. In terms of typical Chinese official secrecy and media management any destruction of Chinese subs is easy to conceal. 

My own thoughts are Taiwanese and other Western ASW surface ships would be vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. Against Taiwanese-Western ASW and other aircraft China has HQ-9 SAMs with a range of 300km. China's S-400 SAMs have an even longer 400km range. Outside air supply of Taiwan might be deterred by the threat of Chinese SAMs. 

Hidden US SSNs, Japanese and maybe South Korean SSKs are the main threat to Chinese submarines.

Australian submarines are simply based too far away to assist. Instead, Australia, as an ever loyal US ally, might feel compelled to send 2 frigates/destroyers with a supply ship. The latter ship’s cruising speed of around 15 knots would make for a slow moving flotilla – vulnerable to Chinese torpedoes and missiles. These Aussie ships may turn out to be the first Western ships China sinks.

Naval Group LIBs Possible for India & Indonesia

Pete Comment

In late 2018 Naval Group was offering Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for its Scorpene and presumably for the now cancelled Attack class submarines.

India, eyeing submarine LIBs developments in late 2020 put out a Request for Information (RFI) for submarine. 

In February 2022 it is understood the 2 Scorpenes Naval Group may supply to Indonesia incorporate LIBs technology. 

LTO and NCA LIBs may be preferred by Japan for submarines - see SM on this.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Anonymous kindly commented on August 16, 2022:

European suppliers all have an offer LIBs technology for submarine. The preferred technology in Europe is the Lithium Iron Phosphate (LiFePO4) aka LFP. For details of LFP see Battery University and here and here. There is the LIBs pioneered by Saft and also recently by FAAM for the Italian Type 212NFS.

Snapshot of the qualities of a typical LFP battery.
(Diagram courtesy Battery University)
---

Naval Group, TKMS and Navantia all have agreements with Saft. The LFP system is intrinsically safe, with a long life (2000+ cycles) flat discharge curve and rapid charge. Selected by Tesla, BMW, aircraft, LFP does not use exotic materials such as Mn, Ni or Co. It will likely dominate the automotive market on a large scale

LFP is lower in Specific Energy density but higher in Specific Power density than Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LiCoO2) aka LCO or similar technology used by Japanese and South Korean cars. LCO requires an extensive safety and battery management system and is essentially a scale up of consumer electronics market items (eg. mobile phones). 

To fully exploit the rapid charge (low indiscretion ratio) nature of submarine LIBs very large, powerful, diesel engines are required. 

With Lead-acid Batteries a submarine might need to recharge every 2 or 3 days but with LIBs high speed recharging every 5 to 7 days is possible. 

[Pete comment: Although submarine commanders may prefer more frequent recharging to keep their batteries "topped up". This is in case rapid escape from threats or prolonged submergence in high threat areas (like the South China Sea) is required.] 

India's P-75(I) + 1 = P-76 SSK Shortage Solved?

In Rajesh Ahujh's "MY TAKE" at IDRW(dot)org on May 3, 2022 he wrote:

"Its Time that Project-76 supersedes Project-75I" at

https://idrw.org/its-time-that-project-76-supersedes-project-75i/

Pete Comment 

India may be slow to mature new submarine projects compared to China, but it is far faster than Australia.

Australia launched its latest submarine, HMAS Rankin in 2001. 

In that time India has leased Chakra II SSN in 2011, launched several Kalvari SSKs since 2015 and commissioned two Arihant-class SSBNs since 2016.

Some in US Prepared to go to War over Taiwan

Anonymous has posed the questions in bolded Red with his answers in bolded Blue. Under some are Pete comments in Black.

1(a).  What can Taiwan do to discourage a Chinese blockade?

Taiwan should try get Hammerhead type smart mines with some means of placing them around Chinese (PRC) ports.  I advocated for these before.  

[Pete comment: Mine laying by Taiwanese (T) aircraft would be shot down by the PRC, laying by T's ancient subs would be detected by PRC subs or its fixed undersea sensors. The US method of choice is laying by large US expendable UUVs.]

1(b).

Also try to stock up on food and consumables. 

[Pete comment: In 2018, T's food self-sufficiency rate was only 35%, which still may apply. T lacks natural resources and relies heavily on imported energy sources, with 98 per cent of its energy and mineral resources from overseas. Natural resources such as coal, iron ore and other metals continue to be major import items.]

2.  What can the democratic world do to discourage a Chinese blockade?

Democratic world should organize "peaceful" blockades of China traffic at choke points too far for Chinese navy to clear.  Economic collateral damage would be horrific, but letting China win is worse. 

[Pete comment: If PRC's blockade is restricted to the already tested ballistic missile impacts in waters surrounding T then this US led escalation could start World War Three, which would be worse.

The US still officially subscribes to the One China Policy which has not officially changed from the 1972 expression "The United States' One-China policy was first stated in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.^[14] The United States does not challenge that position."]

3.  Would "Freedom of Navigation" exercises be useful?

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) may be useful to show China that west is united.  China also probably does not want to fire first shot at combined western fleets.  Wonder if you agree.

[Pete Comment: I don't agree, after the US led Afghanistan and Iraq wars, with Australia being led by the US into another shooting war - this time that may see 1,000s of Australian casualties.] 

4.  If/when a blockade happens, how can Taiwanese endurance of the blockade be maximized?

To maximize endurance, stock up on fuel, food, munitions ASAP. 

[Pete Comment: See my response to red 1(b).)

5.  If/when a blockade happens, what can Taiwan and the democratic world do to maximize the cost/risk to China?

Taiwan to mine Chinese harbors once China starts blockade would incur no additional risks to Taiwan, would not require action by west.  Always liked this option.  West embargo Chinese trade would be catastrophic to everyone, but Chinese victory would be worse.  This should happen when China attacks any shipping near Taiwan. 

[Pete comment: If the PRC has not started mining or killing Taiwanese by other means  then this US led escalation could start World War Three (WW3), which would be worse.]

6.  How far out is the threat?  Is there time to get more hardware, or must we go with what we have on hand?

My gut feel (25% chance) is China may choose to move while west is preoccupied with Ukraine, which would mean very near term.  This requires having a plan using equipment on hand. 

[Pete comment: While the Ukraine war continues Russia is more likely to supply PRC with energy by land and other economically complementary supports. The "blockade" may have already started due to Pelosi. PRC missile impacts in some waters surrounding T might be stepped up for a week each month. PRC maybe playing a game of chicken, daring the US led West to escalate to naval aggression.]   

25% chance happens after Xi gets his next term [maybe in November 2022] , once he decides that west may not make concessions and relative position to Taiwan will stop improving in his favor.  Gives us time to stock on food and munitions.

[Pete comment: Xi may be more likely to be voted leader for another 5 years in Nov 2022 if he has become a PRC "wartime President". Xi may also wish to attack T before the unpredictable, relatively anti-PRC Trump has a chance to return to the US Presidency after the US November 2024 election.] 

25% chance he thinks arms race is in his favor, and his position will be better in 5 years, in which case Taiwan and west need to get new kit

The actions above need to be politically AND militarily realistic given the circumstances.

[Pete comment: Blundering into World War Three over Taiwan is unrealistic.]  

China Bullish on TAIWAN Takeover

With Ukraine distracting much Western military force and policy attention, Commander-in-Chief Biden’s visible mental decline and Pelosi’s reckless visit, Xi may be correct in gambling that escalating drills will soften up Taiwan, maybe without serious Western intervention.  

China’s missile, aircraft and warship live fire drills in sea-space surrounding Taiwan is  damaging Taiwan’s economy. This is through slowing airliner, passenger ship and other shipping traffic. Some airlines don’t want to risk being mistakenly hit by missiles MH17 style. Insurance premiums may be rising making it uneconomic for airlines and shipping to/from Taiwan’s area if it is seen as a conflict zone. 

Taiwan's already troubled semiconductor sector (eg. TSMC) has global supply chain problems. Greater semiconductor disruption may be an encouragement or deterrent to any timely Western military intervention in support of Taiwan.

China turning up politico-strategic salami slicing may continue for months, even years. This is aimed at triggering a Western reaction that China can paint as “Western aggression”. In China's and its ally Russia’s eyes this would justify a Chinese takeover of Taiwan by all means possible, eg:

-  missile impacts on Taiwan itself

-  fighter-bomber airstrikes

-  Chinese SSK and SSN submarine blockade, even attack 

-  Chinese equivalents to US Hammerhead naval smart mines that can discriminate between "friend and foe" shipping and submarines in Taiwanese waters

-  economic including food supply strangulation

-  cyber attacks

 -  ending in amphibious landings once Taiwan is severely weakened and Western forces have been cruise and ballistic missile area isolated from assisting.

Western forces, especially SSKs and SSNs under US leadership, could react decisively against Chinese moves, but whether there is the will remains questionable.

China's Global Times on "Taiwan Encirclement"

Defense Reporter Liu Xuanzun, for China's Global Times, has written an excellent, 

for Taiwan disturbing, article encapsulating the official Chinese viewpoint on the

"Taiwan encirclement". Liu's article published late on August 8, 2022 is below:

"PLA extends ‘Taiwan encirclement’ exercises with anti-submarine warfare, showcases unrivaled area denial capability; ‘drills will not stop until reunification’

Published: Aug 08, 2022 12:36 PM Updated: Aug 08, 2022 08:39 PM

   

Warplanes of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conduct operations during joint combat training exercises around the Taiwan Island, Aug. 7, 2022. The Eastern Theater Command continued its joint combat training exercises as scheduled on Sunday [August 7, 2022] in the waters and airspace around the Taiwan Island. Photo: Xinhua.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on Monday [August 8, 2022] continued military exercises and training activities surrounding the island of Taiwan, marking an extension from the previously announced schedule. Drills like these will not stop and are expected to become routine until reunification, as the Chinese mainland shows its determination to push forward the reunification process after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's provocative visit to the island last week that seriously violated China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, experts said.

The drills not only lock the island from inside out, but also from the outside in, telling external forces that the PLA has powerful area denial capabilities in the region that even the US cannot rival, analysts said. 

The PLA Eastern Theater Command continued realistic combat-oriented joint exercises in sea and air space around the island of Taiwan on [August 8, 2022], focusing on joint anti-submarine warfare and sea assault operations, the PLA Eastern Theater Command said in a statement.

During the drills, the Type 052C guided missile destroyer Changchun operating in waters southwest to Taiwan island coordinated with several Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft and formed an anti-submarine combat formation together with the Changchun's Ka-28 vessel-based anti-submarine helicopter, China Central Television (CCTV) reported.

The Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft dropped sonobuoys for wide-range detection, the Ka-28 helicopter assisted in precision locating, and the destroyer conducted thorough search. After locating the target, the destroyer conducted a simulated attack and immediately released countermeasures for defense. The helicopter and the anti-submarine warfare aircraft also conducted mock attacks, CCTV reported.

Monday's [August 8, 2022] exercises further practiced seizing the control of the sea with anti-submarine drills, analysts said.

Taiwan's armed forces operate outdated submarines, which nevertheless need to be neutralized if the PLA commences a reunification-by-force operation, a Beijing-based military expert told the Global Times on Monday [August 8, 2022], requesting anonymity.

Possible external military interference forces like the US and Japan have more advanced submarines, particularly US' nuclear-powered ones, so practicing anti-submarine warfare drills in the real underwater terrains around the Taiwan island is very significant, the expert said.

The drills displayed that the PLA can detect, locate and attack hostile submarines from multiple dimensions, and defend against their attacks, the expert said.

While the CCTV report did not confirm if a PLA submarine participated in the drills, Zhang Junshe, a senior research fellow at the Naval Research Academy of the PLA, told the Global Times that the PLA has sent an aircraft carrier group featuring at least one nuclear-powered submarine to the ongoing drills around the island of Taiwan for its first carrier deterrence exercise. The PLA also operates a number of conventional submarines.

Fighter jets and early warning aircraft also conducted reconnaissance, early warning and supportive operations around the Taiwan island, CCTV reported.

A Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopter of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the flight deck of the Type 052C guided missile destroyer Changchun on August 8, 2022. The PLA Eastern Theater Command continued realistic combat-oriented joint exercises in sea and air space around the island of Taiwan on Monday. Photo: Courtesy of PLA Eastern Theater Command's Sina Weibo account.

Becoming routine?
Monday's exercises mean that the PLA has extended its drills surrounding the island of Taiwan, which were originally scheduled to conclude on Sunday noon.
"As long as the Taiwan question is not solved, drills like these will not stop," Song Zhongping, a Chinese mainland military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Monday.

The PLA exercises could become a routine, Song said. The longer the island is blockaded, the more it shows about the mainland's control over it, he said.

When asked about the PLA's drills at a regular press conference on Monday, Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the drills are transparent and professional. 

With relevant authorities publishing related notices, the drills abide by domestic and international laws as well as international practices. and aim to warn those who provoked and safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, Wang said.

The Maritime Safety Administration of East China's Fujian Province published a notice on Wednesday [August 3, 2022] setting up the restriction zones for the drills from Thursday [August 4, 2022] to Sunday [August 7, 2022], but no such notice was released for Monday's drills. If no new restriction zones are set for the additional drills, it is because they will not endanger normal civilian activities, so likely without live-fire shooting, experts said.

Military activities, including those by the US, also not always draw restriction zones if they have no impact on other vessels or aircraft, Song said.

When there is need, for example, to keep US warships from entering the Taiwan Straits, the PLA could always set new restriction zones, Song said. 

The Pentagon has ordered the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier to remain in waters near the Taiwan island, and the US will "conduct standard air and maritime transits through the Taiwan Strait[s] in the next few weeks," US news outlet Business Insider quoted White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby as saying on Thursday.

The PLA's drills are aimed to deter "Taiwan independence" secessionists and external interference forces, not to disturb daily lives of the ordinary people on the island, Song said.

Shortly after Pelosi landed in Taiwan island on August 2, the PLA Eastern Theater Command responded with joint military exercises surrounding the island starting the same day. Then the Xinhua News Agency announced that the PLA would conduct a series of live-fire military drills from Thursday noon to Sunday noon in six different areas that encircle the island from all directions.

The first phase of the drills, started in the evening of August 2, featured joint maritime and air exercises in sea and air space to the north, southwest and southeast of the island, with official reports showing J-20 stealth fighter jets taking off for the drills and launchers of rockets and missiles mobilizing under shades of the night.

On Wednesday, [August 3, 2022] the PLA Eastern Theater Command organized its affiliated Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force and conducted realistic combat-oriented joint exercises in the sea and air space to the north, southwest and southeast of the Taiwan island, with joint blockade, sea assault, land attack and air combat drills being at the core of the operation.

The second phase of the exercises started on Thursday [August 4, 2022] with long-range artillery live-fire shooting drills in the Taiwan Straits by the Army, followed by fire assaults with multiple types of conventional missiles at several designated sea areas to the east of Taiwan island by the Rocket Force. More than 100 warplanes and more than 10 warships surrounded the island for blockade, reconnaissance and alert patrol missions.

On Friday, [August 5, 2022] fighter jets, bombers, early warning aircraft and electronic reconnaissance aircraft practiced the seizing of air superiority, cover and support, air strike, reconnaissance and early warning, with pilots visually confirming Taiwan island's coastline and the Central Mountain Range. Warships blockading the island approached the island's coastline as sailors looked closely at an old warship of Taiwan island nearby.

Warships, warplanes and coast-based anti-ship missiles were deployed in Saturday's [August 6, 2022] drills to hone land attack and sea assault capabilities under systemic support, with Navy forces joining their counterparts from the Air Force, boosting the interoperability supported by a joint operational system.

On the last day of the originally scheduled drills on Sunday, [August 7, 2022] bombers and fighter bombers launched a standoff, saturation strike exercises with various types of precision munitions, with the bombers flying across the Taiwan Straits from north to south and from south to north simultaneously, carrying out a deterrence mission around the island.

Now that the PLA extended the drills, and it practiced joint anti-submarine warfare and sea assault operations on Monday [August 8, 2022].

Fu Qianshao, a Chinese mainland military aviation expert, told the Global Times that the PLA is expected to continue to practice different tactics and combat elements, including the involvement of aircraft carriers and amphibious landing warfare." 

South Korea Offering KSS-III Sub to Australia

The first KSS-III being launched September 2018.
(Photo courtesy DSME via Naval Technology)
---

On August 4, 2022, Anonymous kindly provided the following links and comment:

Seoul kicks off efforts to sell submarines to Australia [1]. This includes possible key technologies as Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBMs [2], methanol reforming fuel cell AIP [3],  and LIBs by South Korean company Samsung [4]. Unfortunately the reliability of these technologies has not yet been proven through practical applications.

[1] https://www.kedglobal.com/aerospace-defense/newsView/ked202208030024
South Korea has embarked on efforts to export domestically designed [Dosan Ahn Changho-class KSS-III] submarines weighing more than 3,000 tons to Australia, while also in the final stage of bidding for a $4.6 billion project to sell Redback armoured vehicles to [Australia], according to South Korea’s defense procurement agency on [August 3, 2022].

[In July 2022], the Minister of South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration Eom Donghwan visited Australia and met with officials of the Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG) and the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), part of Australia’s Defense Department….”

[2] https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/south-korea-expands-maritime-ambitions/
The locally developed 3,000-ton class submarine is equipped with six vertical launch tubes. After a round of additional tests, the SLBM will be mass produced for deployment. The SLBM is believed to be a variant of the country’s Hyunmoo-2B ballistic missile, with a flight range of around 500 kilometres, and will be fitted with conventional warheads, according to the sources. The missile has reportedly been codenamed, Hyunmoo4-4. 

[3] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/south-koreas-add-develops-critical-technology-for-submarine-aip/
According to South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD), the use of “methanol-reforming plant [AIP] technology”, which transforms methanol into hydrogen by altering its chemical structure, negates the need for separate charging facilities and decreases charging times significantly, in addition to allowing the submarine to operate submerged for longer.

[4] https://www.ajudaily.com/view/20181107111119548
SEOUL -- South Korea has finally achieved a technical breakthrough in developing a workable lithium-ion battery [LIB] for a new generation of home-made submarines. The project, which began in July 2016, involved five research bodies and six companies including Samsung SDI, a top battery maker.

The [South Korean] Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), a state body controlled by the defense ministry, said Wednesday that lithium-ion batteries have passed its technical readiness assessment for 3,000-ton submarines under construction.

Pete Comment

If Australia opted for "Interim" conventional subs before, or instead of, AUKUS nuclear subs, then Japan, South Korea, Germany, France and Sweden might have claims to having built the best large, operational, conventional subs internationally.

Indonesian, Australian, Indian, Dutch & Soviet Issues

Indonesia's heavy cruiser, Kri Irian, served Indonesia in an unconventional role before disappearing in the 1970s.
---    

On Indonesia's concerns about future Australian SSNs, Indian-Indonesian relations (1960s-70s) and the extraordinary growth of the Indonesian Navy (1950s-60s) Gessler on July 31, 2022 commented:

Hi Pete (and others reading this)

I'm not really aware of the security & diplomatic equations between Australia & ASEAN, so for my sake please entertain this line of thought:

Perhaps certain ASEAN countries (Indonesia in particular) view Australia as a potential future adversary? And if they do, then its obvious that they would prepare not for what the adversary says he will do, but rather for what he is capable of doing. Perhaps Indonesia fears that with RAN operating nuclear submarines, Australia will attain a massive unassailable lead in military terms vis-a-vis Indonesia?

Allow me to tell you why I'm thinking in this way...back in the 60s & 70s, the relationship between Indonesia and my country (India) wasn't very good. At one point, the Indonesians had laid claim to the Nicobar island chain (the southern part of [India’s] Andaman and Nicobar Islands), and were carrying out military intrusions & illegal patrols, not unlike what China is doing in the South China Sea today. Indonesia was also openly on the side of Pakistan during the 1965 war, including providing material assistance. 

This Indian article below sums up a lot of that history (along with an overview of Indonesia's subsurface naval history). Later though, things took a positive turn [between India and Indonesia] and all disputes were abandoned. Though I'd wager India's [“Smiling Buddha”] nuclear weapons testing in 1974 had a lot to do with it. This is along with the fact that the power dynamic between India and Indonesia shifted vastly into India's favour over the decades, especially on the naval front,. This would have made the pursuit of a refreshed Nicobar Islands dispute a not-so-wise decision.

Do you suppose Indonesia fears a similar thing happening vis-a-vis their equation with Australia? Getting potentially "boxed in" by nuclear powers (or at least, nuclear navies) to their north & south, all the while getting needled by the Chinese, can't be an enviable position as far as geopolitics go.

I still think that if push comes to shove, Indonesia will throw its lot in with the QUAD/Western alliance rather than with China...but I can't help but see this as the sort of thing that could change if the political dispensation in Jakarta changes. Note that I do not follow Indonesian politics, just saying that political re-alignment always remains a distinct possibility in a time of global instability like the current.

Pete Comment

The Indian article Gessler has identified, is very interesting.

The link recounts: "In his book Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965-1975, retired Indian Navy Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani traced the dizzying growth of the Indonesian Navy" with words to the effect:

Between 1959 and 1964, the Indonesian Navy had acquired an enormous fleet from the Soviet Union, including:

-  1 heavy cruiser: Kri Irian 
-  18 destroyers and frigates
-  12 Whiskey-class submarines
-  67 corvettes and motor torpedo boats
-  12 missile boats
-  21 minesweepers
-  11 landing ships
-  6 landing craft
-  4 transport ships, and
-  4 oilers.

My first thoughts include Indonesia being insufficiently wealthy in the 1950-60s, to afford a huge fleet. Indonesia had an independent naval history only going back to 1945. Hence, I think Indonesia would have been hard pressed to man one-fifth of the 156 vessels that the Soviets allegedly sold to Indonesia.

Presumably the Soviets provided the huge fleet out of anti-colonial internationalism, to strengthen Indonesia as an ally and most likely to free all of Indonesia from the Soviet's enemy, the Netherlands. This last was seen clearly in Operation Trikora. The section on Soviet sailors and airman wearing Indonesian uniforms in Trikora is most interesting

I’d be very interested to hear from readers about what happened to the majority of the 156 vessels sold to Indonesia.

Chinese Ship Intercepting Indian Communications

Yuan Wang 5 interception ship (Photo courtesy News18).
--- 

Ghalib Kabir commented August 2, 2022.

A Chinese SIGINT and missile instrumentation ship [the 25,000 tonne Yuan Wang 5, photo above] was due to dock in at Hambantota, Sri Lanka on August 11. 2022. It could potentially snoop on Indian ELF submarine communication facilities close to North Sri Lanka besides other naval installations on India's South East Coast. 

The dual standards are galling. Beijing was hopping mad when USN missile instrumentation ships sailed 'close by' to China and now have the temerity to lecture India to not be upset.

Pete Comment

As well as all sorts of Sri Lankan communications INS Kattabomman, a submarine command radio station on the southern tip of India, might be a prime candidate of Chinese interception ship interest. Even if China hasn't cracked India's naval codes this large Chinese ship can perform signals traffic analysis that reveals much about the workings of India's navy. 

Depending on where Yuan Wang 5 sails, it can also intercept much from India's civilian (eg. NTRO), defence, army, airforce and Navy shore bases and from Indian ships. 

Also if India happens to be testing K series SLBM or Agni series ICBM missiles Yuan Wang 5's communications and telemetry interception capabilities could glean much.

Pelosi Crisis: Chinese Blockade of Taiwan

 

China breaching Taiwan's sea and airspace in the Taiwan Strait, west of Taiwan, has been continuing for years, but the Pelosi Crisis has changed all that. Since Pelosi arrived in Taiwan and has now left it, China is holding live fire drills actually surrounding Taiwan. This is deterring airlines and shipping from traveling to-from Taiwain - effectively a blockade situation. (Map/Graphics courtesy Taiwan's Focus Taiwan).

Pelosi usurping US Presidential dominance in Taiwan-China policy has made things worse.

The Guardian reports August 4, 2022: 

"...China is to begin a series of unprecedented live-fire drills that would effectively blockade the island of Taiwan, just hours after the departure of US House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, whose controversial visit this week has sparked fears of a crisis in the Taiwan strait.

Taiwan has characterised the drills, which will last until Sunday afternoon – and will include missile tests and other “military operations” as close as nine miles to Taiwan’s coastline – as a violation of international law.

While China’s military often holds live-fire exercises in the strait and surrounding seas, those planned for this week encircle Taiwan’s main island and target areas within its territorial sea.

Ahead of the drill, it said 27 Chinese warplanes had entered its air defence identification zone, including flights over the median line – the unofficial border in the Taiwan strait. On Wednesday night two suspected drones flew over Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Island, with Taiwan’s military firing flares in response...."