September 3, 2020

Thailand's Postponement For Show, Buying Submarines 2 & 3

Thailand's Army dominated government always needs to keep its junior Thai Navy partner happy. Interservice coalition maintenance is expressed in various ways including buying high priced armaments for the Navy - a carrier in the 1990s and 3 submarines agreed in 2017.

High priced armaments are there for a service's strategic need, pride/morale, professionalism, allegation of "graft", and post-government career jobs (the last in Australia in spades...).

From 1992-1997 Thailand bought an aircraft carrier (the Chakri Naruebet ) from Spain. A carrier that Thailand couldn't afford (no fixed air-wing maintained for long), couldn't regularly justify and has never been able to permanently crew. Good for fleet reviews perhaps.

Thailand has been in a medium sized submarine acquisition for the Navy process since 2015. This is despite its most valuable territorial waters (the Gulf of Thailand with its approaches to the capital Bangkok) being too shallow for medium sized submarine operations.  

In 2015-2017 Thailand purchased its first Chinese Yuan S26T submarine (for delivery by 2023 or so). There was Thai public opposition then over the cost and need for the first submarine. It was bought at a discount price from China which leaves Thailand obligated to China, to an extent. 

Thailand's Government has now tentatively floated (in 2020) the idea of 2 more of the submarines from China - a 3 submarine deal really already made and costed with China in 2017. This again faces public opposition over the high cost (in 2020 particularly over "money could be better spent on anti-Covid measures"). 

But as the deal has already been made with China the Thai government's postponment in finalising purchase of submarines 2 and 3 is more for show to keep the Thai public happy than concrete. 

Time will tell.

6 comments:

retortPouch said...

It's not so much a bone from the RTA as a bonehead atop the RTN.

Adm. Rutdit is known as a bit of a China shill, which in itself is fine; Thailand in recent years has been pretty keen on increasing Chinese influence in Indochina as a counter to Vietnam (memories of the raging war c. 75-91; I also submit that Singapore's oversized armoured forces were geared towards halting a Vietnamese armoured invasion in Cambodia). But under his watch, the S26 acquisition programme, which has been on the cards for several years, has killed off funding for 1) a new locally built OPV 2) new locally built Daegu/super-Daegu frigates 3) MPA procurement, and possibly a few others. This has left 3 glaring capability gaps in the RTN in favour of 1 import programme which didn't even materialise.

Luckily, he's going to be replaced soon and may well retire in ignominy.

Pete said...

Hi retortPouch

Do you have any links to support any of your claims. eg. happenings in this "c. 75-91" presumably not B.C.?

Cheers

Pete

retortPouch said...

None for Thai services. But as for Cambodia, it was part of the long running series of wars in Indochina which only truly cooled down after the UN intervention and Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in the 90s. You may want to refer to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia from 79-89 as a starting point, to better understand the fault lines in the region. Domino theory did not materialise only because of sustained deterrence, diplomacy and active combat in Indochina through the Cold War period by ASEAN member states.

Pete said...

Thanks retortPouch

And here's some links.

The Thais would have been more than aware of a threat from Vietnam and possible communist domino effects all over Indo-China, communists in Malayan Emergency https://academic.oup.com/tcbh/article-abstract/4/3/302/1697155?redirectedFrom=PDF and Indonesian PKI and Sukarno influence. Also Muslims still in southern Thailand and occasional/recent instabilities on Myanmar and Cambodian would worry the Thais.

Special mention US air and sigint bases in Thailand during the Vietnam War years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Force_in_Thailand

and the

The Vietnamese tank invasion of "Kampuchea" December 1978 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian%E2%80%93Vietnamese_War "would Viet forces keep going west?" must have been a big worry for Thailand.

But a communist superpower now with money changes the goalposts! If the US criticizes Thailand's style of democracy and the US supplies neither investment nor discount weapons then its logical Thailand shops at nearby China instead.

The Thai Navy, under Admiral Luechai Ruddit, in addition to buying Chinese submarines is buying a 22,000 ton Type 071E Amphibious Warfare Ship (delivery 2022) from China as well. see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_in_Royal_Thai_Navy#Future_equipment

Regards

Pete

retortPouch said...

Yes, I would agree; ultimately the point of these Chinese purchases (from the land domain e.g. VT4 tanks, to the new RTN MC's ZTD-05, and now indications that it is considering the FK-3 as a naval AAW missile) is as a presumptive hedge against Vietnamese regional ambitions. On the other hand, they have also been hedging the other way, e.g. upcoming purchase of Strikers and Javelins to integrate with US forces. We draw the principal lesson that ASEAN is by no means united yet it is precisely this disunity that drives the member states together to keep the peace; it is important not to mistake such a cow for a horse. Both the West and the Chinese will do well to remember that the ASEAN nations have a long and largely successful history of pursuing independent foreign policy goals in this backyard of superpowers.

Pete said...

Hi retortPouch

Indeed its best for most ASEAN members to hedge, remain non-aligned in terms of letting in investment, infrastructure projects and in weapons' buying.

This is especially for continental ASEAN members, all of whom except Vietnam not having much military capability. Chinese contiguous land forces could move fast, with little obstruction, if provoked.

Tiny in land area, Singapore, being surrounded by relatively large Malay-Muslim countries has different needs. Hence Singapores outsized military, need for Western allies/training areas, and affinity to Israel's situation (in many ways).

Philippines HAD a big moat around it, WAS dominated by US post WWII naval and air power, but now China's naval-air is equalising the balance.

Indonesia, much water, many people and resources for growth to one day be a sizable regional power.

That strange non-ASEAN land and US ally, defying usual catagorization, being just to the south of Indonesia...

Agrarian Latino-like-leftist East Timor has some potential to be a China naval-air station "Cuba of South Sea" potential. No tinpot rightwing "Batista" like dictator - to eventually ignite revolution - wanted https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulgencio_Batista

Cheers

Pete