Australian "Interim" subs? Naval Group Best Bet. Aus Missions?

See the Australian government owned ABC News article dated May 27, 2021.

PETE COMMENT

This ABC article is an Australian Government "we are pressuring Naval Group to speed up" beatup - for public consumption. 

1.  So called "interim subs" take a minimum of 7 years to plan and build (and even then by the politically impossible Build Overseas route). Then you need a plan to retain them for 20-30 more years or hope for a buyer (all very expensive and risky).

2.  Interim is only quicker if Australia is buying large second hand subs (a la the Upholder/Victoria "solution" - a sad UK/Canadian failure.)

3.  And besides, whatever happened to Australia's mid-life upgrade intention? This carries the odd name "life of type extension (LOTE)"). The LOTE interim solution should keep some Collins subs operational all the way from 2029 to 2050.

Some in the Australian Navy are looking at a modified (presumably very enlarged) TKMS Type 214. TKMS could call it the 4,500 tonne Type 216 again (history repeating itself?) 

Also see H I Sutton's accurate doubts that Australia is bucking its LARGE 3,000 to 4,700 tonne submaine trend in contemplating a small 1,800 tonne Type 214 interim sub.

I also note that the 214 explicitly features air independent propulsion (AIP) - designed for short range missions - eg. for navies with such missions as sitting on the seafloor 100km from their main base. Examples are:

-  Israel's AIP 212/214 2,200 tonne Dolphin 2 (nuclear missile armed) variants. These seafloor sit just outside their Haifa, Israel, main base.

and

-  South Korea's (seafloor sit in the Yellow Sea and  Sea of Japan) locally made 1,800 tonne 214 variants). 

A 214 can be seen as a Type 209 with a 300 tonne AIP plug. . 

AIP is something Australia has always seen as counter-productive for Australia's long (all the way from Fleet Base West (Rockingham) to the Malacca Strait? round trip) mission profile. An AIP's LOx and Hydrogen containers represent a dead weight for long range missions - particularly when the LOx and Hydrogen propellants are used up. 

Furthermore (lets assume) in terms of Aus sub discretion risks we are generally talking "Indonesia-peacetime" as well as surveilling/tailing surface ships and subs transiting the Malacca Strait. 

In contrast if Aus subs needed to stay on station in vastly more dangerous Chinese waters (anywhere near China's Hainan SSBN Base, Port of Hong Kong or Shanghai or the Taiwan Strait?) then AIP might be a good idea.

S Korea's DSME Marketing Type 209 Clone to Philippines

The 209 that SK is offering the Philippine Navy has already been successfully marketed to Indonesia as the Nagapasa class aka "Improved Chang/Jang Bogo". 

Note: South Korea confusingly has multiple names and spellings for all of its weapon systems. Hence, the US DIA needs to establish a NATO style designation system for SK weapons, including subs. 

This SK DSME offer is, of course, competing with Naval Group's longer term campaign to offer a small Scorpene variant to the Philippines.

Great Essay Favouring Australian Nuclear Subs (SSNs)

Former Commodore Denis Mole has written an excellent essay advocating nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) for Australia. Denis Mole served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 35 years, commanding submarines and attaining the rank of commodore. He has recently retired from the commercial marine and defence support sector.

ESSAY

Here is Denis Mole's essay (already published at ASPI's The Strategist (April 15, 2021) and The National Interest (April 18, 2021) and at other websites).

"Nuclear submarines could lead to nuclear power for Australia

In Adelaide’s The Advertiser newspaper on 7 March, former defence minister Christopher Pyne said [at the Adelaide Now paysite]. ‘Then there is the nonsensical argument that the Attack Class submarines are no good because they aren’t nuclear. Almost all of these arguments are driven by people who either know nothing at all about submarines and defence or have outdated information that is no longer relevant.’ Pyne must therefore believe that Australia’s current and recent submarine commanding officers know nothing about submarines.

The 2016 defence white paper called for Australia’s future submarines to be ‘regionally superior’. As a former commander of the submarine force, I don’t know any submarine commanding officer over the past 30 years who has any doubt that, overall, nuclear-powered submarines are superior to diesel submarines of similar vintage. Australia’s new Attack-class submarines will probably be superior to most diesel submarines in our region, but they won’t be superior to China’s nuclear-powered submarines entering service in the 2040s and beyond. China’s navy is numerically larger than the US Indo-Pacific fleet now and is forecast to be more powerful than the American fleet by 2035. Australia’s 12th Attack-class submarine won’t enter service until around 2054 and will be in service until about 2080.

Pyne went on to say, ‘Australia does not have a nuclear industry. One cannot be created overnight.’ Pyne might have the cart before the horse. The Americans had their first nuclear-powered submarine in service before their first nuclear power station. The nuclear power station program in the US had been languishing until Captain, later Admiral, Hymen G. Rickover was appointed to head the nuclear reactor development for both naval and civil applications. In the early years, it was trained nuclear submariners leaving navy service and going into the commercial power sector that allowed that industry to grow rapidly.

The claim that Australia can’t have nuclear-powered submarines because it doesn’t have a nuclear industry has never been tested. An Australian ability to manufacture and reprocess nuclear fuel wouldn’t be essential in order to own and operate nuclear-powered submarines. Modern American and British submarines are built with nuclear fuel to last the life of the vessel. Japan has 33 nuclear reactors in power stations but doesn’t manufacture or reprocess nuclear fuel. This is also true of many countries in Europe and the Middle East that have nuclear power. Australia buys advanced combat aircraft and weapons that are manufactured overseas, so why not nuclear reactors and the whole-of-life fuel they require? Nuclear-powered submarines could be built in Australia with imported reactors.

Notwithstanding that reactors and fuel can be purchased from other countries (the OPAL reactor at Lucas Heights is from Argentina), why doesn’t Australia have a larger and more diverse nuclear industry? Of the top 20 economies (Australia is 13th), 17 have nuclear power. Australia, Italy and Saudi Arabia are the three exceptions. Italy imports 16% of its electricity from adjacent countries, more than half from France where it is produced from nuclear power. Saudi Arabia is acquiring nuclear power. And, as various countries commit to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, it’s noteworthy that no major economy intends doing so without nuclear power in the mix.

Diesel submarines have been around for about 120 years and nuclear submarines have been around for about 65 years, so neither form represents new technology. With a choice between the two technologies, the leading Western maritime powers of the US, UK and France all adopted the nuclear option with no diesel attack submarines, because nuclear power is the more effective and superior technology.

At the time when replacements for Australia’s Oberon-class submarines were being developed in the 1980s, it’s almost certain that neither the US nor UK would have sold nuclear submarines to Australia. With the Cold War at its peak, their focus was on the Soviet Union and the possibility of maritime warfare in the North Atlantic. France was just starting to develop its first nuclear-powered attack submarines. But what about when it came time to explore options to replace the Collins-class submarines?

The 2009 defence white paper announced that the Collins class would be replaced and Australia’s submarine force would be expanded to 12 boats. The defence minister at the time, Labor’s Joel Fitzgibbon, directed the department that, in developing options, it was not to bring forward any nuclear proposal. Three years later, when he was no longer defence minister, Fitzgibbon admitted it was a mistake ruling out a nuclear option; however, neither of his successors altered the ‘no nuclear’ guidance to the department. Consequently, when the Coalition government came to power in 2013, only conventional options had been developed.

The notion of conventionally powered submarines’ suitability for Australia in the second half of this century needs to be challenged. The Attack-class program should proceed as replacements for the six Collins-class submarines to avoid a capability gap; however, options to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the additional six boats and eventually replacements for the six Attack-class submarines should be pursued immediately.

Submarines could lead to a broad nuclear industry in Australia. This possibility will be the subject of a seminar to be held at ASPI on Thursday 15 July, jointly hosted by the Submarine Institute of Australia and UNSW Canberra. More information is available here."

COMMENT

Submarine Matters over the years has been ambivalent about SSNs for Australia, mainly on the basis of the extreme cost eg. for nuclear training, including land based training reactors, new emergency base facilities on Australia's eastern seaboard and the cost of decommissioning SSNs. 

Another consideration is the likelihood an Australian SSN program would start an SSN arms race among some countries in Australia's region, particularly Indonesia. Since 2009 when Australia started talking 12 conventional subs significant Indonesian naval factions quickly arrived at an optimal number of 12 subs for Indonesia's hitherto tiny 2 submarine service. 

If Indonesia were to compete in the SSN race another concern is Indonesia's questionable industrial safety record. This includes the tragic KRI Nanggala sinking and Indonesia's ongoing Sidoarjo (aka "Lusi") mud volcano, caused by a 2006 blowout of a natural gas well. Also would Indonesia be prepared to pay the extreme costs of decommissioning its SSNs (rusting sub reactors near Australian waters!). 

Furthermore with Indonesia in the "Ring of Fire" future Indonesian SSNs in port and necessary nuclear reactors on land would all be vulnerable to tsunamis and earthquakes. An Indonesian tsunami "Fukushima" meltdown or gas explosion might spread nuclear debris into the atmosphere which may blow south, Australia's way. Simultaneously there might be  nuclear polluted water in the Timor Sea (between Australia, Indonesia and East Timor).

Yet Australia's vast coastline and strategic responsibilities (some unnamed straits and narrows, may include the South China Sea and one day may extend to helping to defend Taiwan) can only be adequately dealt with by very fast moving, long range, subs (ie. SSNs). This is especially if Australia is forced to confront (with declining US SSN support) hostile SSNs from China, maybe Russia and even from India (one day).

Usually Secret Japan Doc: LIBs for Subs: Code "SLH" is LCO

Pete thanks wispywood2344 for his May 15, 2021, 1:34:00 PM advice that the Japanese Soryu Mk.II and Taigei-class submarine Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) formula (confidentially termed "SLH") is, in fact, LCO, ie. Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LiCoO₂)

Wispy notes LCO is a different substance from the other LIB formula "NCA" ie. Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminum Oxide  (LiNiCoAlO₂) believed to be intended for Japanese submarines.

Wispy's comment that Japanese submarine's current LIB formula being LCO takes into account:

-  the development period and technology trend of LIBs and

-  Japanese language GS Yuasa Technology Co Ltd. (GYT) document which Wispy deems "highly reliable" with link https://ssl.bsk-z.or.jp/kenkyucenter/pdf/gyt20201210.pdf .

 That document was written by employees of large battery producing company GS Yuasa and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI): 

Pete has now translated this document:

TITLE: “Realization of the world's first submarine equipped with a lithium-ion battery system”

DATED: [noting the most commonly used date format in Japan is "year month day”] “20201210”  means  December 10, 2020.

BY: Takahiro Ida, Hidefumi Hasegawa and Kazuyuki Kawamoto all of GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. and by Hiroshi Tonomoto and Ken Nitta of the Defense and Space Segment, Submarine Engineering Department, Ships and Special Machinery Division of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.

"1. 1. Introduction 

GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) has been manufacturing lead-acid batteries for submarines for many years.

Based on this abundant battery building experience we will mass produce lithium-ion batteries for submarines.

We have completed the development of lithium-ion batteries [LIBs] for submarines that match the quality and performance required for submarine use.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) has made lithium-ion batteries safe and fully functional.

We have developed a [computerized onboard submaine] main storage battery management [and safety] control device for LIBs on submarine. GS Yuasa and MHI signed a mass production contract for LIBs on submarine with the Japan's MoD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in 2015.

[ Pete Comment: See "Research on high-efficient electricity storage and supply system for submarines" on ATLA website here at https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/soubi_kansen.html with the ATLA diagram and description below:

[ATLA explains] "Conduct research on electricity storage system with large capacity and high density, electricity supply system with high efficient and compact sized to extend submarines’ underwater endurance without increasing ship size." ]

GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) started mass production of LIB batteries in March 2017. This  proceeded smoothly. In August 2018 GS Yuasa Technology Co., Ltd. (GYT) delivered them to MHI.

After that, the submarine [Soryu Mk. II] JS Oryu was equipped with lithium-ion batteries. The main storage battery computerized management device was integrated into Oryu from the summer of 2019.

After JS Oryu's sea trials, Oryu [with its Lithium-ion Batteries] was handed over to the [Japanese Navy] Maritime Self-Defense Force in the spring of 2020.

2. 2. Development history

GYT established mass production technology for lithium-ion batteries around 1993, and lithium to be installed in submarines in 1994.

GYT proposed the development of an ion battery to MHI's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) [see ATLA's precursor TRDI] at that time under MHI.

In 2003, GYT and MHI's TRDI were contracted to develop "new main storage battery for submarines. [likely by Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD) which likely provided startup, ongoing and on completion funding].

Participated in "Research Trial"

GYT,  conducted research trials, and completed the development of lithium-ion batteries for submarines.

3. 3. Development overview

3.1 Lithium-ion battery

Lithium-ion batteries [LIBs] generally have the following superior performance compared to lead-acid batteries, so they are used in submarines.

LIBs should contribute to improvements of performance, due to.

・ High energy density: Can store more power and discharge

・ Long life: Reduced number of battery replacements

・ High charging efficiency: Shortening charging time

・ Excellent discharge characteristics: Sufficient capacity can be taken out even with a large current.

・ No hydrogen gas generation: [So no need to take safety measures against hydrogen gas].

・ No maintenance required: No battery maintenance required

・ No maintenance required: No battery maintenance required

Figure 1 [can be seen on Page 2 of the original document] shows the external view of the new lithium-ion battery (hereinafter referred to as SLH type) developed by GYT. 

The SLH LIB's dimensions are specifically designed to be the same size as the preceding lead-acid batteries.

The lead-acid battery was a single cell, while the SLH type configuration is an aggregate of 10 cells  arranged in 2 rows and 5 stages and connected in series. Table 1 [also on Page 2 of the original document] shows the main points of the SLH type.

Table 1 indicates Lithium cobalt oxide, which can achieve high energy density, is used as the positive electrode material.

In addition, as will be described later, the SLH type is equipped with a battery monitoring unit that measures the cell voltage and cell temperature at the top.

[From documentDetails]

Fig. 1 External view of the new main storage battery SLH type

Table 1 Key points of the new main storage battery SLH type

[Table 1 literally translated is:]

Table 1 Key points of the new main storage battery SLH type

Item New main storage battery SLH type

Structure sealed type

Electrolyte Organic electrolyte

Positive electrode material Lithium cobalt oxide [LCO]

Negative electrode material carbon. 

3.2 Battery monitoring unit

Unlike the conventional SCG type lead battery, the SLH type is equipped with a battery monitoring unit. Figure 2  [which can be seen on Page 3 of the original document] shows the battery monitoring unit.

The external view of the device is shown. This battery monitoring unit monitors the voltage and temperature of each cell that constitutes the main storage battery.

It is an electronic device that measures the degree and transmits the results to the main storage battery management device [central computer station terminal]. [This station provides details of any] performance degradation or safety degradation.

Therefore, the station is used to confirm that the battery is working in the correct voltage range and operating temperature range.

In order to ensure [accuracy and safety] the [station video screen] is composed of two completely independent units for regular use and supplementary use, and [can operate] automatically in the event of an [emergency] failure on the regular side.

It switches to the auxiliary side. See Fig. 2 External view of the battery monitoring unit [which can be seen on Page 3 of the original document].

3.3 Battery management system

Monitors and displays the temperature and voltage of many cells mounted on the submarine in real time, and data in each control device, etc.

It has a function to send (battery status). The main storage battery management device is serially communicated from the battery monitoring unit.

Receive data at SCC (Ship Condition Control Console) or automatic charging device

Send the required data. In addition, it consists of two sides, one for the front group and one for the rear group, and all the front and rear groups are single on each monitoring screen.

It is possible to display the battery status.

Fig. 3 Battery monitoring system (joint image) [which can also be seen on Page 3 of the original document]

4. Summary

By installing the new main storage battery SLH type on a submarine, the following two points are the effects that contribute to the performance of the submarine.

Can be mentioned.

(1) Compared to lead-acid batteries, SLH LIBs have a higher energy density, so they are smaller and lighter.

[More SLH LCO LIBs, with higher energy density, can fit into the limited space of the submarine. This is compared to larger, lower density "SCG" lead-acid batteries.] [Direct translation:] Equipped with SLH type, which has higher energy density than SCG type lead battery, in the limited volume inside the submarine.

By doing so, [SLH LCO LIBs] can contribute to the extension of the underwater duration.

(2) No hydrogen gas is generated. Moreover, there is no need to manage the specific gravity measurement.

[SLH LCO LIBs make] maintenance management becomes easier [compared to] the measurement and adjustment of electrolyte specific gravity and liquid level, etc., [necessary with the older] SCG type [lead-acid] batteries, etc.

No maintenance work is required.

5. Acknowledgments

We are very honored to receive the Honor of the Defense Infrastructure Development Association Award.

We will continue to do our best to meet your expectations.

In this development, a large number of people concerned, including the Ministry of Defense [MoD] and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency [ATLA] will be enormous. [ie. they have made an enormous effort.]

We are deeply grateful for [the Japanese Government's, mainly the your guidance and encouragement.

That is all." 

[Documents ends]
-----------------------------------

See also this other GS Yuasa document, pages 14, 28 and 31, on GS Yuasa supplying LIBs for Japanese submarines.

UK Carrier Srike Group on world tour (eg. Med & South China Sea)

See BBC article.

News to me - the article indicates UK strike aircraft based in Cyprus regularly attack ground targets in Iraq.

UK F-35Bs from UK carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth will soon strike Islamic State targets in Iraq. 

Also many other UK Carrier Strike Group 21 world tour activities and exersizes with allies from May to December 2021 - all the way to the Pacific Ocean and back.
---------------------------------

In great detail Richard Gardner (London) for top source Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) reports (in part) in APDR's June 2021 magazine:

"Final preparations have been underway at Portsmouth during late April [2021] for the departure of Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) which will see the largest UK naval deployment to Asia Pacific waters for a generation. The flotilla of ships will deploy for 28 weeks, through the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and South China Sea into the Pacific and represents the most ambitious Royal Navy overseas projection of sea power since the Falklands Task Force in 1982.

A very wide selection of vessels will be involved, apart from the flagship, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, and will include Type 45 destroyers, HMS Defender and HMS Diamond, Type 23 frigates, HMS Richmond and HMS Kent, the new offshore patrol vessel, HMS Tamar, an Astute Class nuclear submarine and fleet support ships, RFA Fort Victoria and RFA Tidespring.

Adding an international flavour will be a US Navy Destroyer, the USS Sullivans, and a Dutch frigate, HNLMS Evertse. As well as promoting defence exports along the way, and underlining the UK’s renewed commitment to a more global outreach, the opportunity will be fully exploited to exercise sea and air assets with other friendly nations, gaining experience through cross operating with very diverse equipment and capabilities, including co-ordinated command and control and tactical operations.

The carrier air group will see the intensive use of new aircraft types working together on a longdistance deployment for the first time. The 18 F-35B combat aircraft will see crews from the Royal Navy, RAF and US Marines working together as a group, following intensive training and working up on the new aircraft in the USA and UK. For the Royal Navy the step up in combat capability is considerable, moving to a stealthy, supersonic, fifth-generation fighter/attack platform, aboard a highly automated 65,000 tonne carrier.

Merlin helicopter (R Gardner photo)

The RN has suffered a serious capability gap in recent years following the withdrawal of three Invincible Class 22,000 tonne carriers and their Sea Harrier and Harrier GR9 aircraft. However, the deliveries of UK F-35Bs to date have been relatively small and are being spread three ways between development and training units in the USA and UK and just a single operational squadron, No 617, a joint RAF/RN unit.

The second operational squadron, No 809 Naval Air Squadron, will become operational in 2023 when 37 F-35Bs should be deployable. On CSG21 the inclusion of a USMC squadron within the air group is a bonus for both the UK and USMC and the huge four acre deck and vast hangar of the new carrier has been designed to accommodate 40 aircraft, so operating and maintenance space is not a problem. Several Asia-Pacific nations will be taking a particular interest in seeing up close how the F-35Bs can work closely with helicopters as many already have, or are planning, new small carriers and since the demise of Harrier production, there is currently no other combat jet apart from the F-35B that can use them. The USMC may be the largest user of F-35Bs but is still operating Harriers on its own helicopter landing platform ships as it transitions to the new aircraft.

NEW HELICOPTER PLATFORMS [see in APDR's June 2021 magazine]

Over 40 different countries will be visited during CSG21 and the ships will conduct extensive sea exercises, expected to include working with ships and aircraft from India, South Korea, Singapore,

Taiwan, Japan and Australia. The passage to Japan is expected to be controversial and will involve a balance between avoiding what might be regarded by China as provocation in their backyard, and the opportunity to display a robust show of resolve in support of regional maritime forces committed to the protection of internationally recognised free shipping routes across the South China Sea.

DAZZLING SPECTACLE

One of the new Royal Navy ships will be reviving a tradition that has not been seen at sea on a Royal Navy ship since the end of the Second World War. The OPV HMS Tamar is heading to the A-P region carrying a “dazzle” camouflage paint scheme incorporating various shades of black, white and grey in unusual shapes. This was designed to make it most distinctive - but the purpose of this scheme is the use the different shapes, angles and colours to make the ship harder to identify and to confuse those seeking to calculate its speed and direction, especially when looking through a submarine periscope.

Commander David Louis, Commander of the Overseas Patrol Squadron said... "The Royal Navy’s ships will once again become more familiar in Asia-Pacific waters after CSG21 returns to the UK, and will be followed by further deployments of frigates and larger ships next year."

SEE FULL ARTICLE IN APDR'S JUNE 2021 MAGAZINE

Heart-Rending Video: Enemies become Friends

The highs and lows of a B-29 (all surfaces shredded but still flying) and its crew, eventually shot down by Zeros and by a Ki-45 over Tokyo. 

Note at the time of the action some B-29s still had a 20mm cannon in the tail. The tail armament was then modified to all 0.50 calibers in line with all other gun turrents of B-29s. The common 0.50 caliber made ammo logistics/provision and reloading much easier.

See the less than 10 minute Youtube here and be low:

Pete

Dutton's Darkness Dumbs Down Defence Department

If hard working public servants in Australia's Department of Defence had reason to hope their new Minister, Peter Dutton, might be a breath of fresh air, think again. Dutton sees himself as merely doing time ministering to rather large government departments (was Home Affairs now running Defence) on the way to his true goal, the Top Job, the Prime Ministership. 

Kym Bergmann, editor of Australia's exceptional Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter(APDR), (No.1 in my "Favorite Books" list) has writing an excellent commentary deftly disclosing details of what may await the doting Departmental denizens of Darth Vader Dutton. 

Kym wrote on May 16, 2021: 

"OPINION: Is the Defence Department heading for a major shakeup?" 

"In Canberra we always like a good structure of government story, even if it might be a bit of a yawn for ordinary Australians.  The rumour currently doing the rounds is that new Defence Minister Peter Dutton is planning an assault on the department – not in the physical sense but some sort of major shakeup of its structure and leadership.  This does not come directly from the Minister, who is generally contemptuous of the media and averse to even basic scrutiny, but from the inner circle privy to his thinking.

Some of this might be coming from the head of his former Department of Home Affairs, Mike Pezzullo, who recently made headlines with his views that the drums of war are beating loudly.  He spent the formative years of his career in Defence and has long been suspected of wanting to return as the head of it but has so far not succeeded.  It has been unkindly suggested that since he is unable to control the Army from his current position, he has created a substitute in the form of the armed, black uniformed Border Force.

It is possible that journalists who are starved of information are talking up the possibility of major changes without a lot of hard data. [Dutton's Minister of Defence] office will not answer emails, phone calls or texts from most sections of the media – it being unclear what they actually do with their time – with the partial exception of a couple of stenographers able to accurately record the thoughts of their boss.  The Minister himself largely limits his appearances to right wing radio chat shows that typically feature introductions along the lines of “why don’t you tell the listeners how good you are and what a wonderful job the government is doing.”

Cartoon courtesy "First Dog on the Moon" published via The Guardian.
---

The real Peter Dutton smiling with veiled belligerence.
(Photo courtesy The Guardian)
---

To choke off any useful information about Defence reaching the general public – even for positive stories – the Minister has issued an instruction to the Department containing the following extremely restrictive measures when responding to requests for information:

*   Responses are to be as brief and succinct as possible

*   Guidance is to limit responses to three paras, regardless of the breadth of the
     question(s); additional information can be offered on background

*   Capability-related interviews are unlikely to be approved, be rigidly flexible to revert to
     written responses.

Updating a major program in three paragraphs is impossible.

This instruction has had the immediate and chilling effect of shutting down the flow of information about projects because people in uniform who have an instinctive wariness of the media now have justification for providing minimal information – or as is increasingly the case, none at all.  Ironically the quoted memo was leaked to a journalist. Leaving aside the issue of what “rigidly flexible” could possibly mean, we are entering a dark period were Australians will be denied any information about where $40 billion of taxpayer’s money is going every year.

While this might sound like a few journalists sulking, it is far more than that because Defence is not only responsible for national security – admittedly a lot of which is highly classified, for good reason – but also for managing huge acquisition programs for ships, planes and vehicles.  Some of them are extremely poorly managed and deserve scrutiny; many are going well and the public, as well as the broader defence community including industry and academia, are curious about what is happening.

This has us circling back to the possibility of structural changes to the Department.  One school of thought says why bother with a Federal election less than a year away – but others argue that change is long overdue and that with billions of dollars wasted on procurement mismanagement the country cannot afford for Defence to remain on its current trajectory for a day longer.

No better example can be supplied than the ongoing revelations about LAND 200 and the withdrawal from service at Army’s direction of the Elbit Battle Management System, the subject of the main story in this edition.  By rights the program should have been cancelled in 2019 after a highly critical and detailed report from the ANAO.  To be fair, at that time Army announced a pause of the next part of the contract, which was set to cost Australia another $1 billion on top of the $2 billion already invested.

It is only due to the media that the Australian public are now getting a sense of the extraordinary events that have been taking place with Army’s signature digitisation program – a key ingredient for combat capability – and which has come to a total, shuddering halt.  Even worse, there is no viable alternative readily available, and the way forward seems opaque.  To make matters worse, Army then started selectively leaking information that the system is being withdrawn because of concerns that the software might have some sort of back door that could be used to access secure US networks when connected with them.  There will now need to be a major investigation into who knew what and when inside Defence – especially CASG – and Parliament House.

Elbit has reacted with fury, absolutely denying the allegations about security concerns and pointing out that not only has this been a collaborative program with the Army but that all source code has been transferred to Australia.

If it were up to Defence and the government, all of this would have been hushed up.  There has been no official announcement about the situation even though Army had made the decision about withdrawing it from service last December.  Should the Minister be looking for a good excuse to launch into the Department, this will be it.  To it should be added the Attack class submarine program that is consuming billions of dollars with seemingly very little accountability.

It’s time for everyone to be reminded of the old saying about the best disinfectant being sunlight."

Indonesian Sub Almost Torpedoed Aus-NZ Ships 1999

An Indonesian Cakra-class submarine (KRI Cakra or KRI Nanggala (tragically sunk alone in 2021) was involved in the following confrontation with Australian and New Zealand warships in 1999. Source: the operational history of Indonesia’s 2 Cakra class submarines - 1999 East Timor (ET) Crisis. 

GEO POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Tiny ET (see map below) a former Portuguese colony, was brutally invaded by Indonesia in 1975. ET is less than 700km from Australia and borders Indonesian West Timor. 

By early 1999 UN, US and Australian political pressure forced Indonesia to accept an an August 30, 1999 Referendum in which ET voters overwhelming favoured rapid  independence from Indonesia. 

After the Referendum, rightwing, moderately Muslim, military officers who (under the surface) still dominate Indonesia were outraged ET was to secede from Indonesia. In contrast ET was and remains a Catholic Latin leftwing country. Indonesia was concerned other islands of the difficult to control Indonesia Archipelago (like almost majority Christian West Papua/West Irian) would be encouraged by ET's success.  

Immediately after the August 30, 1999, Referendum Indonesian rightwing military leaders launched a "militia" (thugs paid by the Indonesian military) offensive to crush East Timorese independence. The UN, US and Australia objected to this new Indonesian militar action. 

By late 1999 relations between Indonesia and its southern neighbour, Australia, were extreme.

INDONESIAN NEAR TORPEDOING OF AUS/NZ SHIPS

As Australia was the closest democratic military power trusted by the UN-US, Australia rapidly led an air and sea liberation of ET in late 1999. Naturally this led to some confrontations with Indonesia naval and army and active INTERFET suppression of Indonesia Army paid militia forces in/around ET. 

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) transport vessel, HMAS Kanimbla, was to serve as an INTERFET command post. 

As HMAS Kanimbla approached the coast of East Timor, it entered what were technically still Indonesian waters. One of the two Indonesian Cakra-class submarines (KRI Cakra or KRI Nanggal) was conducting routine patrol duties in the Timor Sea, when the Cakra-class sub's sonar detected several unidentified surface ships moving towards Dili.

The Cakra-class submarine commander ordered his sub to submerge to periscope depth for potential action. The unidentified surface ships turned out to be HMAS Kanimbla and the Royal New Zealand Navy's frigates HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Te Kaha. 

The submarine captain ordered preparations for firing torpedoes.^[3] The New Zealand frigates were aware of the presence of the submarine and could have eventually sunk it with their own lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, but initially they were unable to determine the sub's exact position. 

At that point, the commander of HMAS Kanimbla communicated with the Australian government regarding the situation. The Australian government (in Canberra) emergency contacted the Indonesian government (in Jakarta) requesting permission for the INTERFET vessels to enter Indonesian waters to continue passage to Dili, capital of East Timor.^[3] 

Fortunately naval headquarters in Jakarta ordered the submarine not to obstruct/torpedo the convoy. This averted the open warfare between Australia and Indonesia that submarine torpedo damage or sinking of an Australian or New Zealand ship (and Aus NZ retaliation) would have triggered. The submarine then surfaced (to show non-aggressive goodwill) but continued to shadow the convoy for the rest of the convoy's passage to Dili.^[3]

KRI Nanggala Sunk: Human Error; Old Sub; Internal Wave?

The Indonesian Navy's suspicion that KRI Nanggala's sinking was caused by a natural occurrence, an "internal solitary wave" [aka internal wave] appears adequate given that  Navy's concerns. 

The Jakarta Post, April 30, 2021, reports: 

"The submarine's former commander, Rear Admiral Muhammad Ali, has told local media that a so-called internal solitary wave could have been to blame. The natural phenomenon occurs when different sea depths come together, creating forces that could have dragged the vessel down, he said."

So simply no need to investigate or blame:

-  human error (say, leaving both doors of a torpedo tube open during Nanggala's known
   torpedo drill)

 or

-  a equipment failure brought on by a command decision to send to sea an overly 
   old submarine (with unreliable electrics? maybe with pressure hull metal fatigue?).  

For other possible human error and/or equipment failure causes see Submarine Matters' article Likely CAUSES of Indonesian Submarine Nanggala's Sinking of April 22. 2021.

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Map shows KRI Nanggala's resting place in familiar training/testing waters only 300km east of its Surabaya (home) Naval Base. (Map courtesy The Sun).
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INTERNAL WAVE CAUSE?

Human Error?

KRI Nanggala was training in familiar waters not far from its Surabaya Home Naval Base see “KRI Nanggala-402 at their [TNI-AL 2nd Fleet/Eastern Fleet Command] base in Surabaya, East Java”. It could be the officer/crewman in charge of constant buoyancy corrections, in response to changing sea conditions (like internal waves) may have not have been as efficient or aware of local sea conditions as normally expected. ie: human error?

An internal wave sink rate of 10m/minute does not sound fatal for an efficient submarine crew response. 

Also a submarine commander might be expected to avoid sea areas/conditions known to build up to such waves. 

But:

An archived US Navy report, while revealing submarine commanders awareness internal waves risks since 1966 also points to the greater dangers of internal waves in a submarine without electrical power. See page 13 of the archived US Navy report:

"As a submarine is nearly neutrally buoyant, its total average density is about 1 gm/cm. The buoyant force (positive or negative) exerted on a vessel as a result of a 5 [degree] C temperature change would thus be about 1 dyne/cm, giving the vessel an acceleration of approximately 1 cm/sec, neglecting drag. A submarine under way could easily correct for the effect; however, this slight acceleration could cause serious problems for a submarine without power [as the Indonesian Navy theorised about Nanggala. Still it would be a command error to send such an old submarine, with old unreliable electrics, to sea.] [or] hovering, or moving at very slow speeds. 

Under these conditions it would not be possible to trim the vessel by the diving planes alone. It would be necessary to blow ballast, a difficult process during power failure and undesirable during quiet running. If the vessel were more compressible than sea water, the acceleration would be accentuated as the vessel's density responded to changes in hydrostatic pressure. Vertical displacement could thus reach serious proportions unless promptly controlled. As the vessel reached thermal equilibrium with its new environment, its buoyancy would change in the direction tending to restore the original position and would thus have a damping effect on the influence of the internal wave. 

The other possibility is that the submarine might be caught in a strong vertical current. If this current were caused by an underwater disturbance such as an explosion, landslide, or volcanic activity, it might be expected to reach serious proportions. It is also known that unusual internal wave phenomena occur at the edges of strong currents such as the Gulf Stream and Kuroshio and also in certain straits such as Gibraltar and Malacca. However, an ordinary internal wave moves at such a slow speed and has such a large ratio of wavelength to amplitude that the vertical motion of any region of water within the wave is of extremely low velocity; it would be well within the capability of a submarine commander to correct for any depth change caused by this slight motion. Again, it would be necessary to compensate for any buoyancy change brought about by changes in position and pressure.”

Near Missile Launch Disaster on Russian Frigate

 

The video here and above shows the potentially disastrous failed trial of a Kalibr-NK (export Club-N) cruise missile designed for ship launch. The launch was from Russian frigate/destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov late April 2021.

That attempted launch of the missile was extremely dangerous for the ship's crew. This is because the missile could have immediately cork-screwed back onto the ship - rather than starting to corkscrew 1.5 seconds after launch and falling into the sea dangerously close by. 

Of the Kalibr's short trajectory, there may be at least three possibilities:
1.  the Russian Navy may have had no automatic safety system that would destroy such an erratically flying missile, or
2.  10 seconds into the video the missile appears to break into two (the rocket booster has accidentally, or by electronic signal, been separated from the Main Body (jet stage and non-explosive dummy warhead) or
3.  the missile remained so close to the ship that a ship's officer intentionally triggering the missile's destruction could have damaged or disabled the ship.

Even without an explosive Kalibr warhead the kinetic energy +  unspent jet/rocket fuel in the missile booster could have set Marshal Shaposhnikov ablaze.

Warships hulls are more likely to burn (giving off poisonous fumes) these days due to increasing use of lighter, often stronger, plastic/composites, rather than non-burnable steel.

"White Hat" sitemeter "sigint" - Neptune Spear

My STATCOUNTER sitemeter provided very crude, but effective, “sigint" (aka Cyber Intelligence) before April 2011, when:

-  Google displayed actual keywords used by "Northern Hemisphere" countries, intelligence agencies and nuclear weapons establishments (eg. Iran nuclear) searching my blog, and

-  with these "Northern Hemisphere" entities not disguising their organizational IP addresses, which in turn revealed their organization's name up until April 2011, 2 weeks before this (further details below).

-  Meanwhile Southern Hemisphere entities were/are always more anonymous and careful.

-  Since 2011 all agencies everywhere (except some navies and defense departments) are much more careful not to too openly link IP addresses with actual organizational names, when they're searching. 

OPERATION NEPTUNE SPEAR (double tapping just before 2am May 2, 2011 Pakistan time) 

In mid April 2011, based on my interpretation of Obama’s then weakness in the national security "polls" and his April 2011 statements on foreign policy, I began to discuss, with my neighbour in rural NSW, the likelihood that Obama would organise a major counter-terrorism stunt to boost Obama's national security credibility. 

On April 23 my Statcounter sitementer picked up a visit to my website (gentleseas) from a US agency (name in clear). Why, I don't know, because the agency wasn't pursuing a keyword search.

My birthday just happens to fall towards the end of April and my Mum’s on May 2. So I drove 800km to Canberra on April 28, 2011. In retrospect this worried some authorities because Canberra (being Australia’s capital city) hosts a Pakistani High Commission and large press corps.

My and Mum’s joint birthday having been celebrated on May 1, 2011, I began to drive back home early morning May 2, 2011 (Australian Eastern time) which just happened to coincide with (the reported about 6 hours later) date/time of Neptune Spear (killing of Osama/Usama bib Laden (UBL) at 2am  May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan time). 

As I drove through Manuka, Canberra I stopped across a vacant carpark - empty as it was early morning, 8am pre-business hours Canberra time, 2am May 2, 2011 Abbottabad time, to change my compact disk player disks. 

by which time the boys from Seal Team 6 had just double tapped UBL's head and were helicopting out as bemused Pakistani crowds looked on 

Some guy, for no apparent reason, pulled 2 meters behind me ACROSS the lines of an empty carpark, in a white one tonner (a type of Aussie car) with a small dark grey metal concrete mixer in the tray.

The guy, looking distinctly Polish American, from his good living facial shape and light suntan, spoke into a corded car phone seemingly back to base for further instructions. Turned out later he was senior bureau - main job (with a broader team) to stop me from approaching Paki diplomats/defense attaches/ISI with a quietly documented story (gathered from unsuspecting sources) that the US had known since 2008 precisely where UBL was.

Aforementioned guy in one tonner seemed satisfied with the instructions from his Embassy (the Abbottabad Team by then had helicopted out with UBL's body). 

So when I drove off to the backblocks of New South Wales the guy no longer tailed me.