January 31, 2022

Future Australian Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator: Nuclear Powered Warships

Australia’s agencies involved with the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce include:- The Department of Defence,

- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
- Attorney General’s Department,
- Department of Education, Skills and Employment,
- Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency [ARPANSA], see 1.
and
- the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation [ANSTO] see 2. below

Some ANSTO and ARPANSA staff may form the nucleus (pardon the pun) of an Australian Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator – like the UK Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-nuclear-safety-regulator-dnsr

In the longer term, to staff an Australian Regulator, many more postgraduate Australian nuclear technology experts will need to be trained and UK (and maybe US) nuclear contractors will need to be hired.

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The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency's (ARPANSA's) current role seems the best fit to form the basis of an Australian Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's future role.

See the ARPANSA’s website https://www.arpansa.gov.au/ for the following documents (from the internet January 31, 2022). They are very interesting and revealing. So I have included the full text, bolding some choice bits:

“Nuclear Powered Warship Visit Planning”

at https://www.arpansa.gov.au/research/radiation-emergency-preparedness-and-response/visits-by-nuclear-powered-warships which includes a subsection on “Radiation monitoring”

FULL TEXT: Nuclear powered warships visit planning

Port visits to Australia by naval vessels of friendly nations, and reciprocal visits by ships of the Royal Australian Navy, are one of the most visible aspects of the defence cooperation between Australia and other countries in peacetime. These naval vessels may be conventionally or nuclear-powered. Ship visits are made with the approval of the Australian Government.

Due to the nature of Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW) propulsion plants, special procedures have been adopted to ensure that the safety of the general public is maintained during visits by such vessels. These procedures include Conditions of Entry and the arrangements for visits, as well as contingency arrangements in the unlikely event of an accident resulting in the hazardous release of radioactivity to the environment.

The nature of these requirements necessitates that responsibility for the conduct of these procedures is shared between Australian Government and state/territory Governments. Australian Government responsibility is generally for international negotiations, prescribing guidelines and approving and arranging visits within those guidelines.

The Australian Government requires contingency arrangements to be in place at all Australian ports visited by NPW and also requires that there be the capability to undertake radiation monitoring of the port environment. These arrangements are formulated to cover two potential release mechanisms, which are failure or malfunction of radioactive waste control systems within the vessel and an accident involving the reactor plant.

The potential for the external radiation exposure of personnel in the vicinity of a NPW at an alongside berth is checked at regular intervals by radiation surveys of areas designated as free for public access. The potential for radiation exposure from the consumption of seafood is kept under surveillance by a program of marine environmental monitoring. Analyses for fission and activation products and any other radionuclide known to characterise radioactive discharges likely to arise from a NPW is conducted on samples of the surface layer of the bottom sediment from the vicinity of the NPW berth or anchorage, and selected local seafood taken from the environs of the berth or anchorage (where possible).

The results of NPW radiation monitoring program are published annually by the Department of Defence. The reports on radiation monitoring for the last five years are provided below:

Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) VSPN

An inter-departmental committee, the Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) (VSP(N)), oversees the arrangements for visits to Australian ports by Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW). These include the Commonwealth Plan OPSMAN1 dealing with visits by Nuclear Powered Warships, and the associated Radiation Monitoring Handbook for Visits by Nuclear Powered Warships to Australian Ports and the Department of Defence document Environmental Radiation Monitoring During Visits by NPWs to Australian Ports: Requirements, Arrangements and Procedures.

The responsibilities of the VSP(N) are to:

1. advise the Minister of Defence on proposals for NPW visits

2. develop and maintain procedures related to NPW visits

3. oversee the implementation of specific arrangements, especially safety requirements, for visits by NPWs.

OPSMAN1

The Australian planning covering visits by visiting nuclear powered vessels is detailed in OPSMAN1. OPSMAN1 provides detailed information on the conditions, procedures and the responsibilities for the visits by nuclear-powered vessels to Australian ports. Visits are only permitted to Australian ports, which have been assessed and approved as suitable in terms of strict Australian environmental and safety criteria. Conditions of entry to Australian ports by visiting NPW have been established by the Australian Government. In the event of a reactor-based accident, procedures are in place to ensure the early removal of the damaged vessel from the port, thus removing the radiation source term.

The 2000 reference accident for nuclear powered warships

Much of the planning for managing potential radiation exposures is based on the modelling results of the Reference Accident. The Reference Accident is a computer model devised for estimating the nature and extent of the radioactive contamination for a severe accident scenario involving a loss of coolant accident in a NPW reactor and the subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The Reference Accident is used to assess the acceptability of a port for visits by NPWs and to establish the planning zones for the initial radiation emergency response.

The Reference Accident predicts that, after the passage of the radioactive cloud, the two principal pathways for exposure would be through external irradiation and from ingestion of radioactivity. Resuspension of surface contamination and the subsequent inhalation would be very small. The Reference Accident predicts that the major component of the release would be radioiodine, with the initial levels of [Caesium-137] Cs-137 contamination predicted to be at least an order of magnitude lower than the initial radioiodine levels. Both Cs-137 and radioiodine contamination can move easily into the environment, and this implies that all foodstuff produced in the affected area, particularly milk would need to be monitored closely to ensure that the radiation dose to critical members of the public is minimised.

For the purposes of Australian NPW emergency planning, the radiological consequences of a severe hypothetical accident scenario are calculated and compared with radiological acceptance criteria. The hypothetical accident, termed the Reference Accident, is selected to represent an upper bound risk to the surrounding population, and is used to assist in planning emergency arrangements. The use of such a Reference Accident is also the basis for estimating the adequacy of emergency planning for any research reactor sites in Australia. The aim of the Reference Accident is to aid in planning emergency measures that would take effect if an accident occurred on a visiting NPW, and involved the release of radionuclides from the nuclear reactor on these vessels.

The calculated consequences of this scenario are compared with port acceptability criteria to determine, on a port specific basis, whether the impact of the Reference Accident on the surrounding population meets the criteria. In addition, emergency planning zones based on the calculated consequences of the Reference Accident are used by emergency planning authorities in developing port specific emergency arrangements.

Nuclear powered warships - reference accident 2000

Radiation monitoring

The guidelines in OPSMAN1 require suitable radiation-monitoring programs to address two situations, routine environmental monitoring and emergency monitoring related to a reactor accident. Conditions of Entry for nuclear-powered warships (NPW) require that, for the port being visited, there be an operating safety organisation, competent to conduct a suitable radiation monitoring program and able to initiate actions and provide services necessary to safeguard the public in the event of a release of radioactivity following a reactor accident. The organisation is to be well practised and capable of quick and effective action.

For each NPW visit routine environmental radiation monitoring program

is conducted to provide means for:

a. confirming no release of radioactive material or emission of ionising radiation

b. determination of the nature and extent of any releases/emissions

c. assessing the levels of radiation and any contamination in the environment around the NPW.

The potential for the external radiation exposure of personnel in the vicinity of a NPW at an alongside berth is checked at regular intervals by radiation surveys of areas designated as free for public access. The potential for radiation exposure from the consumption of seafood is kept under surveillance by a program of marine environmental monitoring. Sensitive, high volume seawater monitoring and analyses in the vicinity of the berth or anchorage are undertaken before and after visits to verify there have been no environmental releases of radiation.

A radiation monitoring system is available during each NPW visit to provide early detection of a reactor incident of sufficient severity to possibly cause a major release of fission products to the environment. This early warning system is complemented by arrangements for notification by the NPW should an incident occur.

ARPANSA, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation and the Australian Defence Forces are the main Commonwealth agencies providing radiological support to the emergency plans. The coordination of the Australian Government response is the responsibility of Emergency Management Australia as specified in the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework.

The immediate monitoring response to a NPW accident is provided by local Radiation Monitoring Groups, comprising State radiation health, emergency services personal or navy reservists under the direction of an ANSTO health physicist. ARPANSA provides OSL monitors, analyses marine samples and in event of a NPW incident it may be requested to provide additional teams and the Commonwealth Technical Advisor to support the State response through the Commonwealth Disaster Plan (COMDISPLAN).

The objectives for the conduct of emergency radiation monitoring for NPW visits are to:

1. provide accurate and timely data on the level and degree of hazards resulting from the release

2. provide detail of the physical and chemical characteristics of the hazard

3. determine the extent and duration of the hazard

4. assist decision makers on the need to take protective actions and interventions on the basis of operational intervention levels (OILs)

5. confirm the efficiency of remedial measures such as decontamination procedures

6. assist in preventing the spread of contamination

7. provide information for accident classification

8. provide information for protection of emergency workers

More extensive monitoring of affected areas is conducted following the

immediate post accident monitoring. This could continue for several

days, weeks or months, depending on the extent of the release. The

ARPANSA Environmental Monitoring Handbook for Visits by Nuclear Powered Warships Part A Monitoring for Post Accident Recovery

aims to address these objectives in the context of a radiation release associated with a visiting Nuclear Powered Warship in an Australian port.

It provides the recommendations on procedures for sample collection and analysis and the basis for the training of the relevant monitoring teams.

Note:
If you are unable to access PDFs, please contact us for access to an alternative version of the information.

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Occupational exposure: Emergency workers and helpers

ARPANSA establishing radiation monitoring network

Guide for Radiation Protection in Emergency Exposure Situations (RPS G-3)

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Also gathered by Pete from the Internet on January 31, 2022 is the relevant News Release by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) https://www.ansto.gov.au/

News Release dated September 24, 2021 https://www.ansto.gov.au/news/ansto-looks-forward-to-lending-its-significant-nuclear-science-and-technology-capabilities

Titled: “ANSTO looks forward to lending its significant nuclear science and technology capabilities to support AUKUS”

[with the text] The new trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) is a historically significant development for nuclear science and technology in Australia.

The announcement of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines to be built in Adelaide has been welcomed by the manufacturing and university sectors as a positive development. As the centre of Australia’s nuclear research and technology capabilities, ANSTO looks forward to supporting the Australian government in delivering the capability.

All Australians should be proud of our nation’s nuclear science and research capabilities with over 60 years’ of nuclear engineering and stewardship experience through ANSTO.

ANSTO has ensured the safe management of Australia’s nuclear facilities at our Lucas Heights campus in Sydney which enable leading research, the advanced manufacturing of nuclear medicines and irradiation of silicon ingots for the industry globally.

Through ANSTO, Australia is highly regarded within international networks including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has already well-established research partnerships with the UK and USA.

Over the next 18 months, ANSTO will work with the Submarine Task Force project to determine the optimal pathway for the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia.

This will involve working with the United Kingdom and the United States to intensively examine the requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship, with a specific focus on safety, training, operation, maintenance, disposal, and environmental protection.

The United Kingdom and the United States have set and maintained exemplary safety records in the operation of naval nuclear reactors for decades. Australia will leverage this experience and our own, in safely operating nuclear research reactors at Lucas Heights for more than 60 years, to further build on that safety record."

Australian Pro & Anti Nuclear Politics Very Complicated

Following the Australian Government wedging its political opposition (eg. the Greens) on AUKUS nuclear submarines - on January 28, 2022 Anonymous provided useful details and viewpoints:

"Thanks Pete. Appreciating the intention of this article, I will once again try to respond with counter arguments. In both cases I think we can demonstrate why support for AUKUS SSNs remains robust. AFAIK [As Far As I Know] opinion polls put support consistently around 60+%. That is better than most governments ever get.

Regarding Labor, I think you have miscategorised their factions slightly. You refer to “Wedging is going on between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Left faction from the pro-Jobs, pro-Economic Growth ALP Center-Right faction.”

An important clarification is that the Labor Left is the pro-jobs bit that supports local manufacturing, whereas the Labor Right is the economic rationalist bit that supports economic growth. For example, manufacturing industry advocate Kim Carr is in the Labor Left faction. So is Labor’s Leader AnthonyAlbanese.

I live in Adelaide and the area around ASC near Port Adelaide is in Labor heartland. It would be incredibly hard for South Australian (SA) Labor identities like [Labor's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson] Pennie Wong to oppose AUKUS SSN jobs.

This is significant in getting support for AUKUS. The Labor Right is pro-defence (Kim Beazley [a former Defence Minister 1984-1990 amongst many other leadership positions] pushed for the Collins Class). The Labor Left is pro-local manufacturing jobs. Provided the AUKUS SSN build can be shown to have similar local content and jobs to the Attack Class, Labor has very little room to oppose the project. So I am optimistic that Labor, whether they like it or not, will not oppose AUKUS, even if they win government.

The Australian Greens Party are less likely to support the project, but also less of a threat. Realistically, most of their voters are to the left of Labor, making them unlikely to vote Liberal under any circumstances, especially given LNP climate change policy. The credibility of most of the Greens’ arguments against AUKUS can be easily challenged.

Leader of the Greens Adam Bandt’s line about “Floating Chernobyls” is easily disproven based on UK RN and USN safety records. I note it has not been repeated. Attacking AUKUS on the basis of increased risk of nuclear proliferation would have been a more credible line of attack, but the Greens have not taken this up. I think that that has been a tactical mistake and I do not think the Greens have gained support.

The Greens stated positions you have quoted are easily disproven. Their claim that AUKUS does not make Australia safer is contradicted by statements from Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, India and Japan. The Greens can hardly claim AUKUS only benefits the Anglo-sphere when so many non-Anglo countries support AUKUS. Likewise suggestions that Australia can ignore defence spending ring hollow when the Greens themselves have expressed concern about authoritarianism and militarism in China, and opposed Chinese treatment of Uighurs and Hong Kong citizens.

Stripped of those justifications, the Greens opposition boils down to an ideological opposition to nuclear power. I see the Greens as highly unlikely to depart from that position but, equally, I do not see that as a sellable position to mainstream Australia. Again, as long as AUKUS remains strictly about nuclear propelled submarines and any actors like Rolls Royce are stopped from trying to sell domestic nuclear power [plants in Australia] in parallel, I do not see how the opposition will amount to a majority. By that I mean, I expect AUKUS will retain majority support whether Labor or Liberals are in power.

For the record, I was involved in the SA inquiry into nuclear waste disposal in SA. [See this ABC article and Australian Radioactive Waste Agency] Technically it is easily feasible; SA geology is perfect. But it does not stack up as an economic proposition. That is even more the case for domestic nuclear power. The latest UK nuclear power reactor, Hinkley Point C, is costing over 20 billion pounds (over budget by >100%), which is more than the cost of the entire Astute Class submarine program (all 7 subs combined). By comparison, a 1GW coal station is $5 billion, 1GW of wind about $2 billion."

Pete Comment

Thanks Anonymous. I have changed my views on Labor Left and Centre-Right factional differences in line with your advice.

My views that nuclear power stations are uneconomical are also in line with yours. New build nuclear power stations might have been economical in the 1960s-70s, but Australia's economic future is better centred on renewables.

January 29, 2022

Australian Submarine Tenders? and US Naval Bases

I’m using a different format for this article which draws on Anonymous's comment originally made on January 24, 2022. First will be Anonymous's comments in black and then my responses in red:

Hi Pete: B1: I am not advocating sending Australian submarines to Ukraine. My intent was to point out that Ukraine may have impact on next crisis relevant to Australian navy, where China would use the crisis in Europe as a distraction, to be exploited by a move in the South China Sea. That would create the scenario that AUKUS was founded to address, and indeed the LIKELIEST next big thing for the Australian navy. This would mean that the next Australian adventure would be with China, and in the very near term.

Thanks Anonymous: re B1: Yes China could use a NATO (especially US) distraction of upgraded Russian activity against Ukraine for China to make inroads into the South China Sea and/or territory held by Taiwan.

Australia would then need to await US leadership in any Australian naval activity against China. AUKUS is not yet a NATO Article 5 style "trip wire alliance" and, in any case, Taiwan is not a member.

B2: I think I read something in your blog discussing the possibility of depot ships to support forward submarines (before Australia decided on SSN's), though you were not very keen on that. If depot ships were to be forward based, they may have to be in ports that are not in Australia. From this, I extrapolated that if AUKUS has allies close to the South China Sea, those are the ports where the subs would need to be based. Perhaps you were meaning Guam and or Diego Garcia, but I assumed that the nature of the conflict would have an impact on the choice of ports.

Re B2: If by "depot ships" you mean Submarine Tenders these are sizable ships now only used by the US (as far as I know). The US now has just two remaining submarine tenders of the Emory S. Land-class. One or both of these 2 ships are sometimes at US Naval Base Guam ("Apra") or one of them is at US Naval Base Diego Garcia (its formal name is Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia). Both US Naval Bases have comprehensive facilities that can be used for surface warships and airforce units to defend the submarine tenders and the submarines that use them.

Australian Collins submarines very likely use these tenders and/or the Guam and Diego Garcia base facilities eg. for diesel refueling or to fly in critical spare parts. It makes little sense for Australia to double up with its own tenders in the naval bases of allies, eg. US, New Zealand or Singaporean naval bases.

Australian potential forward bases are considered inappropriate for tenders eg. Port of Darwin (too shallow and adverse tides) or Australia's Cocos islands (too small and isolated for the substantial surface warships and air power needed to defend tenders and their submarines in port).

C: I agree that Australia, like any country, wants to control its own military, but in a large conflict, such as world wars I and II where the outcome is uncertain, smaller allies try to maximize the chance of an allied win more than their own control. To misquote Donald Rumsfeld, The war you have to prepare for is the war you are likely to get, not the one you want to get. The whole point of my letter is that the Australian navy is not choosing the scenario: It can at best adapt to the most dangerous likely scenario. In war, the bad guys choose the time, place and scenario. I think a near term Moscow/Beijing axis breakout is the most likely scenario. If you don't agree, what scenarios do you think are more dangerous/likely?

C: I think Australia basically having a SSN squadron/flotilla within the USN of UK RN would remove too much independent Australian action. This is particularly during major conflicts when those allies might have their own ideas or intentions for Australian SSNs on hand.

However, there is already close interaction with US and UK nuclear submarines visiting one Australian base. That is US and UK SSNs and US SSGNs occasionally visiting Australia's main submarine base called HMAS Stirling "Fleet Base West" which is just south of Perth, Western Australia. Over several decades the USN has thought about using HMAS Stirling as a US nuclear submarine crew change-over base, but the US has decided not to, so far.

Increased US (and maybe UK) nuclear submarine visits or even temporary basing at HMAS Stirling may become an outgrowth of AUKUS.

E: I do follow other sources, but I find yours most educational. You are very smart and well informed, but I sometimes disagree with you on requirements and war scenarios. On technology and operational issues you are the best teacher I found.

Best regards. I am still a fan.

E. Thanks so much Anonymous. Praise like yours keeps me writing.

Cheers Pete

January 28, 2022

Australian Greens Party Policy: Australian Nuclear Submarines

The Australian Government's AUKUS nuclear propelled submarine decisions may eventually boost Australia's defences against China.

As I expressed in September 2021 there are also more immediate political benefits for the Australian Government in starting the AUKUS process. The AUKUS submarine decisions have occurred in the runup to Australia’s next Federal Election to be held by on, or before, May 21, 2022.

The Australian Government, by establishing a nuclear submarine future aims at "wedging" the major Opposition parties. "Wedging" most immediately means politically dividing the Pro-Jobs, Pro-Local manufacturing Australian Labor Party (ALP)

from the the strongly anti-nuclear, anti-nuclear submarine leftwing Australian Greens Party (whose support is often required for the ALP to win power and govern).

Submarine Matters likes to air both sides of the debate., particularly on hugely expensive submarines.

In this volatile nuclear submarine political situation here are 2 Greens anti nuclear submarine links.

1. https://greens.org.au/campaigns/no-nuclear-subs

“NOT HERE, NOT NOW AND NOT EVER"

2. "Greens Announce Plan for Peace, Demilitarisation and Rejection of AUKUS Submarine Deal"

January 27, 2022

Alternative Propulsions For Australia's Future Submarines?

Pete Comment

My opinion is that the AUKUS submarine project will only survive (and make sense) if Australia actually uses the pressurised water reactors (PWRs) developed by the UK https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR

or US https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Naval_reactors#Submarine_reactors

A major requirement of Australia nuclear subs will be their ability to inter-operate with UK and US nuclear subs. This includes the ability to move at a sustained speed of 30 knots and preferably faster.

Australia is in no position, and without the industrial base, to develop radically new types of alternative propulsion sources for submarine that are discussed below.

I therefore support Plan A which is already Australian AUKUS policy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS#Nuclear-powered_submarines ie. choosing a UK or US attack submarine (SSN). The AUKUS SSN may have many UK and US characteristics.

As Submarine Matters is an equal opportunity website other Plans for alternative propulsion systems are being given “airtime” below:

ARTICLE

"How to Fall Forward, Not Back

[Plan A]

If Australia is to not stuff-up its program to acquire nuclear propelled submarines, the best path is that first spelled out [in October 2021] on this site https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/10/strangely-sober-sermon-aukus-ssn.html ; i.e. begin early, by funding the RAN to wet lease Astute boats with RN crews, then spend the next ten years gradually replacing RN and other UK staff seconded to Australia with newly qualified Australian crew members and technicians as local capacities mature.

As such a (potentially pear shaped) project like the nascent Australian SSN program is wide open to foreign or domestic financial, political or organizational attack - and the Collins class won’t last forever - there has to be a plan 'B' and preferably a plan 'C' to.

To survive a perceived failure of plan 'A'; plans 'B' and 'C' should not resemble a warmed over, shrunken and re-scheduled version of whatever plan 'A' the government of the day first announces.

A Possible Plan 'B' ?

One 'fall-forward' alternative to [Plan A] the 7,000 tonne Astute LMA [ie. the Lockheed Martin Astute (LMA) for Australia. This would have Lockheed Martin’s integrating the AN/BYG-1 (or follow-on) combat system] , mooted on Submarine Matters last year, would be a 4,000 tonne hybrid LIB/nuclear boat that eschews the perennial PWR as a power source, in favour of modular micro-reactors driving, say, free-piston Stirling [AIP] engines paired with linear alternators.

The so-called 'disruptive' technology, noted, above was pioneered not for the US Navy, but for NASA.

In the 1980s, NASA began investing in innovative means of powering space missions that travel beyond the distance where solar cells are a viable power source. The US Idaho National Laboratory and its partner institutions, such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory, designed and tested engineering development devices under projects:

- KRUSTY https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/krusty-project-demonstrates-potential-power-sources-future-space-exploration

- Kilopower https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/kilopower

- and, most recently, Fission Surface Power (FSP) https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/fission-surface-power/index.html .

* the devices built and stress-tested under each of these nuclear projects (for which NASA was the customer) all eschew traditional nuclear fuel-assemblies (so no fuel pellets and no zirconium); instead using solid uranium cores and non traditional cooling and power take-off systems (so no system-critical pumps, no water and no steam raising equipment).

One early engineering development was a solid nuclear core the size of a toilet roll (their description, not mine!) that provided the heat source for a Stirling-cycle generator delivering (low watts) for use on NASA interplanetary missions.

The next technological maturity step for NASA was to fund a reactor project (Kilopower), which saw the same U.S. government agencies create and test a 1 KWe generator designed to withstand space flight, including the shock of being literally blasted off a launch pad.

NASA's current FSP project (see above) is intended to deliver a power source for use on the moon or on Mars with a space launch date 'in the late 2020s'.

On pages 3 and 5 of the relevant public RFP (see Request for Proposal - Fission Surface Power) prospective respondents are informed that the power source NASA needs (to keep on boldly going. . . ) must deliver 'not less than 10 KWe', run autonomously for not less than ten years and weigh less than 3.6 tonnes.

On page 10 of the RFP, respondents are invKWeited to detail any devices they believe they can produce for NASA that generate up to 40 KWe, so long as such devices meet all the other essential design criteria.

There are powerful, very persuasive commercial and professional interests that stand to lose heavily if anything other than a PWR ever goes to sea on a submarine.

Therefore, if NASA had not invested the time, money, technical effort and reputation in its (Lunar and Martian) nuclear power generation systems, I'd be among the committed skeptics to any PWR alternative.

But NASA did so, so I am not (yet) sceptical.

From Nuclear Science to System Delivery

Meanwhile, back on earth, one of the pioneering manufacturers of nuclear propulsion systems for U.S. submarines, Westinghouse, is currently 'aggressively' (again, this is not my word) developing modular micro-reactors 'for civil and military uses' rated at up to 5 MWe ; i.e. an order of magnitude more powerful than the nuclear power generation systems of interest to NASA.

NB: The advertised power rating of the planned Westinghouse micro reactor seems to be about 20 per cent higher than the MTU4000 series diesel alternators that were likely to have equipped the 4,000 tonne Shortfin Barracuda 1A design.

Therefore, two 5 MWe Westinghouse micro reactors appear sized to handle the entire battery recharging needs of a 4K LIB/nuclear boat, thereby reducing its indiscretion ratio to (?) zero and extending its submerged endurance to conventional SSN levels, rather than conventional AIP levels.

The Westinghouse modular micro-reactor design appears to have little in common with the large number of PWRs Westinghouse previously supplied to the US Navy (eg. unlike the Westinghouse S6W submarine reactor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S6W_reactor , it uses no water and produces no steam) but seems, (to this non-nuclear non-engineer) eerily similar to the innovative nuclear powered alternator designs NASA has sponsored. Westinghouse is reportedly seeking NRC authority to sell its micro-reactors to customers in 2025.

The art work accompanying journal articles about Westinghouse's modular micro-reactors seems to show that the modules comfortably fit into a U.S. standard (8 x 8 x 20 foot) shipping container. If their compactness is an actual fact, then the complete reactor module is a cylindrical unit about 2 meters in diameter and 6 metres in length (eg. see page 27 of Nuclear Plant Journal, March-April 2019).

Under the hypothetical plan 'B'; the work initiated by NASA and, it does seem to appear, built on by Westinghouse just might open two alternative technical pathways for submarine nuclear propulsion.

The first pathway would be to use, say, four FSP-model 40 KWe nuclear powered alternators per Australian LIB/nuclear boat to cover the submarine's full hotel load and use traditional diesel alternators to charge the submarine's batteries for everything else.

Such a boat could be tasked, say, with sitting on the bottom of the Gulf of Tonkin for two months or so listening, looking, recharging, 'interrogating' and 're-briefing' XLUUVs, before returning to base for crew changes, re-storing etc. The mooted submarine's batteries could be kept at, or near, their full charge indefinitely by relying on a small trickle flow to the battery from the 160 KWe nuclear generation plant.

While this technical pathway transforms the submarine's endurance and time on station, it does little or nothing to increase either its rate of advance (i.e. deployment speed) or its top underwater speed, since the nuclear plant cannot generate energy at a rate near that at which battery power is consumed by the submarine when it is underway. An un-modified Collins class boat would presumably outperform this style of hybrid LIB/nuclear boat, both for rate of advance and sustained underwater speed.

The second pathway would be to use, say, three Westinghouse 5 MWe modular reactors per boat to generate a combined 15 MWe to simultaneously cover (a) the submarine's full hotel load; (b) the power needed for propulsion at sustained speeds up to 10 knots; and (c) continuous battery re-charging.

This technical pathway both transforms the submarine's endurance and time on station, matches or betters the rate of advance of a Collins class boat and gives the submarine commander the option of using a fully charged LIB in ways outside of normal parameters (i.e. to meet or exceed SSN top speeds over short distances, but not an SSNs sustained rate of advance).

Why would you not 'just go for a pure SSN'? - because repairing or replacing an SSN reactor can only be done in a tiny number of secure dry-docks and it reportedly takes hundreds of highly skilled workers between weeks (K15 reactors) and years (PWR2 reactors https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR2 ) to do so. If designed for easy removal (like the gas turbines on a destroyer) a sealed modular reactor of the size and shape Westinghouse (or NASA) describe could be done by a crane in a day - an important advantage over PWR propulsion.

BUREAUCRATUS LEX JANUARY 26, 2022